Fluidkey hack: $1.58M went to the attacker in 36 minutes
For 36 minutes on 19 November, Fluidkey's own relayer paid money out of user accounts on six chains. We traced every payout to see who got it.
- $1.58M
- $277K
- 17:33
- 881.6 ETH
- $13.5K
- 18:04:59
01 · What happenedThe Fluidkey hack drained $1.58M in 36 minutes
On 19 November, money started leaving Fluidkey accounts without the owners' knowledge. The drain itself took 36 minutes. By the time it stopped, at least $1.58 million had landed in wallets tied to one attacker.
Fluidkey is a privacy wallet. Each user gets a name, and every payment to that name lands in a fresh address. Outsiders see a crowd of new addresses and cannot add up what one person holds. Fluidkey also pays network fees and sends each user's payments on their behalf. The service that does this is called a relayer.
Soon after the drain began, Fluidkey told users to stay off its website and app. That evening it posted an update on X. All services had gone offline at 18:05 UTC, and no unauthorized transaction had gone through since. SEAL 911, a volunteer team that helps crypto projects during a hack, was helping. Fluidkey did not say how much was lost, or how.
Bitquery reads every transfer on Base, Ethereum and four more chains where Fluidkey paid out. So we followed every payment its relayer made that hour to its next stop. An outside tracker on GitHub puts the loss at $1.63 million. That falls inside our range of $1.58 million to $1.64 million.
Not all the money went to the attacker. Some payouts went to wallets with a history, most likely the owners' own. One user moved $277,000 out while the drain ran. The chain does not show whether that user saw it coming. Nor does it show how the attacker made the relayer pay.
02 · The walletHow Fluidkey works: stealth addresses and a relayer
A normal crypto wallet has one public address. Anyone who learns it can see every coin it holds and every payment it makes. Fluidkey breaks that link with stealth addresses. A stealth address is a new address made for each payment, and only the receiver can tie it back to themselves.
Each stealth address is a Safe, a smart contract wallet that answers to a single key. Fluidkey's docs say the user creates that key in the browser by signing a message with the wallet they already use. The spending key stays with the user. A second key, the viewing key, goes to Fluidkey so that it can create new addresses and spot incoming payments.
A new address holds no ETH to pay gas, the fee every transaction costs. So Fluidkey sends the transaction itself and pays the gas. On each chain, one Fluidkey wallet signs those transactions and sends them through one smart contract. That pair is the relayer. On 19 November, the relayer moved money out of Fluidkey accounts on six chains at once.
03 · The hourThe relayer paid out for 36 minutes
On a normal day, the relayer is quiet. Across Base and Ethereum, it never sent more than 30 transactions per hour on 18 November or on the morning of the 19th. In the hour from 17:00 UTC, it sent 174.
The attacker got ready hours before. In the early afternoon, a fresh wallet got its first ETH from Tornado Cash, a mixer that breaks the link between where coins come from and where they go. A second wallet got its ETH the same way soon after. The pair then sent small amounts of ETH to other chains to pay gas there.
At 17:16, the first wallet sent tiny ETH deposits to a Fluidkey account on Base. In the same minute, that account paid 5.15 USDC to a wallet that later got its gas from the attacker. It looks like a test. Ten minutes later, the first wallet sent more tiny deposits to two more accounts. Then the relayer drained money from all three. The deposits suggest the attacker picked its targets in advance.
The real drain began at 17:28, on Ethereum and Base within seconds of each other. The largest single transaction drained $415,783 in USDT from two accounts on Ethereum. Half of the attacker's take had been paid out within five minutes. The relayer sent its last transaction at 18:04:59. When we checked the next morning, nothing had gone through it since on any of the six chains, which matches what Fluidkey said.
04 · The payoutsWho got paid: the attacker, and the owners themselves
We took every transfer the relayer made in that hour and kept the ones that went to an outside wallet. Then we sorted each payout by what its wallet did next.
A wallet counts as the attacker's only if money or gas ties it to the attacker. That means it sent the money on to Tornado Cash or to collector wallets that gathered the stolen funds, or it got its gas from the attacker. Those wallets took $1.58 million, and Base lost the most.
