Chainflip hack: one rogue signature emptied its Ethereum Vault of $4.86M
Chainflip's validators must sign every payment its Ethereum Vault makes. On 21 November, a wallet with one minute of history got the Vault to pay. We went through every signature the Vault has ever accepted.
- $4.86M
- 1 in 299,677
- 1 min
- 2,909 ETH
- 13 hours
- 0
01 · What happenedThe Chainflip hack took $4.86M with one signed request
Early on Saturday, one transaction emptied a Chainflip vault on Ethereum. It took $4.86 million in ether and dollar tokens. The wallet that sent it had received its first coins one minute earlier.
Chainflip is a network for swapping coins between chains, such as bitcoin for ether, with no wrapped tokens in between. It keeps users' coins in vaults on each chain, and up to 150 validators run the network. Together they hold one shared signing key, and only that key can move coins out of a vault.
The Ethereum Vault pays only when a request carries a valid signature from that key. At least 100 of the 150 validators must take part to make one. The request on Saturday had a valid signature, so the Vault paid. It sent out every unit of ETH, USDC and USDT it held.
The signature checked out, but its number did not fit. Each signature Chainflip makes for Ethereum carries a number from a running count, one higher than the last. We went through all 299,677 signatures the Vault has accepted in three years. The drain's signature is the only one off the count.
Within minutes, the money was in Tornado Cash, a mixer that breaks the link between where coins come from and where they go. Less than two hours later, the network switched to a new key, 13 hours before the next regular change. The network has signed nothing on Ethereum since. Chainflip's website says its services are down.
Defimon, a security alert service, flagged the drain within half an hour, and Onchain Lens soon followed. Both said the key may have leaked. The team behind Chainflip has not said what happened.
02 · The networkHow Chainflip works: vaults, validators and one shared key
Most ways of moving coins between chains hand you a wrapped copy on the other side. Chainflip swaps the real thing. You send bitcoin to a Chainflip deposit address, and ether lands in your wallet on Ethereum. The coins on each side sit in Chainflip's vaults. On Ethereum, the vault is a smart contract, a program that holds money and follows fixed rules.
No single validator can move that money. Chainflip uses a threshold signature scheme called FROST. Each validator holds one share of the key, and any 100 of them can sign together. Every three days, the validators make a fresh key and hand the vaults over to it.
Each signature also carries a nonce, a number used once. The Vault's key contract keeps every nonce it has seen and rejects a repeat, so that nobody can replay an old payment. On Ethereum, Chainflip takes these numbers from one running count: one, two, three and on.
Billions of dollars in coins have passed through the Ethereum Vault since launch. On the morning of the drain, it held $4.86 million in ETH, USDC and USDT.
03 · The minutesThe Chainflip exploit, minute by minute
The wallet behind the drain got its first ETH a minute before it. It came from Tornado Cash. Every Ethereum transfer pays a fee in ETH, called gas, and this was the gas money. The wallet has sent nothing else, before or since.
The wallet's one request called the Vault directly. It asked for a batch payment and came with a signature. The Vault's key contract checked it and let it through, and the Vault paid $4.86 million to a second new wallet.
The second wallet moved fast. Circle and Tether can freeze their dollar tokens, but nobody can freeze ETH. Within four minutes, the wallet traded all of them for ETH on Uniswap, a decentralized exchange. Uniswap paid the ETH straight to a third wallet, and the second wallet then sent the ETH it got from the Vault to the same place.
Three minutes later, the third wallet began to pay into Tornado Cash. It took three transfers and less than a minute to deposit 2,909 ETH. From the first gas to the last deposit took under 10 minutes. AMLBot, a firm that tracks dirty money, said the laundering looked scripted from start to end. The timing fits.
04 · The money trailWhere the stolen crypto went: Uniswap, then Tornado Cash
The stolen money ended up as ETH in Tornado Cash. The third wallet received ETH from both Uniswap trades and the second wallet. It kept less than 1 ETH and paid the rest into Tornado Cash.
