On-chain investigationEthereum · Kraken · Crypto.com · OKX1–5 November 2026

$126.0M left accounts at three exchanges in 28 hours. 30% of it still sits on Ethereum, in wallets anyone can watch

The bank says attackers wired money out of its own account before it became crypto. We followed $126.0M from three exchanges into 526 wallets to see where it went, and how much can still be stopped.

At a glance
On 1 and 2 November, $126.04M in USDC left accounts at Kraken, Crypto.com and OKX for 17 wallets. Crédit Mutuel Arkéa, the French bank ZachXBT named, has confirmed a cyberattack. It says the attackers used its own account to wire money to other banks, and Paris prosecutors have opened an inquiry. Twelve of the wallets had taken payouts from the same exchanges before, two of them since May. Within hours, half of the money was swapped into ETH. At 08:47 UTC on 5 November, $37.26M still sat on Ethereum in addresses tied to the thief. Tether has frozen 1.14M USDT of it, but not another 0.54M USDT. Circle has frozen none of the 1.71M USDC that is left.
$126.0M
Withdrawn from three exchanges in 28 hours
$37.3M
Still on Ethereum, 08:47 UTC 5 Nov
12 of 17
Paid wallets that were already in use
$1.1M
USDT frozen by Tether, the only on-chain freeze so far
Key findingsEach line has its own share link
  1. $126.0M

    Left accounts at Kraken, Crypto.com and OKX in USDC for 17 wallets on 1 and 2 November, more than the $106M first reported.

  2. 12 of 17

    Wallets had taken payouts from the same exchanges before the theft, two of them since May, which fits accounts set up in advance.

  3. $37.3M

    Still sat on Ethereum in addresses tied to the thief at 08:47 UTC on 5 November, mostly as ETH.

  4. $36.09M

    Left through LI.FI, a bridge and swap router, the biggest single route out. $11.1M of it went after Wednesday morning.

  5. $1.1M

    Of USDT frozen by Tether at 23:10 UTC on 2 November, the first freeze. Circle has frozen none of the 1.71M USDC the thief holds.

  6. $17.2M

    Paid by Kraken to two more wallets between 15:46 and 16:30 UTC on Monday, found on 5 November. A thief wallet and their branch paid the same fresh wallet less than a minute apart.

01 · What happenedWhat happened in the $106M crypto theft

On Sunday, 1 November, more than $100 million left accounts at three crypto exchanges. More followed on Monday. Kraken, Crypto.com and OKX paid it all out as USDC, a digital dollar, over about 28 hours. Most of it went first to wallets those exchanges had paid before. Within minutes, it moved on to new ones nobody had seen before.

On Monday, a post by Officer's Notes said the on-chain sleuth ZachXBT had flagged a suspected theft of more than $106 million from an EU entity. The post listed 11 addresses. It said the thief was swapping USDC for ETH and sending money through instant exchanges. Some of it was turned into Monero, a privacy coin. A graph from the analytics firm TRM went with it.

On Tuesday, ZachXBT raised his count to more than $133 million. He said he had found another $27 million in exchange withdrawals, some made after his first post. He later named the victim as Crédit Mutuel Arkéa, a French bank.

On Wednesday, the French reporter Grégory Raymond said the money came from Fortuneo, the group's online bank. In his account, fraudsters had opened exchange accounts under false names, and the bank's transfers paid into them.

The same day the bank confirmed a cyberattack, and said the attackers got in through the platform of one of its suppliers, which it did not name. They used the bank's own account to send transfers to other banks, and the money was then turned into crypto. The bank said no entry was made through Fortuneo and that no customer lost money. It put the amount at about €100 million, a first estimate, and is trying to recover it. It did not confirm the $133 million figure, though AFP reported that the bank accepted the order of magnitude. The Paris prosecutor's office opened an inquiry the same day, and France's anti-cybercrime police are investigating.

