Cyber bridge hack: one stolen key drained $1.10M, and it still works
A bridge handed out $1.10M in real CYBER for a deposit that never happened. We traced every signature and transfer behind it, and the door is still open.
- 5.21M
- 329
- 1 key
- 905
- 11 hours
- 575 ETH
01 · What happenedThe Cyber bridge hack: 5.21M CYBER from messages nobody sent
On Saturday afternoon, 5.21 million CYBER tokens showed up on Solana. No one had paid for them. Two minutes later, the same number of real tokens left a vault on Ethereum. By evening, the thief held 575 ether in one wallet.
CYBER is the token of Cyber, the project once called CyberConnect. Cyber runs its own blockchain, and its token also lives on Ethereum, Solana and other chains. To move tokens between chains, holders use a bridge built on LayerZero, a network that passes messages from one blockchain to another.
The bridge works like a lockbox. Real tokens wait in a program on the chain they left. When a message says tokens were locked, the other chain mints the same amount. The trip back burns those tokens and frees the locked ones. Before any message counts, a verifier has to confirm it is real and sign it.
We read each step of Saturday's theft on Solana and Ethereum, and checked the route's message count. The new tokens came from two messages that Cyber's chain never sent. Someone signed them with the verifier's own key. The route needed only that one signature. Later that day, the verifier's admin switched to a new key. By the next morning, the thief was signing with that one too.
Cyber said on X later that day that it had seen "unexpected minting of CYBER on Solana" and was looking into it. It asked users to stay off the bridge and not to send CYBER to exchanges. It has not named a cause. South Korea's Upbit and Bithumb paused CYBER deposits and withdrawals.
02 · The bridgeHow the CYBER bridge works, and the one check that failed
Each route on the bridge has its own settings. The route from Cyber's chain to Solana trusts one verifier, number 168. LayerZero calls these verifiers DVNs, short for decentralized verifier networks. Each app picks its own and sets how many must agree.
The verifier signs with a private key, a secret number that proves who signed. Its settings list the keys that may sign and how many signatures a message needs. On this route, one was enough. Each approval we decoded, real or fake, had one signature. Solana took each one.
That makes the key the whole lock. Whoever holds it can call any message real. Solana will then mint what the message asks for. Kelp DAO's bridge was drained in April on a route that also trusted one verifier. And hours before the Cyber mint, one valid signature emptied Chainflip's Ethereum Vault.
03 · The fake messagesMessages 330 and 331: what Cyber's chain never sent
Each LayerZero message has a number. The sending chain counts up one at a time, so the numbers on each route run in order. We asked Cyber's chain how many messages its bridge program had sent to Solana. It said 329.
The last real one went out on 2 November. On Saturday, Solana approved two more, numbers 330 and 331. Cyber's chain never sent them. The second one asked for 5.21 million tokens, and Solana minted them.
We read each approval straight from Solana. Each one has a signature, and a signature gives away the key that made it. The real message was signed by a key starting 0xb6f5. So were the fake ones. Whoever made them held the verifier's real key.
The chain does not show how that key got out. Only the people who run the verifier can answer that, and the chain does not say who they are.
04 · The minutesThe Cyber exploit, minute by minute
The thief set up on two chains in under an hour. First, a new Ethereum wallet got a little ETH to pay its fees, called gas. Then a new Solana wallet got SOL from Mayan Finance, a service that swaps coins across chains.
Just after 16:00 UTC, a helper wallet funded by the thief added itself to the verifier's admin list. It signed that change with the stolen key. Over the next 13 minutes, it approved the two fake messages and queued them up.
At 16:13, the second fake message ran. The thief's Solana wallet got the new tokens. A minute later, the wallet burned them and sent them home to Ethereum. That message was real, backed by a real burn. So the Ethereum lockbox did its job. It paid out real tokens to the thief's first Ethereum wallet.
The selling began two minutes after that.
