Dominion SILV hack: $3 million of silver tokens sold for $238,000.

01 · The loan that closed after midnight

A new wallet, and a price that would not hold

At 00:23 UTC on 11 September, a Solana wallet paid off a loan. It had borrowed dollars on Loopscale, a lending market, against a stack of SILV tokens. In one transaction it pulled the tokens back out, sold them and cleared the debt. People close loans like that every day.

Six minutes later the same wallet did it again. This time the freed tokens went to an address that had never made a transaction, and about 10 minutes after that the new address started selling. SILV had spent the evening at about $63. By 01:00 UTC it was changing hands for less than half of that.

SILV comes from Dominion, a company that sells silver as a crypto token and says each one is a troy ounce of physical silver in a vault. The wallet with the loan was one of the five signers on Dominion's treasury.

What followed was a multisig compromise. The treasury moved only when three of its five keys agreed, and whoever was behind this held three. Bitquery indexes every transfer and trade on Solana, so we rebuilt the night from the ledger, reading every approval, swap and bridge deposit and checking each figure a second way. The ledger shows how the treasury was emptied, what the tokens fetched, a fight over the keys, and a second visit hours after the team took them back. The stolen wallets were still exposed when we finished, so balances here are a snapshot taken at 15:36 UTC.

02 · What SILV is

A silver token with a treasury and two sets of keys

Dominion launched SILV on Solana in August, and most of the supply was minted between 13 and 16 August. The token's own metadata says it is "backed one to one by physical silver", with each token standing for one troy ounce "held in allocated, audited vault storage". On DEXes it traded close to the price Dominion's program charged for a new token, about $63 on the evening of 10 September.

Dominion's own program kept it there. It mints new SILV for anyone who pays USDC at the silver price plus a fee, and buys SILV back for USDC at close to the same price. When the DEX price drifts, traders mint or redeem and pocket the gap, and the price comes back into line.

The company also kept a large stock of SILV in a treasury vault. On the night of the hack that vault held 45% of all the SILV there was.

Two Squads multisigs sat on top of all this. A multisig is a wallet that moves only when enough of its keys sign. The first controlled the treasury and the switches that turn minting and redemptions on and off. The second held three powers over the token itself. Through a Token-2022 feature called a permanent delegate it could move SILV out of any holder's account. It could also freeze any account, and replace the code of Dominion's mint program. Both multisigs needed three signatures out of five, and both had the same five signers.

03 · Three keys that signed as one

What the signing record shows

A multisig with five signers and a threshold of three is built to survive the loss of two keys. That only works if the keys live in different places.

The signing record suggests three of these did not. From 26 August, every payment out of the treasury was started, approved and executed by the same three keys, each inside a minute. Four days earlier the rhythm was different. Another signer started two treasury transactions, and the approvals needed to pass them came 101 minutes and 25 minutes later.

The three keys also rolled the create, propose and approve steps into a single transaction, the way software wallets and scripts sign. One of the two signers the attacker never held signed each step on its own, seconds apart, which is how signing on a hardware wallet usually looks. Where the keys were stored is not on the chain. For two weeks before the hack, though, three of them acted as a unit, which fits keys kept together and within reach of a single break-in.

04 · Paying off the loans

The first hour, and 11 wallets

The attack began with debt. Several of the stolen wallets had borrowed USDC on Loopscale with SILV as collateral, and collateral stays locked until the loan is repaid. So the attacker repaid the loans, in the biggest case by selling part of the SILV inside the same transaction, and kept the rest.

Within an hour, SILV collateral had come out of loans in four wallets. Clearing the first wallet's loans alone meant handing more than $81,000 back to lenders.

SOL was being swept out at the same time. Ten wallets were emptied down to exactly 890,880 lamports each, about 9 cents, and every sweep went to the attacker's first wallet. The same odd leftover every time looks like one script working through a list of keys.