Bitquery records every transfer on Ethereum, so we followed the money from those 11 addresses, and back to where it came from. We count $126.04M withdrawn to 17 wallets, six more than the list named. We found two of them only on 5 November. Kraken paid them $17.2M on Monday afternoon, after the first post went up, and ZachXBT said some of the withdrawals he added came after it. Part of that money reached the thief's wallets two and three steps later. Our total is about $7M short of ZachXBT's and above the bank's first estimate, about $113M at AFP's exchange rate. We cannot yet explain either gap. We found no other exchange payments into the thief's wallets on Ethereum. On Thursday morning, $37.26M still sat in addresses we tie to the thief, mostly as ETH. Tether has frozen $1.1M of it.

02 · The setupHow the money got out of the exchanges

The exchanges paid 17 wallets. Twelve of them had been paid by the same exchanges before, two of them since May. They got 79% of the money. Whoever moved it on had the keys to those wallets.

From exchange accounts to the thief's walletsKraken, Crypto.com and OKX to 526 addresses
HOW THE MONEY MOVED, 1–5 NOVEMBERExchange accountsKraken, Crypto.com, OKX$126.04M in USDC12 known walletspaid by the same exchangesbefore the theft5 new walletsno history beforetheir payoutsFresh walletsmoney moved on in about 5 min(median)Swapped into ETH27,553 ETH via UniswapXSwapped into DAIa stablecoin no onecan freezeOut: $95.80Mexchange deposits, bridges,instant exchangesStill with the thief at 08:47 UTC, 5 November: $37.26M8,926 ETH, 12.27M DAI, 1.71M USDC and 1.68M USDT, spread over 526 wallets
Most payments went to addresses the exchanges had paid before. Within minutes the money moved on to new ones with no history.

The other five had no history before their payouts. They took $26.00M. The very first payments from OKX and from Kraken both went to new wallets.

The payout sizes point to many accounts. Eight wallets got close to $10M each from Kraken, two of them in a single payment with odd cents. That fits an account being emptied in one go. Other wallets got long runs of smaller payments, each kept under its own cap. Different caps suggest different accounts.

From there the money split three ways. Half was swapped into ETH within hours, some became DAI, a stablecoin with no freeze button, and the rest left through exchange deposits, bridges to other chains, instant swap services and unnamed wallets.

03 · The daysTwenty-eight hours of withdrawals

The first withdrawal left OKX at 12:25 UTC on Sunday. Kraken followed 44 minutes later and ended up paying 95% of the total. Withdrawals built up through the afternoon and peaked in the evening. In the three hours to 23:00 UTC, $73.2M left. By 23:10 UTC, 84% was gone. Overnight another $2.6M went out, nearly all of it to one wallet, 0xd3c1…a7c1. Then the payouts stopped on Monday morning.

Six and a half hours later they started again. Between 15:46 and 16:30 UTC on Monday, Kraken paid $17.2M to two more wallets, in nine payments. That was the last of it. Raymond's sources describe the scheme running for several days, which may be true of the bank transfers that the chain cannot see. The crypto withdrawals took 28 hours, across Sunday and Monday.

Most of the money left in one eveningpayouts to the 17 addresses, Sunday and Monday
USDC WITHDRAWN EACH HOUR (BARS) AND THE RUNNING TOTAL (LINE), UTCWithdrawn in the hourRunning total$0M$10M$20M$30M$0M$35M$70M$105M$140M12:001 Nov15:0018:0021:0000:002 Nov03:0006:0009:0012:0015:0023:10 · 84% gone15:46 Mon · two more wallets
By 23:10 UTC on Sunday, 84% of the money was gone. Two more wallets took $17.2M later on Monday. The last payment came at 16:30 UTC on 2 November.

The money did not sit still. The median wait before the USDC moved on to a fresh wallet was 5 minutes, and all but three of the wallets that got large payments passed them on within 15 minutes. One new wallet took 43 Kraken withdrawals in 91 minutes, each under $50k. That looks like an account with a cap on each withdrawal.

