On-chain investigationLayerZero21 November 2026

Cyber bridge hack: one stolen key drained $1.10M, and it still works

A bridge handed out $1.10M in real CYBER for a deposit that never happened. We traced every signature and transfer behind it, and the door is still open.

Still open · checked 22 November, 10:00 UTC
A third fake message, number 332, is approved on Solana and waiting to run. Both keys the thief has used are still on the verifier's signer list, and one signature is enough to approve a message.
332
Fake message approved, not yet run
2 of 2
Signer keys the thief has used
575 ETH
Still in one wallet, not moved
At a glance
Cyber, the project once called CyberConnect, moves its CYBER token between chains over LayerZero. On 21 November, someone signed two fake messages from Cyber's chain to Solana with the route's own verifier key. Solana minted 5,213,000 CYBER backed by nothing. Two minutes later, Cyber's Ethereum lockbox paid out the same amount of real CYBER, about $1.10M. Within 85 minutes, the thief had sold 92% of it and parked 575.286 ETH in one wallet. The verifier's admin switched to a new key that evening, and by morning the thief was signing with that one too.
$1.10M
CYBER paid out by the Ethereum lockbox
329 vs 331
Messages sent, and messages Solana accepted
905
CYBER left in the lockbox after the drain
575 ETH
Still in one wallet, not moved
Key findingsEach line has its own share link
  1. 5.21M

    CYBER minted on Solana at 16:13 UTC on 21 November from a fake message. Cyber's Ethereum lockbox paid out the same amount two minutes later.

  2. 329

    Messages Cyber's chain had sent to Solana. Solana accepted numbers 330 and 331 anyway, and approved 332 the next morning.

  3. 1 key

    The fake messages carry the same verifier key that signed the route's real messages. The route needed only one signature.

  4. 905

    CYBER left in Cyber's Ethereum lockbox after the drain. It had held 5,213,905.

  5. 11 hours

    After the verifier's admin switched keys, the thief signed with the new key too, and approved fake message 332.

  6. 575 ETH

    In wallet 0xe0a6 since 17:40 UTC on 21 November. It had not moved at our check at 10:00 UTC the next day.

01 · What happenedThe Cyber bridge hack: 5.21M CYBER from messages nobody sent

On Saturday afternoon, 5.21 million CYBER tokens showed up on Solana. No one had paid for them. Two minutes later, the same number of real tokens left a vault on Ethereum. By evening, the thief held 575 ether in one wallet.

CYBER is the token of Cyber, the project once called CyberConnect. Cyber runs its own blockchain, and its token also lives on Ethereum, Solana and other chains. To move tokens between chains, holders use a bridge built on LayerZero, a network that passes messages from one blockchain to another.

The bridge works like a lockbox. Real tokens wait in a program on the chain they left. When a message says tokens were locked, the other chain mints the same amount. The trip back burns those tokens and frees the locked ones. Before any message counts, a verifier has to confirm it is real and sign it.

We read each step of Saturday's theft on Solana and Ethereum, and checked the route's message count. The new tokens came from two messages that Cyber's chain never sent. Someone signed them with the verifier's own key. The route needed only that one signature. Later that day, the verifier's admin switched to a new key. By the next morning, the thief was signing with that one too.

Cyber said on X later that day that it had seen "unexpected minting of CYBER on Solana" and was looking into it. It asked users to stay off the bridge and not to send CYBER to exchanges. It has not named a cause. South Korea's Upbit and Bithumb paused CYBER deposits and withdrawals.

One fake message minted 71 times what a month of real ones didCYBER minted on Solana, 22 October to 21 November
CYBER MINTED ON SOLANA: ONE MESSAGE AGAINST A MONTHLargest normal mint, 30 days7,696All 38 normal mints together73,887The fake message, 21 November5,213,000The teal bars barely show at this scale. The attack minted 71 times what the bridge minted in the 30 days before.Every mint of the token on Solana, 22 October to 21 November 2026. Bitquery Solana transfers.
38 ordinary bridge mints in 30 days added 73,887 CYBER. Read from every CYBER mint in the Solana dataset.

02 · The bridgeHow the CYBER bridge works, and the one check that failed

Each route on the bridge has its own settings. The route from Cyber's chain to Solana trusts one verifier, number 168. LayerZero calls these verifiers DVNs, short for decentralized verifier networks. Each app picks its own and sets how many must agree.

The verifier signs with a private key, a secret number that proves who signed. Its settings list the keys that may sign and how many signatures a message needs. On this route, one was enough. Each approval we decoded, real or fake, had one signature. Solana took each one.