The second wallet also got 22 ETH from Titan, a block builder that packs trades into Ethereum blocks, in the same blocks as its trades. It looks like a refund on those trades. That ETH went to Tornado Cash with the rest.
Defimon's alert said a laundering group had funded the second wallet. We found no sign of that. Its first transfer ever was the drain, and it paid its fees out of the stolen ETH. The only outside money in the whole trail came from Tornado Cash, to the first wallet.
Tornado Cash takes deposits in fixed sizes, such as 1 ETH and 100 ETH. So the third wallet split its ETH into 38 deposits, sent in three batches. Once inside, the ETH mixes with everyone else's. We have looked before at what Tornado Cash hides, and what it cannot. The thief behind the Fluidkey hack two days earlier also sent its haul to Tornado Cash.
Within minutes, bots began to send the second wallet fake tokens named ETH. They came from addresses made to look like the third wallet's. The trick is called address poisoning, and it aims at anyone who copies an address from their history. Here the targets were the thieves. We left every fake token out of our totals.
05 · The countThe one signature that broke Chainflip's count
The nonce is where the drain stands apart. In the two hours around it, the Vault took about a hundred other signatures. Their numbers climb one step at a time. The drain's number came in between two of them, and it was 39 digits long.
Then we went back to the start. The Vault's key contract has taken 299,677 signatures in three years. All but the drain's sit on the count. The count does skip some numbers, about one in twenty, that never show up on Ethereum. Our own node shows the same gaps, so they are part of how Chainflip runs. Why it skips them is not clear from the chain.
A number off the count means the payment never came through the usual process. Someone made a valid signature outside it. A stolen key would explain that. So would key shares taken from enough validators, or a flaw that let a bad signature pass the check, and the transfers would look the same.
06 · After the drainChainflip changed its key, then stopped signing
For almost two hours after the drain, the network looked normal. The validators kept signing ordinary payouts with the same key as new deposits came in, 63 of them, and the count ran on as before.
At 08:53, the Vault moved to a new key. The validators change keys every three days, in the evening UTC, and the next change was due that night. This one came 13 hours early. Chainflip has changed keys early before, in March and June this year, so the timing alone proves little.
The silence after the switch says more. On 20 November, the Vault took about 46 signatures an hour. Since the switch, it has taken none. Chainflip's blog shows a banner saying its services are down. Crypto news sites report that it paused deposits, withdrawals and swaps.
Chainflip also runs a vault on Arbitrum. Its payouts that morning look ordinary, and the largest was about $50,000 in USDC. We have seen no spending from Chainflip's Bitcoin vault address since Friday. We did not check Solana.
07 · EarlierThe second Chainflip loss since September
The network lost money once before this autumn. On 12 September 2026, an attacker found a flaw in how the network read Tron payment notes and took $736,000 in USDT. Chainflip paused the network and explained the flaw. A governance vote then approved paying the affected users back.
That was a bug in Chainflip's own code for one chain. The Ethereum drain does not look like that. Its signature was valid, and the Vault did what it was built to do.
08 · The limitsWhat the chain cannot tell us
The chain shows a valid signature with a number from outside the count. It does not show who made it, or how. Chainflip's own report should settle whether the key leaked or a check failed.
We cannot say who controls the three wallets. Money and timing tie them together, but no transfer names a person. Once the ETH went into Tornado Cash, the trail stopped, and we cannot see where it comes out.
Nor can we say what Chainflip will do for its users. After the Tron loss, it paid people back. It has said nothing yet about this one.
09 · The methodHow we checked every Chainflip signature
Chainflip's docs list the addresses of its Ethereum Vault and key contract. We read every log the key contract has written on Ethereum, all 299,677 signatures. We took each nonce twice, from the raw log and from the decoded fields. Both ways found one number off the count.