04 · The walletsMost of the wallets had been used before

Twelve of the 17 have a history. The oldest, 0x730b…3992, took its first Kraken withdrawal on 4 May. It took 48 more before the theft and paid the money on to other addresses, often in round sums. Another, 0x90f0…c557, took $858k from Kraken in October and spent it within days.

They also paid each other before the theft. Three of them sent USDC to the oldest one over the summer. Two others paid the same outside addresses in October. One owner most likely ran them all.

Three of the 11 posted addresses were new on 1 November. The posted list also left out six addresses that took $45.25M between them. One of those, 0xe944…8cb9, does appear in TRM's graph.

Twelve of the wallets had a history17 addresses, May to November 2026
THE WALLETS THE EXCHANGES PAID · HOW LONG EACH HAD BEEN IN USE, AND WHAT IT GOTIn use before 1 NovNo history before its payoutMissing from the posted listMayJunJulAugSepOctNovReceived 1–2 Nov$0M$5M$10M0x730b…3992$9.58M0x12d9…51db$9.59M0xadd9…dd58$9.81M0x29e9…1020$9.79M0x99d3…400f$5.25M0x378b…57d5$9.60M0x795a…2621$9.63M0xe944…8cb9$9.67M0x8a97…c6b0$5.37M0x90f0…c557$5.50M0x5cf7…abc1$8.52M0xd3c1…a7c1$7.74M0xd010…a16a$605k0x5a15…2ff7$9.33M0xa109…7224$1.99M0x3e6c…40f2$5.34M0xe378…a6b2$8.73M
Each line starts at the wallet's first withdrawal from the same exchange. Addresses in red were missing from the posted list.

Both sides used the same kind of wallet. Of the 17, 9 are Trust Wallet smart accounts, set up to pay their network fees in USDC, and so are 22 of the thief's addresses. Millions of people use Trust Wallet, and nothing here points to a flaw in the app. The shared setup fits one group running both the wallets that took the withdrawals and the ones that moved the money on.

We missed two of the wallets until 5 November. Their money took a longer path. The first, 0x5cf7…abc1, had taken four small Kraken payouts in October. It took $8.52M in five payouts within four minutes on Monday, and sent $5.12M on within a minute of the last. Two hours later, $1M of it reached 0x94dc…06f0, an older wallet that had moved money to the thief since the first day. The second, 0xe378…a6b2, uses the same Trust Wallet setup. Most of its $8.73M went through more wallets, and part of it was swapped into ETH. On Wednesday some of that ETH landed in a fresh wallet less than a minute after a thief wallet paid it. Paying a wallet that new, that fast, points to the same owner. The two also paid the same new wallet about $3.4M each, half an hour apart, and on Tuesday their money met in a single wallet. One owner most likely ran the pair.

Our first reading was a break-in at the victim's own exchange accounts. The bank's account points elsewhere. It says the attackers came in through a supplier and wired money from the bank's own account to other banks.

If so, the exchange accounts and the wallets belonged to the attackers from the start, and the earlier use was part of the setup. Kraken and Crypto.com told Cointelegraph that their platforms remained secure.

We also looked at every address the 17 wallets dealt with before the theft, and matched them against every wallet the thief used later. None of the thief's addresses had dealt with the 17 directly. One outside address was paid by both groups in October. But it has about 170 other senders. So the link is weak.

05 · The victimWho lost the money

Crédit Mutuel Arkéa has now confirmed the attack and given a first estimate of about €100 million. It says the money came out of its own account and that customers lost nothing. It also says no entry was made through Fortuneo. None of the 17 wallets appears in our address labels, and none has an ENS name or a public post tying it to a company.

The bank's side of the theft was bank transfers, so it leaves no trace on Ethereum. The chain shows the other side. The wallets' owners used Kraken from May and Crypto.com from October, while the one wallet OKX paid was new that day. Between 20 October and 1 November, two of the wallets also paid deposit addresses of a service that TRM's graph tags as Kyrrex, a European exchange. The wallets swapped tokens on-chain and paid dozens of other addresses, often in round sums.