That makes the key the whole lock. Whoever holds it can call any message real. Solana will then mint what the message asks for. Kelp DAO's bridge was drained in April on a route that also trusted one verifier. And hours before the Cyber mint, one valid signature emptied Chainflip's Ethereum Vault.

The route trusted one verifier, and one signaturea normal transfer next to the attack
HOW CYBER MOVES TO SOLANA, AND WHAT THE THIEF FAKEDA NORMAL TRANSFERTokens are lockedon Cyber's chain,in the bridge contractA message goes outLayerZero numbers it:... 328, 329Verifier 168 signsone signature isall the route needsSolana mintsthe same amountof new tokensTHE THEFT, 21 NOVEMBERNothing is lockedCyber's chain sentno message after 329Fake messagesnumbered 330 and 331,made up by the thiefSigned anywaywith the verifier'sown private keySolana mints5,213,000 tokensbacked by nothingThe way out was real: the thief burned the new tokens on Solana and sent them to Ethereum, and the lockbox there paid.Message count from Cyber's chain. Signers recovered from each signature on Solana. Verifier 168 needs one signature.
Cyber's chain counted 329 messages sent to Solana. Solana approved three more.

03 · The fake messagesMessages 330 and 331: what Cyber's chain never sent

Each LayerZero message has a number. The sending chain counts up one at a time, so the numbers on each route run in order. We asked Cyber's chain how many messages its bridge program had sent to Solana. It said 329.

The last real one went out on 2 November. On Saturday, Solana approved two more, numbers 330 and 331. Cyber's chain never sent them. The second one asked for 5.21 million tokens, and Solana minted them.

We read each approval straight from Solana. Each one has a signature, and a signature gives away the key that made it. The real message was signed by a key starting 0xb6f5. So were the fake ones. Whoever made them held the verifier's real key.

The chain does not show how that key got out. Only the people who run the verifier can answer that, and the chain does not say who they are.

Cyber's chain sent 329 messages; Solana approved three morethe message numbers on the route from Cyber's chain to Solana
MESSAGES CYBER'S CHAIN SENT TO SOLANA, AND THE THREE IT NEVER SENT324325326327328329330331332sent by Cyber's chain (its counter stops at 329)never sentapproved withthe stolen keyminted5.21M tokensapproved 22 Nov,not run yet300 CYBER on 2 November:the last real messageCyber's chain counts every message it sends. On 22 November it still read 329 for this route.Source: the outbound message count on Cyber's chain and the verifier's transactions on Solana.
Message 331 is the one that minted the tokens. Message 332 was approved the next morning and has not run.

04 · The minutesThe Cyber exploit, minute by minute

The thief set up on two chains in under an hour. First, a new Ethereum wallet got a little ETH to pay its fees, called gas. Then a new Solana wallet got SOL from Mayan Finance, a service that swaps coins across chains.

Just after 16:00 UTC, a helper wallet funded by the thief added itself to the verifier's admin list. It signed that change with the stolen key. Over the next 13 minutes, it approved the two fake messages and queued them up.

At 16:13, the second fake message ran. The thief's Solana wallet got the new tokens. A minute later, the wallet burned them and sent them home to Ethereum. That message was real, backed by a real burn. So the Ethereum lockbox did its job. It paid out real tokens to the thief's first Ethereum wallet.

The selling began two minutes after that.

From gas money to a parked fortune in about two hoursthe attack on Solana and Ethereum, 21 and 22 November
21 NOVEMBER 2026 (UTC), WITH 22 NOVEMBER AT THE END15:22ETHGas arrives0.1 ETH lands in a new Ethereum wallet, 0xaf3215:36SOLGas on Solanathe thief's Solana wallet gets SOL from a Mayan Finance wallet16:00SOLTakes overa helper wallet adds itself as the verifier's admin, signed with the real key16:13SOLThe mintfake message 331 runs and mints 5,213,000 tokens16:14SOLSent homethe thief burns the new tokens and sends them to Ethereum16:15ETHLockbox paysthe lockbox releases 5,213,000 real tokens to 0xaf3216:17ETHSellingMetaMask Swaps and KyberSwap trades turn the tokens into ETH17:15SOLKey changethe verifier's admin removes the helper and switches to a new key17:26ETHLast salewallet 0x7305 makes the last of its 25 KyberSwap sales17:40ETHParked575.286 ETH moves to 0xe0a6 and stays there18:25XCyber speaksCyber says it is looking into unexpected minting on Solana04:29SOLSecond key22 Nov: the thief signs with the new key and approves message 33208:38SOLAdmin moved22 Nov: the admin role moves to a new wallet; the keys staySOL and ETH mark the chain. Every step is a public transaction; the record at the end lists the wallets.
Times are block times in UTC. The record table at the end lists the wallets and the key transactions.