05 · The lockboxCyber's Ethereum lockbox lost all but 905 CYBER
The lockbox holds the real tokens behind each one minted on the far side. Last year, it held more than 8.5 million tokens. Just before the drain, it held a little over 5.21 million.
The fake message asked for 5.21 million. That left 905 in the lockbox. A smaller fake message would have left money behind. A larger one would have stalled on Ethereum, because the lockbox can only pay out what it holds.
Normal users kept using the bridge. Solana minted 7 small batches in the next 40 minutes. By our check on Sunday, the lockbox was back up to 6,696 tokens.
06 · The money trailWhere the stolen CYBER went: KyberSwap, then one wallet
The thief sold fast, mostly on open markets. From the first wallet, it sold 1.27 million tokens through MetaMask Swaps and KyberSwap, a service that splits a trade across many exchanges. It got about 148 ETH back.
It then moved the other 3.53 million and the ETH to a second wallet. That wallet sold them on KyberSwap in about half an hour.
Smaller amounts went to Binance and KuCoin deposit wallets. Each passed through one wallet in between. Those in-between wallets got their first gas only after the tokens arrived, from wallets that pay gas for many others. Swap services clear out deposit wallets that way, so our labels do not mark them as the thief's.
Another batch went through a swap service and ended at KuCoin. Later, a ChangeNOW wallet paid about 14 ETH to a fresh wallet, which passed it on to the second wallet. The amount and timing match that batch. No on-chain transfer links the two.
Then the second wallet sent 575 ETH to a new wallet, 0xe0a6. At that minute's ETH price, it was worth about $965k. That wallet has sent nothing since. Exchanges can freeze deposits, and token issuers can freeze their tokens. Nobody can freeze plain ETH. The next move from 0xe0a6 is the one to watch.
Bots also sent worthless look-alike tokens to these wallets. They came from addresses made to look like the thief's. The trick is called address poisoning, and we left those transfers out.
07 · Still openThe keys still work: fake message 332 is waiting
About an hour after the mint, the verifier's admin fought back. It removed the helper from the admin list and swapped the signer list to a new key, starting 0x5aeb. It signed that change with the old key. That was the same key the thief held.
Less than 20 minutes later, the helper began to queue a third fake message, number 332. Approving it needed a key on the signer list. At 04:29 UTC the next morning, the helper signed with the new key. It added itself back as admin and put both keys on the signer list. Then it approved message 332.
So the thief had the new key less than 12 hours after the switch. A single leaked copy would not explain a second key. The leak points to the place where the keys are made or kept.
On Sunday morning, the admin role moved to a new wallet. That shut the helper out. The signer list stayed the same. At our 10:00 UTC check on Sunday, both keys the thief has used were still on it, and one signature was still enough.
Message 332 sits approved on Solana. Only its fingerprint is public, so only whoever made it knows the amount. That person can also run it. The Ethereum lockbox holds only a few thousand tokens now. A repeat of Saturday would pay out little there. Any tokens minted on Solana would still be the thief's. With both keys, the thief can also approve new fake messages.
The fix sits with whoever runs the verifier, and with Cyber. Taking both keys off the signer list would block message 332 and any new fake ones. So would a pause on the Solana side of the route. A route that needs two or more verifiers to agree would not fall to one stolen key.
08 · The limitsWhat the chain cannot tell us
The chain shows which key signed each fake message. It does not show how the thief got that key, or the second one. Cyber has not said.
We cannot say who runs the verifier. Its admin wallet acted against the thief within the hour. That points to Cyber's team or a firm working for it. Bitquery's labels do not name it.
We tie the thief's wallets together by money and timing. No transfer names a person, and we attribute the wallets to nobody.
09 · The methodHow we checked the Cyber bridge exploit
We decoded each approval on Solana and rebuilt the data each key had signed. Working back from each signature gives only the two keys in the verifier's settings. A wrong method gives random keys, so the match is a real check.
Cyber's chain gave us its own message count. On Ethereum, we traced every transfer out of the lockbox and through the thief's wallets. We also added up the lockbox's whole history. The sum matches its live balance.
