The Optimizely hack took $2,260 in crypto, in 19 payments. The $7,040 first reported counts the thief's own swap.
A script trusted by some of the web's biggest sites showed visitors the wrong wallet address for most of a day. We traced the wallets behind it, coin by coin, into the next morning.
- $2,260
- $4,920
- 92%
- $54
- 4 of 8
- 0.085 BTC
01 · What happenedThe Optimizely hack, in one day
Did you copy a crypto address from a big website on 16 November? If so, check where your money went. For most of that day, pages on the BBC, CNN, Zoom and other big sites could show the wrong address.
Nobody had to break into those sites. Each one loads a tool from Optimizely, a US software company. The tool lets a site show two versions of a page and keep the better one. That day, someone slipped their own code into the tool on the sites of 178 companies. We call that person the thief. Report URI, a web security firm, found 188 infected copies among the 1,611 it checked.
The code did three jobs. It copied card numbers that people typed into forms. Security teams call that web skimming, or formjacking. It tried to break into iPhones. And when a page showed a crypto address, the code swapped in one of the thief's addresses.
Optimizely blamed a flaw in the signup flow of one of its products, BleepingComputer reports. Most of the infected copies were clean again that night.
The first count of the damage came from the thief's wallets. By that evening, they had taken in about $7,040, Report URI found. News reports repeated that figure. Bitquery reads every transfer on Bitcoin and the other chains those wallets use. So we went through each payment and split victim money from the thief's transfers.
Victims paid about $2,260. Most of the Bitcoin in the first count came from the thief's own swap. The thief traded dollar tokens for Bitcoin, and the Bitcoin came back to the same wallet. Below, we show who paid, how that swap worked and where the coins sat a day later. We cover the crypto only. Card theft leaves no trace on a blockchain.
02 · The attackA supply chain attack on 178 companies
A supply chain attack hits a supplier to reach its customers. Here the supplier was Optimizely, and the customers were the sites that load its code. A browser treats that code like the site's own. So the code can read and change anything on the page.
Report URI's list runs from banks and airlines to news sites and streaming services.
Only 6 of the 178 companies work in crypto or trading. One of them is Ledger, which makes hardware wallets. Last month we traced the Ledger CryptoBilis hack.
Crypto people call an address swapper a clipper. Older clippers run on the victim's own machine and change an address after the user copies it. This clipper ran inside the web page. It replaced addresses in the page text, in links and in anything the visitor copied.
The thief built the first clipper about four hours after the bad code appeared on a site. Report URI counted 26 builds of the code that day. Later builds added wallets and removed none. The last build carried 8 addresses, one for each kind of coin it looked for.
Attacks on the web page in front of a wallet are common. A hijacked domain drained users of Across Protocol this month. In October, a DNS hijack at Name.com turned 12 DeFi sites against their own users.
03 · The victimsHow much crypto was stolen, and from whom
A payment to a swapped address looks like any other payment. So we read the full history of all 8 wallets. Four of them never got a coin. Those were the wallets for Solana, TON, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin.
The other 4 wallets took in 19 payments from outside that day, from 18 senders. The first came about 90 minutes after Report URI first saw the clipper on bbc.com. The last came ten hours later.
Most payments were small. The median was $54, and 6 of them were under $25. The largest was 15 LTC, worth about $670.
Together, the payments come to about $2,260. One payment may not belong in that sum. A busy service wallet sent $51 of TRX, and the thief may have bought that TRX to pay network fees. Without it, the total is $2,210.
Two payments came from wallets that our labels mark as Revolut's and Bybit's. In those cases, the victim likely pasted the swapped address into a withdrawal form.
| Time (UTC) and chain | Payment on 16 November |
|---|---|
| 09:57 · BNB Chain | 1.00 USDT, $1 |
| 10:01 · BNB Chain | 1.00 USDT, $1 |
| 10:26 · TRON | 21.89 USDT, $22 |
| 10:31 · TRON | 168.70 TRX, $51, may be the thief's |
| 11:13 · Bitcoin | 0.0052807 BTC, $341, from a Revolut wallet |
| 12:04 · BNB Chain | 60.00 USDT, $60 |
| 12:11 · TRON | 350.00 USDT, $350 |
| 12:50 · TRON | 15.00 TRX, $5 |
| 12:51 · TRON | 175.00 USDT, $175 |
| 14:23 · TRON | 100.00 USDT, $100 |
| 14:30 · BNB Chain | 20.00 USDT, $20 |
| 15:24 · Litecoin | 15.00 LTC, $674 |
| 15:51 · Litecoin | 1.35 LTC, $61 |
| 16:25 · Bitcoin | 0.00084 BTC, $54 |
| 16:39 · Litecoin | 0.67 LTC, $30 |
| 16:50 · TRON | 16.00 USDT, $16, from a Bybit wallet |
| 17:28 · Ethereum | 0.0553 ETH, $101 |
| 18:53 · Bitcoin | 0.00078436 BTC, $51 |
| 19:57 · Bitcoin | 0.00231063 BTC, $150 |
04 · The countWhy the first count was $7,040
Report URI added up what the wallets had received, and its sum is correct. It also noted that the TRON wallet was in use months before the attack. But one Bitcoin transfer in the sum did not come from a victim.