05 · The lockboxCyber's Ethereum lockbox lost all but 905 CYBER

The lockbox holds the real tokens behind each one minted on the far side. Last year, it held more than 8.5 million tokens. Just before the drain, it held a little over 5.21 million.

The fake message asked for 5.21 million. That left 905 in the lockbox. A smaller fake message would have left money behind. A larger one would have stalled on Ethereum, because the lockbox can only pay out what it holds.

Normal users kept using the bridge. Solana minted 7 small batches in the next 40 minutes. By our check on Sunday, the lockbox was back up to 6,696 tokens.

The lockbox paid out all but 905 CYBERCYBER held by Cyber's Ethereum lockbox, June 2024 to November 2026
CYBER HELD BY CYBER'S ETHEREUM LOCKBOX02M4M6M8M10MJun 202420252026905 left21 Nov, 16:14: 5,213,90516:15: 5,213,000 paid outTeal: month-end balance; November stops just before the drain. Red: what was left. By 22 November it held 6,696.Every transfer into and out of the lockbox on Ethereum; the sum matches its balance on 22 November.
Month-end balances from every transfer in and out, in the Ethereum dataset.

06 · The money trailWhere the stolen CYBER went: KyberSwap, then one wallet

The thief sold fast, mostly on open markets. From the first wallet, it sold 1.27 million tokens through MetaMask Swaps and KyberSwap, a service that splits a trade across many exchanges. It got about 148 ETH back.

It then moved the other 3.53 million and the ETH to a second wallet. That wallet sold them on KyberSwap in about half an hour.

5,213,000 CYBER in, 575.286 ETH outwhere the money went, 16:13 to 17:40 UTC
WHERE THE CYBER WENT, 16:13 TO 17:40 UTCThief on Solana58Zgo: mints, then burns5,213,000 tokens16:13 and 16:14Ethereum lockboxCyber's bridge contractpays 5,213,000at 16:15Wallet 0xaf32sells 1.27M tokensfor 147.8 ETH onMetaMask, KyberSwapToward exchanges411,918 tokensto Binance and KuCoindeposits, a swap serviceChangeNOW payout13.93 ETH, matched tothe swap service routeby amount and timeWallet 0x7305gets 3,531,082 tokenssells them in 25 tradesfor 413.8 ETHWallet 0xe0a6holds 575.286 ETHsince 17:40 on 21 Novno transfer out yettokens + 147.8 ETHThe trail stops here,for now. Plain ETH hasno issuer who canfreeze it.Dashed lines: the ChangeNOW payout is linked to the swap service route by amount and timing, not by an on-chain hop.Fake look-alike tokens sent to these wallets are address-poisoning spam and are left out.
Boxes are wallets and services. Solid arrows are public transfers; dashed ones are matched by amount and time.

Smaller amounts went to Binance and KuCoin deposit wallets. Each passed through one wallet in between. Those in-between wallets got their first gas only after the tokens arrived, from wallets that pay gas for many others. Swap services clear out deposit wallets that way, so our labels do not mark them as the thief's.

Another batch went through a swap service and ended at KuCoin. Later, a ChangeNOW wallet paid about 14 ETH to a fresh wallet, which passed it on to the second wallet. The amount and timing match that batch. No on-chain transfer links the two.

92% of the CYBER was sold for ETHthe six transfers out of wallet 0xaf32
WHERE THE 5,213,000 CYBER WENTsold for ETHsent toward an exchange or swap serviceSold on KyberSwap4,281,082 82%from two walletsSold on MetaMask Swaps520,000 10%from 0xaf32Binance deposit200,000 4%one wallet in betweenSwap service, then KuCoin111,918 2%13.93 ETH came backKuCoin deposit100,000 2%one wallet in betweenThe six transfers out of 0xaf32 add up to exactly 5,213,000.The wallets one step before Binance and KuCoin may belong to a swap service; we do not call them the thief's.
KyberSwap sales came from two wallets, 0xaf32 and 0x7305. The rest went toward exchanges.

Then the second wallet sent 575 ETH to a new wallet, 0xe0a6. At that minute's ETH price, it was worth about $965k. That wallet has sent nothing since. Exchanges can freeze deposits, and token issuers can freeze their tokens. Nobody can freeze plain ETH. The next move from 0xe0a6 is the one to watch.

Bots also sent worthless look-alike tokens to these wallets. They came from addresses made to look like the thief's. The trick is called address poisoning, and we left those transfers out.