Another $65,000 went to wallets with no clear link either way. Most were new, and a few sent the money straight on to Coinbase or Binance. Some of it may well be the attacker's. But a privacy wallet's users have good reason to withdraw to a fresh address. So those payouts stay out of our lower count.
The other $349,000 went to addresses with a history. Some of it left before the drain began, as ordinary payments. The largest of those went to a KuCoin deposit address minutes before the first theft. During the drain, one user moved $277,000 across Ethereum and Base to a wallet in use since 2024, and the money is still there. Another topped up a crypto card.
| Chain | Who got the payouts, 17:10 to 18:10 UTC |
|---|---|
| Base | attacker $837K · owners $194K · no link $22K |
| Ethereum | attacker $660K · owners $151K · no link $28K |
| BNB Chain | attacker $43K · owners $4K · no link $5K |
| Optimism | attacker $30K |
| Polygon | attacker $7K · no link $3K |
| Arbitrum | attacker $990 · no link $6K |
The tracker marks $516,000 as suspected but not confirmed. At least $229,000 of it is the attacker's, going by gas or by where the money went next. Three Base wallets, for example, got gas from the attacker and passed the money to one of its collectors. The tracker also counts one Polygon payout as an owner's own withdrawal. But on Base, the same wallet sent its USDC to the attacker's swap wallet, so we count it as the attacker's.
05 · The stocksThe drain took tokenized stocks too
Most of the money was in dollar stablecoins: USDC on Base, and USDT and USDC on Ethereum. On BNB Chain, the relayer also paid out tokenized stocks, tokens that track a share price. They included NVIDIA, Apple, Alphabet and S&P 500 tokens from Ondo Global Markets.
They came to about $13,500 at the day's prices, and $5,500 of that reached the attacker's wallets. It is a small part of the loss, and the tracker's total leaves it out. We have written before about how big the tokenized stocks market is.
06 · The money trailWhere the stolen crypto went: swaps, bridges and Tornado Cash
The attacker did not sit on the stolen dollar coins. Within minutes, collector wallets pulled them in and swapped them for ETH. One swap wallet on Ethereum had passed on 352 ETH by 17:44.
Money on Base went to Ethereum through bridges, services that move coins between chains. The tracker saw the largest Base payout go through two of them, Mayan and HiFiSwap. We saw HiFiSwap pay out 125 ETH to the attacker's wallets on Ethereum. On BNB Chain, the USDT went to the same collector address the attacker used on Ethereum.
Then the ETH went into Tornado Cash. Two hours after the drain, six wallets started to deposit. In under 90 minutes, they put in 881.6 ETH, about $1.57 million. That is about as much as the attacker took. We have looked before at what Tornado Cash hides, and what it cannot, and at how the Binance hacker laundered its haul.
Fake transfers also piled up along the trail. Bots sent fake tokens named "ETH", "USDC" and "USDT" between the attacker's wallets, with the same amounts as the real ones. The trick aims at anyone who copies an address from their wallet history. It is called address poisoning. A total built on token names counts the fakes as real money. Every figure here uses the real tokens.
07 · EarlierA possible earlier run, five hours before
The tracker flags a possible first round in the early afternoon, and gives it about a 60% chance. We found the same pattern.
In half an hour, four new Ethereum wallets each got about $4,500 from Fluidkey accounts. Each swapped the money for ETH and passed it to a second new wallet. All four paid a small fee to the same address as they moved the ETH on. Four wallets acting the same way look like one person.
But no money or gas links them to the main attacker. We left them out of our count.
08 · The limitsWhat the chain cannot tell us
Nobody outside Fluidkey has said how the relayer came to send these payouts. The chain records every payment and nothing about the reason.
Fluidkey's design keeps the spending key in the user's browser. A 2024 audit by Dedaub warned that if someone broke into Fluidkey's servers, they could send users harmful code. That would fit what we see. So would a flaw in the relayer contract, or a stolen key on Fluidkey's side. Transfers cannot tell these apart, and we have not read the contract's code. Fluidkey's own report should settle it.
We also do not know who the attacker is. The money between wallets can tie them together, but it cannot name a person. We followed each owner's payout one step only. The owner class rests on a wallet's history, so a few of those calls could be wrong.
Once coins go into Tornado Cash, the trail stops. We cannot say where that ETH goes next.