At 13:18 UTC, the Bitcoin wallet received 0.076 BTC in one transfer. That transfer was 92% of the Bitcoin in Report URI's count.
Take it out, and the count falls to about $2,110. Our own count of victim payments up to that time gives the same figure. One more Bitcoin payment, worth $150, came in half an hour later.
05 · The swapThe thief's own swap
The 0.076 BTC came from the thief. Early that afternoon, in under two minutes, the thief's wallets sent stablecoins to three deposit addresses on three chains. A stablecoin is a token meant to hold $1. A deposit address is an address a service hands out to receive a customer's coins.
Fourteen minutes after the first deposit, one Bitcoin transfer paid three amounts to the thief's Bitcoin address.
Each amount matches one deposit. The two larger pairs work out to the same Bitcoin price, within 0.1%. Each payout is worth a little less than its deposit. The gap is about 1% for the two larger ones and 2% for the smallest. A swap fee would leave that gap.
Our labels mark the deposit addresses and the paying wallet as HitBTC's. HitBTC is an exchange. But the two largest deposit addresses are shared. Tens of thousands of senders have paid into each one since July. That points to a swap service, a site that trades one coin for another without an account. So the chain shows a swap on wallets labeled as HitBTC's. The chain shows no account in the thief's name. The wallets behind the Kava hack used a swap on the same exchange's wallets two days earlier.
The stablecoins had two sources. About $610 was victim money from that morning, which we counted above. The rest was 4,311 USDC that sat in the wallet before the attack. It came in on 12 November from a wallet our labels mark as OxaPay's. OxaPay is a payment gateway, a service that lets shops take crypto. The same gateway wallet also paid this address in March.
That USDC is no part of this hack's losses. It may be income the thief earned, or it may come from an earlier theft. The chain cannot tell us which.
06 · The moneyWhere the coins went
For the rest of that day, the coins sat still. Then, early on 17 November, the thief emptied the wallets.
The Bitcoin, 0.085 BTC, went to what looks like a deposit address at a custodial service. That is a firm that holds coins for its users. Days earlier, coins at that address were swept up together with coins from almost 1,000 other addresses. We have no label for the service. The Litecoin moved to a new address and stopped there. When we last read both addresses, on the morning of 17 November, neither had sent the coins on.
The ether went to an address that forwards what it gets to the gateway wallet named above. Other people pay into that address too, so it may belong to a shop the thief paid. The TRON funds went to an address the thief's wallet has used since March. That month, the wallet also paid into Shuffle, a crypto casino, going by our labels.
Anyone can follow these wallets with the Bitquery MCP.
07 · For victimsWhat to do if you paid on 16 November
Look at each crypto payment you made that day after you copied an address from a website. Compare the address you paid with the 8 addresses in the record at the end.
If it matches, nobody can reverse the payment. A freeze is still possible. The Bitcoin sits at what looks like a custodial service, and the swap ran on an exchange's wallets. Both kinds of firms keep records and respond to police requests.
So report the payment to the police, and to your exchange if you paid from one. Give them the transaction ID. Guides on how to recover stolen crypto often promise more than that. Be careful with anyone who offers to get the coins back for a fee.
Did you type a card number on one of the sites that day? Treat the card as exposed and call your bank. For larger cases, we also run crypto investigation services.
08 · The limitsWhat the chain cannot tell us
We do not know who the thief is. The swap service and the payment gateway hold records that could say.
We treat a payment as a victim payment when it reached one of the 8 addresses after the first clipper build. The sender must have no other tie to the thief. Someone could still have paid one of these addresses for another reason.
An earlier wave of the same campaign ran for three days before the Optimizely one, through other companies' scripts. One analysis says that wave carried the iPhone attack and no clipper. We did not test that ourselves.
The thief's Ethereum address works on dozens of chains. We read nine of them. Only Ethereum and BNB Chain had victim payments.
09 · The methodHow we traced the stolen crypto
We took the 8 addresses from Report URI's write-up. For each wallet, we read every coin in, every coin out and the address on the other side. For Bitcoin and Litecoin, we opened each transfer to see who paid and who else got coins in the same batch. Then we checked the wallet totals against public block explorers.
We left out fake tokens that bots sent to the wallets, a trick called address poisoning. Dollar values use Bitquery's price for each coin at the time it moved. Exchange names come from Bitquery's address labels.