These do not look like a bank's wallets. In the bank's account the money left as bank transfers and became crypto later, so the wallets were most likely never its own. Kraken, which paid 187 of the withdrawals, can say who opened the accounts and with what papers.

06 · The swapInto ETH before anyone could freeze it

Circle, the company behind USDC, can freeze the coins at any address. ETH has no such switch. So the thief's first job was to swap.

Just before midnight UTC, a fresh wallet started selling stablecoins through UniswapX. That is an auction where market makers, the trading firms that quote prices, compete to fill your trade. A large order gets done fast and near the market price. Within about four hours it had sold $62.98M of USDC and USDT for 27,553 ETH, about $2,286 each.

27,553 ETH in four hours23:44 UTC Sunday to 04:02 UTC Monday
ETH THE SWAP WALLET BOUGHT EACH HOUR (BARS) AND IN TOTAL (LINE), UTCETH bought in the hourRunning total04k ETH8k ETH12k ETH010k20k30k4,82223:0011,09300:002,94601:006,64602:001,83003:0021604:00
It paid $62.98M in USDC and USDT, about $2,286 per ETH.

Another branch of the theft swapped its USDC into DAI instead. Circle did not freeze any of the thief's USDC during the sale, or by our check on Thursday.

After the Binance hack last week, Tether and Circle froze more than $2 billion within hours. Here the swap ran for four hours with no freeze at all. We do not know whether anyone asked Circle to act.

07 · The money nowWhere the $126.0M is now

At our Thursday morning snapshot, $37.26M sat in addresses we tie to the thief. On Wednesday morning the same wallets held $50.4M; we reported $42.6M then, because we had not yet found the two Monday wallets. ETH rose about 4% in between, so the drop hides some of what the thief sent away. In all, $15.5M has left since Wednesday morning.

30% of the money had not left EthereumETH valued at $2,421
WHERE THE MONEY SAT AT 08:47 UTC, 5 NOVEMBER$0$20M$40M$60MStill held: ETH$21.6MStill held: DAI$12.3MStill held: USDC and USDT$3.4MExchange deposits$12.3MBridges$60.6MInstant exchanges$5.0MUnlabelled addresses$17.9M
Held ETH is valued at $2,421. Exits count money that left the thief's addresses, net of anything sent back.

On Monday afternoon the ETH sat in three big piles, and two of them had never sent anything, but since then the thief has broken them all up. On Thursday no wallet held more than 1,654 ETH. The thief has been adding to its DAI, which no issuer can freeze. Early on Thursday a fresh wallet swapped 2,478 ETH into 5.90M DAI in two bursts, and it now holds more DAI than any other. DAI now makes up 33% of what the thief holds.

A few wallets hold most of itby dollar value, ETH and stablecoins combined
THE 10 LARGEST STASHES AT 08:47 UTC, 5 NOVEMBER$0$5M$10M$15M$20M0xf19b…617a$5.9M 11 ETH + 5.90M DAI0xa3a9…ae0d$5.1M 1,654 ETH + 1.14M USDT, frozen0x2f5e…b904$4.1M 4.14M DAI0xb3a2…9762$3.8M 1,560 ETH0xc3dd…5d07$3.1M 1,295 ETH0x9179…a760$2.9M 1,180 ETH0x3f60…4382$2.6M 1,040 ETH0xdae8…e3ef$2.2M 2.23M DAI0x8a1a…bf89$1.9M 780 ETH0x18cd…1939$1.7M 1.70M USDC
The wallet whose USDT Tether froze holds the most ETH, 1,654 ETH.

The breakup began on Monday afternoon. One untouched wallet sent a test payment to a new address, then 1,956 ETH six minutes later. That evening the biggest pile was split across new wallets. Of that, 4,450 ETH landed in the wallet whose USDT Tether froze four minutes later. The thief also swapped 1.53M USDC into ETH and moved its DAI to a fresh wallet.