25 trades in 32 minutes, then one moveETH arriving in wallet 0x7305, 21 November
ETH PILING UP IN WALLET 0X7305, 21 NOVEMBER (UTC)010020030040050060016:4517:0017:1517:3017:45147.8 ETH from 0xaf32's first sales25 KyberSwap payouts+13.93 ETH, ChangeNOW17:40: 575.286 ETHout to 0xe0a6Each step is one transfer into 0x7305. Dust from address-poisoning spam (under 0.001 ETH) is left out.
The wallet took in 575.461 ETH and sent 575.286 ETH on to 0xe0a6.

07 · Still openThe keys still work: fake message 332 is waiting

About an hour after the mint, the verifier's admin fought back. It removed the helper from the admin list and swapped the signer list to a new key, starting 0x5aeb. It signed that change with the old key. That was the same key the thief held.

Less than 20 minutes later, the helper began to queue a third fake message, number 332. Approving it needed a key on the signer list. At 04:29 UTC the next morning, the helper signed with the new key. It added itself back as admin and put both keys on the signer list. Then it approved message 332.

So the thief had the new key less than 12 hours after the switch. A single leaked copy would not explain a second key. The leak points to the place where the keys are made or kept.

On Sunday morning, the admin role moved to a new wallet. That shut the helper out. The signer list stayed the same. At our 10:00 UTC check on Sunday, both keys the thief has used were still on it, and one signature was still enough.

Message 332 sits approved on Solana. Only its fingerprint is public, so only whoever made it knows the amount. That person can also run it. The Ethereum lockbox holds only a few thousand tokens now. A repeat of Saturday would pay out little there. Any tokens minted on Solana would still be the thief's. With both keys, the thief can also approve new fake messages.

The fix sits with whoever runs the verifier, and with Cyber. Taking both keys off the signer list would block message 332 and any new fake ones. So would a pause on the Solana side of the route. A route that needs two or more verifiers to agree would not fall to one stolen key.

The thief has signed with both keysevery change to verifier 168, 2 to 22 November
WHO SIGNED WHAT ON VERIFIER 168WHEN (UTC)KEYWHAT THE SIGNATURE DIDWHO2 Nov0xb6f5approves message 329, the last real onenormal use21 Nov 16:000xb6f5adds the thief's helper as adminthief16:00-16:130xb6f5approves fake messages 330 and 331thief17:150xb6f5swaps the signer list to a new key, 0x5aebthe admin22 Nov 04:290x5aebadds the helper back as adminthief04:290x5aebputs both keys on the signer listthief04:300x5aebapproves fake message 332thief08:38noneadmin role moves to a new wallet; keys staythe adminAt 10:00 UTC on 22 November both keys were still on the signer list. The thief has used both, and one signature is enough.Signers recovered from each signature on Solana. The 08:38 change is an admin-only update that needs no key.
We worked out each key from its signature. At 10:00 UTC on 22 November, both were still on the signer list.

08 · The limitsWhat the chain cannot tell us

The chain shows which key signed each fake message. It does not show how the thief got that key, or the second one. Cyber has not said.

We cannot say who runs the verifier. Its admin wallet acted against the thief within the hour. That points to Cyber's team or a firm working for it. Bitquery's labels do not name it.

We tie the thief's wallets together by money and timing. No transfer names a person, and we attribute the wallets to nobody.

09 · The methodHow we checked the Cyber bridge exploit

We decoded each approval on Solana and rebuilt the data each key had signed. Working back from each signature gives only the two keys in the verifier's settings. A wrong method gives random keys, so the match is a real check.

Cyber's chain gave us its own message count. On Ethereum, we traced every transfer out of the lockbox and through the thief's wallets. We also added up the lockbox's whole history. The sum matches its live balance.

We value CYBER at its price on 21 November, and ETH at its price when the ETH moved. Bitquery also sells the full histories as files on its Data Store, as the Ethereum dataset and the Solana dataset. We also run crypto investigation services for cases like this one.

Limits on these findings

We read the verifier's transactions and the CYBER mints on Solana, the message count on Cyber's chain, and every CYBER transfer in and out of the Ethereum lockbox, up to 10:00 UTC on 22 November 2026.

Signatures show which key approved each message. They do not show how the keys were taken, or who runs verifier 168. Cyber has not published its findings.

Transfers and timing tie the thief's wallets together. We attribute them to nobody. The wallets one step before Binance and KuCoin may belong to a swap service.

We match the 13.93 ETH from ChangeNOW to the swap service route by amount and time. No on-chain transfer links them.