Each chain's full history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store. We used the Bitcoin, Litecoin, TRON, Ethereum and BNB Chain datasets.
All chain data was read on 17 November 2026, up to about 06:45 UTC. Anything after that is not covered. The wallets may have moved since.
The 8 wallet addresses, the times of the injection and of each build, and the count of affected companies come from Report URI's public write-up. We did not examine the malware ourselves.
We treat a payment as a victim payment when it reached one of the 8 wallets on 16 November after the first clipper build, from an address with no other tie to the thief. We cannot confirm what each sender meant to do.
One TRON payment of $51 in TRX came from a busy service wallet and may have come from the thief. With it, the total is $2,260. Without it, $2,210.
The link between the three stablecoin deposits and the Bitcoin payout rests on timing and on the amounts. The names HitBTC, OxaPay, Revolut, Bybit and Shuffle are Bitquery's own labels on addresses. We do not say any of these companies knew where the coins came from.
Dollar values use the price at the time of each transfer. TRON prices are daily. Report URI used prices from the evening of 16 November, so its dollar figures differ from ours by a few dollars.
We read the thief's Ethereum address on Ethereum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Arbitrum, Base, Optimism, Avalanche, Mantle and Blast. Other chains that use the same address format were not checked.
Wallet totals for Bitcoin and Litecoin match public block explorers. The Solana, TON, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin wallets show no history on public explorers. The TRON totals match Report URI's figures.
We did not check the earlier wave of the campaign, from 13 to 16 November. Card theft and the iPhone attack are outside what a blockchain records.
Links between wallets are money links. They do not prove who controls a wallet.
10 · The recordThe addresses behind the Optimizely hack
Follow the money in plain English
Every payment and every move in this story comes from Bitquery's data. The Bitquery MCP server puts that data behind an AI assistant, so you can ask where a wallet's money went without writing a query. The full history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store, as the Bitcoin dataset.
This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any token or asset, or to use or avoid any exchange, wallet, website, software product or service.
The findings describe transactions and balances observed on Bitcoin, Litecoin, TRON, Ethereum, BNB Chain and other public blockchains between 12 and 17 November 2026. Attributions come from on-chain behaviour and Bitquery's own labels; they may be incomplete or incorrect and may be revised as more data becomes available. Optimizely has said it will publish an incident report, and its findings may differ from those described here.
References to Optimizely, Report URI, BleepingComputer, the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Ledger, HitBTC, OxaPay, Revolut, Bybit, Shuffle, Across Protocol, Name.com or any other named project, company or service describe what the public record shows and what those parties have said in public. They are not statements about any party's intent, security practices, solvency or conduct, and nothing here asserts that any named party acted unlawfully or negligently or knew of the events described. The wallets that received the payments are described by their behaviour and attributed to nobody.
Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and company names are the property of their respective owners.
Reported by Gaurav Agarwal for Bitquery Research, with AI tools; every figure was checked against the raw data.
FAQ
Was Optimizely hacked?
Yes, in part. On 16 November 2026, someone put bad code into scripts that Optimizely serves to the sites of 178 companies. Optimizely blames a flaw in a signup flow. The thief did not need to break into the sites' own servers.
What is a supply chain attack?
A supply chain attack hits a supplier to reach its customers. Here, the thief changed code that Optimizely serves, and each site that loads the code ran it. The sites changed nothing.
How much crypto was stolen in the Optimizely hack?
Victims paid about $2,260 into the thief's wallets, in 19 payments on 16 November. If we leave out one payment that may have come from the thief, the total is $2,210. Card theft is not part of that figure.
Why did early reports say $7,040?
The first count added up everything the thief's wallets had received by that evening. That included 0.076 BTC that a swap by the thief paid back to the Bitcoin wallet. Without it, the count comes to about $2,110.
What is a crypto clipper?
A clipper is malware that swaps a crypto address for the thief's address. Older clippers change the address after a user copies it. This one ran inside the web page and changed the address on the page, in links and in copied text.
What is formjacking?
Formjacking is code on a web page that copies what people type into a form, such as a card number. Some call it web skimming. The Optimizely malware gained a card skimmer on the afternoon of 16 November.
Is cdn.optimizely.com safe now?
Report URI found that all but one of the infected copies were clean by the end of 16 November. Site owners should still open each Optimizely project and check its code. Visitors cannot check this themselves.
Can you recover or trace stolen crypto?
Anyone can trace it, because each transfer is public. Getting it back is harder. Nobody can reverse a payment. A firm that holds the coins can freeze them if the police ask in time.
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Ask any question of the blockchain. Bitquery's AI Investigations agent traces funds, attributes wallets, and writes auditable reports across every major chain. Prefer to do it yourself? Connect the Bitquery MCP server to your AI assistant, pull the raw datasets, or query the chain directly with the Bitquery API.