The thief sped up on Tuesday and kept going on Wednesday. Since our Wednesday morning snapshot, 95% of the money that left went through bridges. The last move we saw was at 08:43 UTC on Thursday.

The thief's addresses are already getting fake look-alike transfers from spammers, a trick known as address poisoning. Anyone can follow the stashes with the Bitquery MCP.

08 · The exitsHow money left the thief's hands

About $95.8M has left so far, net of anything that came back. Most of it went through bridges.

A bridge router and one deposit address took the mostto 08:47 UTC, 5 November
WHERE MONEY LEFT THE THIEF'S WALLETS · TOP 10, NET OF ANYTHING SENT BACKExchange depositBridgeInstant exchangeUnlabelled address$0$5M$10M$15M$20M$25M$30M$35M$40MLI.FI bridge (incl. Wagyu)$36.09MKuCoin deposit (TRM: Kyrrex)$8.14MLayerZero bridge (USDT)$5.78MUnlabelled 0x949e…dccc$5.73MRouter to USDT0 (USDT)$4.87MBridgers bridge$4.11MFixedFloat$4.01MNEAR Intents bridge$3.98MRango bridge$2.44MUnlabelled 0xda2e…2554$1.55M
Unlabelled wallets are shown by address. Several of them swap and pay out like over-the-counter desks.

LI.FI, a bridge and swap router, took $36.09M, more than any other route. Of that, $11.1M came after our Wednesday morning snapshot, nearly all of it as 4,330 ETH in 60 payments. Part of the earlier money went through one-time order wallets that TRM tags as Wagyu, a service that swaps crypto into Monero. The amounts match TRM's graph to the unit, but the Monero side is out of sight by design.

The biggest exchange exit is a KuCoin deposit address that took $8.14M and swept it into KuCoin's own wallet. The same address took money from about 175 other senders in a little over a day, and TRM's graph tags part of the flow as Kyrrex. So it is likely Kyrrex's pooled account at KuCoin, and some October payments from two of the wallets to Kyrrex ended up at the same address.

On Monday afternoon the thief opened another route. It swapped ETH for USDT and sent the USDT through LayerZero, a bridge to other chains. That route has now carried $5.78M, with $1.68M of it since Wednesday morning.

On Tuesday afternoon the thief found a faster route. In just over half an hour it swapped 1,286 ETH into USDT through a router that both swaps and bridges. Three times, seconds after a swap, the thief paid the USDT to the router, which passed it on to USDT0, the version of USDT that moves between chains over LayerZero. In all, 2.82M USDT went out this way. Unlike the batch Tether froze, this USDT spent less than a minute in the thief's wallets. Counting three payments on Sunday night and eight on Monday evening from the branch fed by the Monday wallets, the router has moved $4.87M of the thief's USDT off Ethereum.

Since Wednesday the thief has also tried two bridges it had not used before. deBridge took $419k. Early on Thursday, $194k of ETH went into Arbitrum's own bridge in small lots. We have not yet found where that money landed on Arbitrum.

FixedFloat, an instant exchange that needs no account, has taken $4.01M, most of it since Monday afternoon. WellWallet took $250k, and other exchanges, among them Bybit, MEXC, Bitget, BingX, BloFin and Gate.io, took $3.2M between them. Bridgers and NEAR Intents each took about as much as FixedFloat, and Rango less. Smaller sums went to other bridges, among them the MetaMask Bridge. Another $17.92M went to wallets that are not known services, or through swaps that paid them. Several of those swap and pay out like over-the-counter desks. We saw the same pattern in the $110M TRON laundering circuit.

09 · FreezeWhat can still be frozen

Most of what the thief holds cannot be frozen by an issuer. ETH has no issuer, and DAI has no freeze function.

Tether froze one batch of USDT. Circle has frozen nothingheld at 08:47 UTC, 5 November
WHAT THE THIEF HELD, BY ASSET · CAN ITS ISSUER FREEZE IT?$0$20M$40M$60METH$21.6M · no issuer freezeDAI$12.3M · no issuer freezeUSDC$1.7M · Circle can freeze itUSDT, frozen$1.1M · frozen by TetherUSDT$536k · Tether can freeze it
Tether can still freeze the other 0.54M USDT, and Circle the 1.71M USDC.