Values use CYBER at $0.2115, its daily price for 21 November, and ETH at $1,678 at 17:40 UTC. Anything that happened on Solana or Ethereum after our check would not show here.

10 · The recordThe wallets and transactions behind the Cyber bridge hack

58ZgoAHMgfFPuzLkA6avW5nCh8vHibt1qDfCSvpPZvSo
6pnHXHtNXddyRYg15TJJrkW9VjMZnep5oj99CqdmfZxx
TzMKUZhibQNADjETHhe1QiNp4NPpgAkyHivrJu2CJuToK7gFZMB3nFe3UR9UjpMHGLdTKE8wig5C9M9BRBpsF1F
4nM8H6qwiEsPEGx2GE53Rd7qK7PovFhJTg4HgEZ8GmKeoVix8Uibd8VdKgss5extMvDT2B1K65ZYDMSrVMBkv6U2
CQQ7nwaQYDiU3gjxMmvXx1SyEWCsYrUQymWL4qjsHNZf
0xcb07992de144bdee56fdb66fff2454b43243b052
0x92a1b430c066cbfb636f67f5354b1720c47e6075523551d9f47bb03bcdc20737
0xaf32a9db0b0ac8eaa860a43a9d32a1c9277277cc
0x73052e10334096b96deacd7bf6c6ec3b9b6c1b32
0xfba2151e4018b46ecc51f85645c5fa18820dc412d16f87119431067a87fa7f65
0xe0a6bd0f2d391a3ee99a5a8550baa1b3347fe8b9
Run it yourself

Follow stolen crypto in plain English

Every transfer and mint in this story comes from Bitquery's data. The Bitquery MCP server puts that data behind an AI assistant, so you can ask where a wallet's money went without writing a query. Bitquery also sells the full histories as files on its Data Store, as the Ethereum dataset and the Solana dataset.

Follow a wallet's money across Ethereum and SolanaList every mint of a token on SolanaCheck an address against Bitquery's labelsPrice a token at the minute it moved
Explore Bitquery MCP →Solana and Ethereum data from Bitquery and public nodes. Data read on 22 November 2026, to 10:00 UTC.
Legal disclaimer

This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any token or asset, or to use or avoid any wallet, exchange, bridge, protocol or service.

The findings describe transactions observed on Solana, Ethereum and Cyber's chain from 22 October to 22 November 2026. Attributions come from on-chain behavior and Bitquery's own labels; they may be incomplete or incorrect and may be revised as more data becomes available. Cyber has not published a report, and its findings may differ from those described here.

References to Cyber, CyberConnect, LayerZero, Kelp DAO, Chainflip, Mayan Finance, MetaMask, KyberSwap, ChangeNOW, Binance, KuCoin, Upbit, Bithumb or any other named project, company or service describe what the public record shows and what those parties have said in public. They are not statements about any party's intent, security practices, solvency or conduct, and nothing here asserts that any named party acted unlawfully or negligently or knew of the events described. The wallets that took and moved the money are described by their behavior and attributed to nobody.

Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and company names are the property of their respective owners.

Reported by Gaurav Agarwal for Bitquery Research, with AI tools; every figure was checked against Bitquery data and the chains' own nodes.

FAQ

What is Cyber (CYBER)?

Cyber, once called CyberConnect, is a crypto project with its own blockchain. Its CYBER token also lives on Ethereum, Solana and other chains, and it moves between them over a bridge built on LayerZero.

How much was stolen in the Cyber bridge hack?

The Ethereum lockbox paid out 5.21 million CYBER on 21 November, about $1.10M at that day's price. The thief sold most of it and holds the ETH in one wallet.

How did the Cyber bridge hack happen?

Someone signed fake messages from Cyber's chain to Solana with the key of the route's only verifier. Solana minted the tokens, and the thief sent them to Ethereum, where the lockbox paid out real tokens. How the key was taken is not visible on the chain.

Was LayerZero hacked?

The route used LayerZero to carry its messages and trusted one verifier to approve them. The fake messages had a valid signature from that verifier's key. Nothing in the chain data points to a fault in LayerZero's own programs.

Where did the stolen tokens go?

Most of it was sold for ETH on KyberSwap and MetaMask Swaps. Some went to Binance and KuCoin deposit addresses. The ETH ended up in one wallet, which had sent nothing by our check on 22 November.

Is the Cyber bridge still at risk?

At our check on 22 November, a third fake message was approved on Solana but had not run. Both keys the thief has used were still on the verifier's signer list, and one signature was enough.

Do CYBER holders need to do anything?

Cyber asked holders to avoid the bridge and not to send their tokens to exchanges for now. It said they do not need to move their tokens, connect a wallet or sign anything.

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