Our own Ethereum node gave back the same logs for three sample runs of blocks, gaps included. It also gave us every log from Friday up to 11:23 UTC on Saturday. We traced the money through each transfer's receipt and checked each wallet against our labels.
The drain matched the Vault's balance just before it, to the last unit of each coin. We value ETH at $1,635, its price in Bitquery's price data at the minute of the drain, and USDC and USDT at face value. The full Ethereum history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store: the Ethereum dataset. We also run crypto investigation services for cases like this one.
We read every log of Chainflip's Ethereum key contract from November 2023 to 11:23 UTC on 21 November 2026, and traced the money that left the Ethereum Vault on 21 November.
A signature off the count shows the payment did not come through Chainflip's usual process. It does not show whether a key leaked or a check failed. Chainflip has not published its findings.
Transfers tie the signer, receiver and collector wallets together. We attribute them to nobody.
We checked the Arbitrum vault's payouts on the morning of 21 November and the Bitcoin vault address from 20 November. We did not check Solana or other chains.
Values use ETH at $1,635 and face value for USDC and USDT. Tornado Cash amounts are what went in; where the ETH comes out is not visible on-chain.
10 · The recordThe wallets and transactions behind the Chainflip hack
Follow stolen crypto in plain English
Every transfer and signature in this story comes from Bitquery's data. The Bitquery MCP server puts that data behind an AI assistant, so you can ask where a wallet's money went without writing a query. The full history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store, as the Ethereum dataset.
This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any token or asset, or to use or avoid any wallet, exchange, bridge, protocol or service.
The findings describe transactions observed on Ethereum, with checks on Arbitrum and Bitcoin, from November 2023 to 21 November 2026. Attributions come from on-chain behavior and Bitquery's own labels; they may be incomplete or incorrect and may be revised as more data becomes available. Chainflip has not published a report, and its findings may differ from those described here.
References to Chainflip, Defimon, Onchain Lens, AMLBot, Uniswap, Titan, Circle, Tether, Tornado Cash or any other named project, company or service describe what the public record shows and what those parties have said in public. They are not statements about any party's intent, security practices, solvency or conduct, and nothing here asserts that any named party acted unlawfully or negligently or knew of the events described. The wallets that took and moved the money are described by their behavior and attributed to nobody.
Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and company names are the property of their respective owners.
Reported by Gaurav Agarwal for Bitquery Research, with AI tools; every figure was checked against Bitquery data and our own Ethereum node.
FAQ
What is Chainflip?
Chainflip is a network for swapping native coins between chains, such as bitcoin for ether. It holds users' coins in vaults on each chain. Up to 150 validators share one signing key that controls those vaults.
How much was stolen in the Chainflip hack?
$4.86 million left Chainflip's Ethereum Vault in one transaction on 21 November. That was every unit of ETH, USDC and USDT the Vault held.
How did the Chainflip hack happen?
The request carried a valid signature from the key Chainflip's validators share, so the Vault paid. Its nonce was the only one in three years that broke Chainflip's running count. That points to a signature made outside the network's usual process. Chainflip has not published a cause.
Where did the stolen funds go?
The thief traded the dollar tokens for ETH on Uniswap within four minutes. Within 10 minutes of the first gas payment, all of it was in Tornado Cash.
Is Chainflip paused?
Chainflip's site says its services are down. On Ethereum, its key contract has taken no signature since the validators switched to a new key on the morning of the drain.
Were other Chainflip vaults drained?
We saw only ordinary payouts from the Arbitrum vault that morning, and we have seen no spending from the Bitcoin vault address since the day before. We did not check Solana.
What is a nonce in a signature?
A nonce is a number used once. Chainflip's Ethereum key contract rejects any nonce it has seen before, so an old signature cannot be replayed. Chainflip hands these numbers out from a running count.
Will Chainflip users get their money back?
Chainflip has not said. After its Tron loss in September, it paid the affected users back.
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