Tether made the first freeze. On Monday afternoon the thief swapped 500 ETH into 1.14M USDT and that evening moved it to a fresh wallet. Tether froze it at 23:10 UTC. Four minutes earlier the thief had sent 4,450 ETH to the same wallet. Tether cannot touch that ETH. On Thursday morning the thief moved 200 ETH out of that wallet and swapped it into 0.48M USDT elsewhere, and Tether has not frozen it. The bank says part of the stolen money has been blocked, without saying where.

Kraken now has a way to act as well. On Tuesday morning, 396 ETH arrived at a Kraken deposit address. It came from the wallet whose USDT Tether froze, through two fresh wallets. Three minutes later it was swept into a Kraken hot wallet. The deposit address has taken payments since last December, and every earlier payment out of it also went to Kraken's own wallets. So it belongs to an existing Kraken account. Kraken can see whose it is.

Raymond's sources say Kraken began to freeze funds on Monday night, and the fraudsters then moved to other platforms. The last Kraken payout we found came at 16:30 UTC on Monday, which fits a freeze that evening. Our 4 November update said the payouts had ended that morning, which was wrong: we had not yet found the two Monday wallets. We found no other exchange paying the thief after that last payout, so the chain does not show the move to other platforms. This Tuesday deposit is the only payment back into Kraken.

Circle has still frozen nothing. On Wednesday morning the thief held 5.16M USDC, two thirds of it in the branch fed by the Monday wallets. Later that morning the thief swapped 3.15M USDC of it into ETH and sent 0.60M USDC through LI.FI. On Thursday, 1.71M USDC was left, nearly all of it in one wallet. Kraken, KuCoin and Kyrrex can say whose accounts their deposit addresses credited, and FixedFloat, WellWallet, Bybit, MEXC, Bitget, BingX, BloFin and Gate.io can see who sent them money.

A 0.13 ETH payout from WellWallet gave the swap wallet its first ETH for network fees, so WellWallet can also see who ordered that payout. One wallet, 0x94dc…06f0, is older than the rest. It moved $4.75 million into the thief's addresses in the first two days, and it has made small payments since December 2025, among them one in May to a Revolut deposit address. Revolut can tell who owns that address. On Tuesday afternoon the older wallet swapped its last $824k of USDC into ETH, out of Circle's reach. Our investigation team can take a case like this further.

10 · LessonsWhat this means for banks and exchanges

The bank says the attackers came in through a supplier's platform and sent the money out of its own account. The crypto came last. Raymond's sources add that each transfer named the exchange account holder exactly. That passes the usual name check, even when the holder is a fake.

From the outside, the cash-out had a clear shape. Seven of the eight wallets that took close to $10 million that evening had taken smaller Kraken payouts before. The oldest went back to May. Each passed the money on within minutes. An exchange can flag that pattern before the coins leave. Issuers can freeze stablecoins in the first hours, before the swap. Someone has to ask in time. Three days after the theft, 5.16M USDC was still within Circle's reach.

11 · GapsWhat we could not see

We cannot see the bank transfers or the exchange accounts, so we cannot confirm how the money was taken. We read Ethereum in full, and on five other networks we checked only for exchange payments to the first 15 addresses. We did not check the two Monday wallets on other networks. Other chains, and other wallets at the same exchanges, could still add to the total.

Four of the 17 link to the thief through a few steps rather than directly. On Monday morning, $400k from 0xd3c1…a7c1 reached a thief wallet through two middle wallets. From 0x3e6c…40f2, $3M went through the older wallet that once paid Revolut, then on to the thief. The two Monday wallets link through two and three steps. Without these four, the count would be $95.71M.