We value CYBER at its price on 21 November, and ETH at its price when the ETH moved. Bitquery also sells the full histories as files on its Data Store, as the Ethereum dataset and the Solana dataset. We also run crypto investigation services for cases like this one.
We read the verifier's transactions and the CYBER mints on Solana, the message count on Cyber's chain, and every CYBER transfer in and out of the Ethereum lockbox, up to 10:00 UTC on 22 November 2026.
Signatures show which key approved each message. They do not show how the keys were taken, or who runs verifier 168. Cyber has not published its findings.
Transfers and timing tie the thief's wallets together. We attribute them to nobody. The wallets one step before Binance and KuCoin may belong to a swap service.
We match the 13.93 ETH from ChangeNOW to the swap service route by amount and time. No on-chain transfer links them.
Values use CYBER at $0.2115, its daily price for 21 November, and ETH at $1,678 at 17:40 UTC. Anything that happened on Solana or Ethereum after our check would not show here.
10 · The recordThe wallets and transactions behind the Cyber bridge hack
Follow stolen crypto in plain English
Every transfer and mint in this story comes from Bitquery's data. The Bitquery MCP server puts that data behind an AI assistant, so you can ask where a wallet's money went without writing a query. Bitquery also sells the full histories as files on its Data Store, as the Ethereum dataset and the Solana dataset.
This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any token or asset, or to use or avoid any wallet, exchange, bridge, protocol or service.
The findings describe transactions observed on Solana, Ethereum and Cyber's chain from 22 October to 22 November 2026. Attributions come from on-chain behavior and Bitquery's own labels; they may be incomplete or incorrect and may be revised as more data becomes available. Cyber has not published a report, and its findings may differ from those described here.
References to Cyber, CyberConnect, LayerZero, Kelp DAO, Chainflip, Mayan Finance, MetaMask, KyberSwap, ChangeNOW, Binance, KuCoin, Upbit, Bithumb or any other named project, company or service describe what the public record shows and what those parties have said in public. They are not statements about any party's intent, security practices, solvency or conduct, and nothing here asserts that any named party acted unlawfully or negligently or knew of the events described. The wallets that took and moved the money are described by their behavior and attributed to nobody.
Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and company names are the property of their respective owners.
Reported by Gaurav Agarwal for Bitquery Research, with AI tools; every figure was checked against Bitquery data and the chains' own nodes.
FAQ
What is Cyber (CYBER)?
Cyber, once called CyberConnect, is a crypto project with its own blockchain. Its CYBER token also lives on Ethereum, Solana and other chains, and it moves between them over a bridge built on LayerZero.
How much was stolen in the Cyber bridge hack?
The Ethereum lockbox paid out 5.21 million CYBER on 21 November, about $1.10M at that day's price. The thief sold most of it and holds the ETH in one wallet.
How did the Cyber bridge hack happen?
Someone signed fake messages from Cyber's chain to Solana with the key of the route's only verifier. Solana minted the tokens, and the thief sent them to Ethereum, where the lockbox paid out real tokens. How the key was taken is not visible on the chain.
Was LayerZero hacked?
The route used LayerZero to carry its messages and trusted one verifier to approve them. The fake messages had a valid signature from that verifier's key. Nothing in the chain data points to a fault in LayerZero's own programs.
Where did the stolen tokens go?
Most of it was sold for ETH on KyberSwap and MetaMask Swaps. Some went to Binance and KuCoin deposit addresses. The ETH ended up in one wallet, which had sent nothing by our check on 22 November.
Is the Cyber bridge still at risk?
At our check on 22 November, a third fake message was approved on Solana but had not run. Both keys the thief has used were still on the verifier's signer list, and one signature was enough.
Do CYBER holders need to do anything?
Cyber asked holders to avoid the bridge and not to send their tokens to exchanges for now. It said they do not need to move their tokens, connect a wallet or sign anything.
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