Leaving out its own two new wallets, the attacker signed for at least 11. The oldest first moved in February 2024 and the newest in June 2026. Four were created within 25 minutes of each other on 26 February 2026, and one of those four was sent 1,500 SILV straight from Dominion's treasury in August. Any of them can be traced the same way through the Bitquery MCP.

05 · One proposal

The treasury, in two minutes

The treasury was guarded by the same three keys, so nothing had to be broken to reach it. At 01:48 UTC one of them created proposal 45, a plain transfer of every SILV in the vault. A second key approved it about a minute later and a third 49 seconds after that. It executed 8 seconds later.

Half an hour later the attacker used the same three keys again, this time to take 5 SOL out of each multisig's vault. One of those vaults belonged to the multisig with power over the token itself.

06 · Silver sold for pennies

Half the supply, into pools built for a quiet market

Selling that much SILV at once was never going to fetch the silver price. The pools were sized for everyday trading, and each sale pushed the price down for the next.

The attacker sold anyway, in dozens of swaps a few seconds apart. Its second wallet got rid of about 43,100 SILV that night, the treasury's tokens among them, at an average of $3.34.

Six minutes after the treasury drain, a wallet with no transfers to or from any attacker wallet opened a new SILV pool. The attacker sold into it, and one trade there printed the lowest price of the day, 2,457 SILV for 8.39 SOL.

Dominion's program was still buying SILV back at the silver price, so traders bought cheap tokens on DEXes and redeemed each one for about $63 of USDC. The window stayed open until the team switched redemptions off, and it cost the reserve little.

No new SILV was minted after 00:06 UTC, and neither the permanent delegate nor the freeze power was used that night. The chart shows 5-minute medians of every SILV trade over $10 on Solana, from Bitquery's Solana DEX data.

07 · The fight for the keys

Two sides, signing with the same keys

At 03:42 UTC one of the stolen keys proposed adding a sixth signer to the second multisig, the one with power over the token. The new key had never been used, and the three stolen keys passed the change a minute later. Nobody has ever signed with that key, and the team removed it less than two hours later, so it was almost certainly the attacker's.

About a minute after that change went through, the team made its first move on-chain. One of the clean signers started a proposal to switch off redemptions.

Within a minute, a stolen key filed a proposal to remove one clean signer and tried to remove the other. The second attempt failed because the key had run out of SOL to pay rent. Another stolen key sent it 0.02 SOL 36 seconds later, and the proposal went in on the next try. If both removals had passed, every signer left would have been a key the attacker held.

Less than a minute after filing that proposal, the same stolen key signed the team's proposal to switch off redemptions. It signed the one that switched off minting 8 minutes later. Only one clean key signed either of them, so the other two signatures came from stolen keys, and the simplest reading is that the team held copies of those keys too. Until the rotation was done, both sides could sign with the same keys.

The closest call came at 05:24 UTC. One stolen key gave the vote to remove a clean signer its second approval, one short of passing. The same key had created the team's rescue proposal 30 seconds earlier. The chain cannot tell us whether that was the attacker racing the team or a misclick in the Squads app. Less than 3 minutes later the rescue proposal passed, and under Squads rules a change of members voids every proposal filed before it.

By 06:19 UTC the stolen keys were gone from both multisigs. Two new keys took their place, and neither was made after the hack. One first appeared on the evening of 10 September. The other has been active since September 2025.

It could have gone further. For 5 hours after the attack began, the attacker held enough keys to pass anything on the multisig that can move any holder's SILV and rewrite the mint program. Beyond adding a signer and filing votes against the team, it used that power once, to take 5 SOL.

08 · Where the money went

Two trips through Chainflip

The attacker sold almost everything for SOL. The SILV sold to clear loans went for USDC, and nearly all of those dollars went to the lenders.

Twice before 02:10 UTC, the first attacker wallet sent SOL to a hop wallet, which passed it into Chainflip, a network that swaps coins across chains, with a request for ether in return. We decoded both swap instructions. They name the same Ethereum address, and Chainflip's vault paid it 9.25 ETH.