09 · The methodHow we traced the Fluidkey hack
We looked at each transfer the relayer made on Ethereum, Base, BNB Chain, Optimism, Arbitrum and Polygon in the hour from 17:10 UTC. One relayer contract serves all six chains. On each one, a single Fluidkey wallet signs for it. A payout is money that left Fluidkey for an outside wallet.
A payout wallet is the attacker's if it passed the money to a collector or to Tornado Cash, or got its gas from the attacker. It is the owner's if it had a history before the attack, or if our labels mark it as an exchange deposit address. We value ETH at $1,778, and stock tokens at their day price from Bitquery's price data. We left out tokens with no price, and every look-alike token.
Both chains' full history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store: Base and Ethereum. We also run crypto investigation services for cases like this one.
We read payouts from 17:10 to 18:10 UTC on 19 November 2026 on Ethereum, Base, BNB Chain, Optimism, Arbitrum and Polygon. Gnosis is not in our data; the tracker shows about $20 there.
Fluidkey has not published a report on the cause. Its own findings may describe the event differently.
Transfers and gas payments tie the wallets to each other. We attribute them to nobody.
The owner class rests on each wallet's history and on our labels. We followed each owner payout one step, so a few of those calls could be wrong.
Values use ETH at $1,778, the day price for tokenized stocks, and face value for dollar stablecoins. We left out tokens with no price.
Tornado Cash amounts are what went in. Where the money comes out is not visible on-chain.
10 · The recordThe wallets behind the Fluidkey hack
Follow stolen crypto in plain English
Every transfer in this story comes from Bitquery's data. The Bitquery MCP server puts that data behind an AI assistant, so you can ask where a wallet's money went without writing a query. The full history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store, as the Base dataset.
This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any token or asset, or to use or avoid any wallet, exchange, bridge, protocol or service.
The findings describe transactions observed on Ethereum, Base, BNB Chain, Optimism, Arbitrum and Polygon on 19 and 20 November 2026. Attributions come from on-chain behavior and Bitquery's own labels; they may be incomplete or incorrect and may be revised as more data becomes available. Fluidkey has not published a report, and its findings may differ from those described here.
References to Fluidkey, SEAL 911, Dedaub, Safe, Ondo Global Markets, KuCoin, Tornado Cash, HiFiSwap, Mayan or any other named project, company or service describe what the public record shows and what those parties have said in public. They are not statements about any party's intent, security practices, solvency or conduct, and nothing here asserts that any named party acted unlawfully or negligently or knew of the events described. The wallets that took and moved the money are described by their behavior and attributed to nobody.
Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and company names are the property of their respective owners.
Reported by Gaurav Agarwal for Bitquery Research, with AI tools; every figure was checked against Bitquery data.
FAQ
What is Fluidkey?
Fluidkey is a privacy wallet that runs on Base, Ethereum and other chains. Each payment to a user lands in a new stealth address, so outsiders cannot add up what one person holds. Fluidkey pays the gas and sends transactions for its users through a relayer.
How much was stolen in the Fluidkey hack?
At least $1.58 million went to wallets tied to the attacker, across six chains. Counting payouts we could not tie to anyone, the total could be as high as $1.64 million.
How did the Fluidkey hack happen?
Fluidkey has not published its report yet. On-chain, the money left through Fluidkey's own relayer, the service that sends its users' transactions. Transfer data shows the payouts but not why the relayer sent them.
Where did the stolen funds go?
The attacker swapped the dollar coins for ETH and moved it to Ethereum through bridges. That evening, it put 881.6 ETH into Tornado Cash, about as much as it took.
Did Fluidkey users get their money out?
Some did. While the drain ran, one user moved $277,000 to an older wallet. Other payouts went to exchange deposit addresses.
What are stealth addresses?
A stealth address is a new address made for a single payment. Only the receiver can link it to themselves, so a public chain does not show one balance per person. Fluidkey makes each stealth address a Safe smart contract wallet.
Is Fluidkey still being drained?
Not as of our last check. The relayer's last transaction came on the evening of the attack. Nothing had gone through it on any of the six chains by the next morning. Fluidkey said it took its services offline at 18:05 UTC.
Can the stolen funds be recovered?
It is unlikely. Most of the money went into Tornado Cash, which hides where it comes out. An exchange can freeze funds only if they reach one of its deposit addresses.
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