12 · The methodHow we traced the money

We started from the 11 posted addresses and the exchange wallets that paid them. Then we followed every large payment forward, skipping known services, and looked back for other addresses the same exchange wallets had paid. On 5 November we also followed every payout of $50k or more from the three exchange wallets since midday on 1 November, four steps forward. It found the two Monday wallets. It found no others. We checked each wallet's history and each balance at the same moment, so the money in and the money out add up.

We traced the Name.com DNS hijack and the b14g drain the same way last week. You can get the full history of the chain as files on the Bitquery Data Store, in the Ethereum dataset.

Limits on these findings

We read Ethereum in full. Transfers and balances were both read at block 26,347,530, 08:47 UTC on 5 November. Later moves are not covered. Wednesday's holdings for the same wallets were rebuilt from Thursday's by reversing every transfer and fee in between; for the wallets we already knew, this matches our real Wednesday read exactly. On Base, Arbitrum, BSC, Polygon and Optimism we checked only for exchange payments to the first 15 addresses since 25 October, and found none.

This read counts 526 thief wallets, up from 229 on 2 November, because the thief spread the money into new ones. Older, busy wallets the thief paid are counted as outside parties.

The total counts USDC that the main wallets of Kraken, Crypto.com and OKX paid to 17 addresses on 1 and 2 November. Every payout of $50k or more from those three wallets since midday on 1 November was followed four steps forward, through steps of $10k or more and wallets with no more than 25 senders; only these 17 reach the thief. Other wallets at those exchanges, other exchanges and other chains were not searched.

Four of the 17 addresses link to the thief through a few steps rather than directly. Without them the total would be $95.71M.

A wallet counts as the thief's when most of what it received came from the theft. Contracts, busy services and 83 addresses with long histories count as outside parties. Two wallets are counted in by hand: an older wallet that acted as a hub, and one whose other inflows were swap outputs and money bridged in from another chain.

All ETH, held or sent out, is valued at $2,421, the price at the snapshot. So holdings and exits come to $133.1M, more than the $126.04M withdrawn, partly because ETH rose after the thief bought it. Exits are net of money that came back to the thief from the same place, directly or through up to three wallets.

Who controlled the 17 paid wallets is our reading of their history. The exchanges have not confirmed it, and the bank transfers cannot be seen on the chain.

Names of exchanges, bridges and services come from our address labels and from TRM's published graph, checked against on-chain behaviour.

13 · The recordThe addresses behind the theft

0x2744dfd9898f0babbc570cc594bbbc84b487a22b
0x730bcb1296758c377149d7409f98f041cf723992
0xe944f94a773027d5ca80806955dc670e587a8cb9
0xd3c1cda4d49fe4280a94b43c92a2e4acf530a7c1
0x3e6c3d135ca8f8be793e5fe1715ce6c057d140f2
0x99d314e6970b8d3db0dbe6f6e041cc904143400f
0x9eca05d78f6751c91ab048858b7d21a67c015547
0x65c33571ca72885637076b84db517809c16eb841
0xa3a98584d410c4e32f9825f6af1168f4e774ae0d
0x18ec8239cbd3062289e4bd514250d14bdd426413
0x448cdc9b813d3bdeabcc07a922ac4e06aaa97337
0x2f5e296bbf152e879b76cbd501ff0efb466ab904
0x18cd13416793e140345d87ec69e12841647a1939
0xbb2a25a0918290c501f793ed12425b3b0854295a
0x94dc65f1f9ff552d6b61d5560eae0f43ae4c06f0
0xfa6766b362461a20046451b16277ec5f7d159556
0x8d04cc7e86e687854eb41d9d43512b655b93184b
0x5cf70edce65847ef989933c3072fb0e7f335abc1
0xe378cdccb369a64a0190577787ef61ca2eefa6b2
0xf19b12578f7c2820c87b4b7c35ab2e2bdf8a617a
Run it yourself

Watch the thief's wallets in plain English

Every transfer in this story comes from Bitquery's Ethereum data. The Bitquery MCP server puts that data behind an AI assistant, so you can ask where a wallet's money went, or which wallets an address has paid, without writing a query. The full history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store, in the Ethereum dataset.