That wallet has received and sent ether since May 2026, and it took two Chainflip payouts on its first day, 16 May. Its last outgoing transaction was on the evening of 10 September, under two hours before the attack began, and the 9.25 ETH has not moved. For anyone chasing the money, that older history is the best lead in the case. The attacker behind the Aquifer hack also left its haul sitting on Ethereum.

The rest of the SOL sat still until 13:45 UTC. Then the attacker moved all of it. The first wallet sent about 1,900 SOL to a new address, which passed it into Chainflip in 5 chunks, most of about 400 SOL. Each chunk went to a one-time deposit address that Chainflip's own agent key emptied within minutes, the same key that collected the first overnight deposit. The second wallet sent 249 SOL through a hop wallet in a direct swap to a different Ethereum address.

Chainflip paid that address 9.83 ETH. The address already held about 214 ETH and has taken ether from several sources since August. Whether it belongs to the attacker or to a service the attacker paid, the chain alone does not say. Where the deposit-address swaps paid out lives on Chainflip's own chain. By 15:36 UTC all but a fraction of one SOL of the attacker's haul had gone through Chainflip. The whole trail can be followed with the Bitquery MCP.

Look-alike addresses sent the attacker's wallets dust within a minute of several of these moves, the setup for address poisoning.

09 · Back at 10:51

Rotating the signers left the wallets exposed

Dominion's update on X said the team had full control again. For the multisigs, that was true. The stolen wallets were a different matter, because a wallet with one key cannot be rotated and anyone holding a copy of the key keeps it.

At 10:34 UTC, one of the keys the team had removed from the multisigs that morning sent 0.03 SOL to another stolen wallet, enough to pay fees. That wallet repaid its Loopscale loan 17 minutes later, withdrew 279.95 SILV of collateral and sent it to the attacker's second wallet. About a minute and a half after that, the SILV was sold for 74.61 SOL.

Any position still held by one of the 11 wallets is exposed the same way. The safe assumption is that all of them are burned.

10 · The freeze

Dominion uses the token's own powers

At 13:37 UTC Dominion's authority multisig began freezing SILV accounts, using the power that sat idle through the attack. The three keys that approved it are the new and clean signers the team now holds. A first wave froze about 1,800 accounts in under three minutes. A second wave, about half an hour later, froze about 1,000 more. Among them were the SILV vaults of the two biggest pools, and trading in both stopped within a second.

A third of all SILV now sits in frozen accounts, and all but a handful of them belong to wallets that received SILV after the attack began. The freeze did not reach every such wallet. About 490 others that also got SILV after the attack began still held about 29,900 SILV, and 60 more transactions sat in batches the team had already approved. The frozen accounts can be listed with token holder data.

At 14:58 the multisig used the permanent delegate for the first time. It thawed one frozen account and moved one millionth of a SILV out of it into Dominion's treasury, the smallest amount the token can move, then left the account unfrozen. The same power reaches every frozen account. What Dominion plans to do with it is not on the chain.

11 · What the team said, and what the chain shows

Dominion's update, line by line

Dominion posted an update on X, signed by its founder, after the attack. Most of it is about next steps. The lines that describe what happened and when can be checked against the chain.

A team fighting an attacker in the middle of the night can get a time wrong, and nothing here says anything about intent.

12 · What the chain cannot tell us

The limits of the record

How the keys were taken is not on any chain, and neither is whether the person using them sat inside the company or outside it. We say attacker for whoever held the stolen keys. As with the LootBot drain, the ledger shows keys being used and says nothing about where they leaked from.

We cannot say who clicked the approval at 05:24 UTC. Nor can we prove who owns every side wallet. One was funded straight from Dominion's treasury, and three more were created within 25 minutes of it, which links them without proving who controls them.

Nor can it tell us what Dominion will do with the frozen tokens. The permanent delegate has moved one millionth of a SILV so far. If it moves more, the chain will show where it goes.

13 · Method

How we checked it

We rebuilt the attack from raw Solana transactions and checked every figure a second way before using it.

14 · The record

Addresses and transactions behind the story

Every address below can be followed onward with the Bitquery MCP.