Watch the thief's biggest ETH stashes for new movesList every wallet an exchange's main wallet paidTrace stolen stablecoins through swaps and bridgesCheck an address against Bitquery's labels
Explore Bitquery MCP →Ethereum transfers and balances from Bitquery. Data read from 2 to 5 November 2026.
Legal disclaimer

This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any token or asset, or to use or avoid any exchange, wallet, protocol or service.

The findings describe transactions and balances observed on Ethereum from 1 to 5 November 2026. Attributions come from on-chain behaviour; they may be incomplete or incorrect and may be revised as more data becomes available.

References to Kraken, Crypto.com, OKX, KuCoin, Kyrrex, Circle, Tether, Trust Wallet, Uniswap, LI.FI, Wagyu, FixedFloat, WellWallet, Bridgers, Rango, Chainflip, Harbor, NEAR Intents, deBridge, Arbitrum, MetaMask, Bitget, BloFin, BingX, Gate.io, AeroSwap, Revolut, Crédit Mutuel Arkéa, Fortuneo, Cointelegraph, The Block, AFP, franceinfo, Grégory Raymond, ZachXBT, TRM or any other named project, company or person describe what the public record shows and what those parties have said in public. They are not statements about any party's intent, security practices, solvency or conduct, and nothing here asserts that any named party acted unlawfully or negligently. Crédit Mutuel Arkéa has confirmed a cyberattack and given a first estimate of its loss, but has not linked it to these wallets; that link rests on public reporting and on-chain behaviour. The wallets that took the funds are described by their behaviour and attributed to nobody.

Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and company names are the property of their respective owners.

Reported by Gaurav Agarwal for Bitquery Research, with AI tools; every figure was checked against the raw data.

FAQ

Was Kraken hacked?

Nothing shows that. Kraken and Crypto.com say their platforms remained secure. Crédit Mutuel Arkéa says the attackers came in through one of its suppliers and wired money from its own account to other banks. The on-chain pattern fits exchange accounts that were set up in advance.

How much was stolen?

We traced $126.0M in USDC taken from accounts at Kraken, Crypto.com and OKX on 1 and 2 November. The first report put the suspected loss at more than $106 million, and ZachXBT later raised it to more than $133 million. The bank put the amount at about €100 million in a first estimate, or about $113M at AFP's exchange rate. AFP reported that the bank did not confirm the higher figure but accepted its order of magnitude. Our count sits between the two.

Where did the money go?

30% was still on Ethereum on Thursday, mostly as ETH and DAI. About $95.8M had left through bridges, exchange deposits, instant swap services and unnamed wallets, with one route into Monero.

Can the money be frozen or recovered?

Only a small part can be frozen by an issuer. Tether froze $1.1M of USDT on 2 November. About $1.7M was still in USDC, which Circle can freeze, and $0.5M in USDT that Tether has not frozen. The bank says part of the funds has been blocked. Kraken, which took in 396 ETH of the stolen money on 3 November, can act on the account it credited. Exchanges and swap services that received funds can hold accounts or share records with police.

Who is the victim?

Crédit Mutuel Arkéa, a French bank, confirmed on 4 November that a cyberattack let attackers make fraudulent transfers from its own account. ZachXBT had named it the day before. The bank says no customer lost money. Nothing on the chain names the bank, because its side of the theft was bank transfers.

How did the money get from a bank into crypto?

The bank says the attackers sent transfers from its own account to other banks, then turned the money into crypto on specialised platforms. Raymond's sources say the transfers went to exchange accounts opened under false names. The money bought USDC, which was then withdrawn to the 17 wallets. Only that last step shows on the chain.

Who is investigating?

The cybercrime section of the Paris prosecutor's office opened an inquiry on 4 November, after a complaint from the bank. France's anti-cybercrime police are handling the case, as an attack on a computer system by an organised group.

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