On-chain investigationEthereum · Hyperliquid16 November 2026

One transaction took $6.44 million from a Safe wallet, and no owner signed it. $1.89 million went through a Monero swap service in 12 orders.

A shared wallet lost two of its tokens in a transaction that none of its owners signed. We traced each dollar across Ethereum and Hyperliquid, then asked whose treasury it was.

At a glance
A Safe wallet lost $6.44 million on 16 November. Safe and Zodiac say their code worked as built and that a member's key was likely stolen. We followed the money. The thief swapped most of the stablecoins for ETH within 20 minutes. At 06:32 UTC on 17 November, 1,833 ETH, about $3.3 million, was still in three wallets, and a fourth address was selling more. Another $1.89 million passed through a Monero swap service in 12 orders. PeckShield's alert counted $813,000, and we first counted $1.01 million. The service keeps the XMR1 it buys, so the thief has likely been paid in Monero already. The first deposit into the Safe, and the Safe that took in what was left, both lead back to a multisig wallet that our labels mark as Status. Status has not confirmed the label or the link.
$6.44M
Taken from the Safe in one transaction
1,833
ETH still in three wallets on 17 November
$1.89M
Through a Monero swap service, in 12 orders
43 min
Until the owners replaced a signer
Key findingsEach line has its own share link
  1. $6.44M

    Left the Safe in one transaction at 11:35 UTC on 16 November. A wallet with a role on the Safe's module signed it, and no owner did.

  2. 2 of 5

    Of the Safe's large holdings had an approval with no limit to ParaSwap. The drain took those two and left the other three.

  3. 1,833 ETH

    Still in three wallets at 06:32 UTC on 17 November, about $3.3 million. That is 52% of what was taken. A fourth address has begun to sell.

  4. $1.89M

    Went through a service that swaps coins for Monero, in 12 orders within 40 minutes. PeckShield's alert counted $813,000, and our first count was $1.01 million.

  5. 43 min

    Until the owners replaced one signer. They moved 13 other tokens to a second Safe within 63 minutes of the drain.

  6. 140M SNT

    Sent, with 41,650 ETH, by a multisig that our labels mark as Status to the Safe that funds this group of wallets. Status has not confirmed the label or the link.

01 · What happenedA Safe wallet lost $6.4 million in one transaction

On 16 November, a crypto wallet lost $6.44 million in a single transaction. Three hours later, a security firm said some of the money was turning into Monero.

The firm was PeckShield. Its alert on X put the loss at $6.45 million. It said the hacker had spent about $813,000 on XMR, the ticker for Monero, on Hyperliquid. Monero is a privacy coin, built so that outsiders cannot follow its payments.

The wallet was a Safe, a shared wallet that many crypto teams use. Safe, the company behind it, said on X that the event touched one wallet and that "no owner signed it". Zodiac makes the add-on that the money left through. Its co-founder told Cointelegraph that the add-on has no flaw. A member's key was most likely stolen, the co-founder said. Unchained reported both statements. No one has said who owns the wallet.

Bitquery reads every transfer on Ethereum and every trade on Hyperliquid. So we followed the money out of the Safe, one transfer at a time.

Within 20 minutes, the thief had turned most of the stolen stablecoins into ETH. A stablecoin is a token meant to hold $1. Then the money split. 52% of it still sat as ETH in three wallets when we last read the chain, at 06:32 UTC on 17 November. Another $1.89 million went through a Monero swap service, a site that trades one coin for another with no account. That money went in 12 orders, and the total is more than twice what the alert counted.

Our own first count was short too. In our piece on the Lighter incident, we found five of those orders, and we correct that here. We also looked at who owns the Safe. Its first deposit, and the Safe that later took in what was left, both lead back to wallets that one project funds.

52% of the money was still ETH in three wallets on 17 Novemberthe money from the Safe, by where it went
WHERE THE MONEY WENTThe Safe4.39M USDC, 1.72M syrupUSDC$6.44M, taken at 11:35 UTCThe thief's two wallets3,274 ETH bought in 20 minutes490,000 USDC kept for the serviceThree wallets hold 1,833 ETHabout $3.3M, 52% of the totalat 06:32 UTC on 17 NovemberA Monero swap service, 12 orders790,000 USDC and 610 ETH in3,657 XMR1 bought, $1.89MSold through Bitget Wallet475 ETH for $863Ka fourth address holds 100 ETH to sellA wallet that never moved140,000 USDCthe issuer can still freeze itBalances read at 06:32 UTC on 17 November 2026. ETH priced at $1,827.
Every arrow is a public transfer. The transfers come from the Ethereum dataset, and the XMR1 buys from Hyperliquid.

02 · The walletWhat a Safe wallet is, and who can move its money

Safe, once called Gnosis Safe, is a multisig wallet. It has several owners, and it moves money only when enough of them sign. This Safe had four owners and needed two signatures.

Owners can also add a module. A module is a small program that can move the Safe's money without an owner signature. Teams add one so that daily work does not need a round of signing each time.

This Safe used the Roles module from Zodiac, a set of tools for Safes. The module gives a named wallet a role, a short list of actions that wallet may take. We call that wallet the role wallet.

The role wallet was no stranger to the Safe. It had sent 792 transactions since June 2024, the month the Safe and its module were set up. Zodiac's co-founder called it a long-standing member.

We have seen a module empty a Safe before, in a drain of 2,900 rsETH.

03 · The transactionHow the Safe wallet was drained in one transaction

Late that morning, the role wallet sent one transaction through the module. That transaction did two things.

First, it cashed in the Safe's shares in a Morpho vault. Morpho is a lending protocol, and a vault there pools deposits and lends them out. The shares returned 4.39 million USDC.

Second, it called ParaSwap twice. ParaSwap is a DEX aggregator, an app that routes a swap across exchanges that run on the chain. Each swap on ParaSwap names an executor, the program that carries out the trade. Here, the executor was a new address, and the swap asked for next to nothing in return.

ParaSwap took the Safe's tokens and handed them to that address. Nothing came back to the Safe. The address received all of that USDC and 1.72 million syrupUSDC, a yield token from Maple that trades near $1.19. Together, that is $6.44 million.

The drain, 16 November 2026Figure
Time11:35 UTC
Signed byThe role wallet
Owner signaturesNone
USDC taken4,387,188
syrupUSDC taken1,717,919
Paid back to the SafeNothing
Value$6.44 million

ParaSwap could take the tokens because the Safe had approved it to. An approval is a standing permission that lets an app move one token out of a wallet. The Safe had given ParaSwap an approval with no limit for both tokens.

So no code broke. The module checked the role, the role allowed the call, and ParaSwap did what the call asked. Zodiac said the same on X. In its words, a custom policy allowed the transaction "but likely never intended" it.

The chain cannot tell a stolen key from an insider. Both sign the same way.

04 · The swapsStablecoins became ETH in 20 minutes

The first swap came two minutes after the drain. The hurry has a plain reason. Circle, the issuer of USDC, can freeze the token in any wallet, as Tether does with USDT. No one can freeze ETH.

The first wallet sent 3.0 million USDC to a second wallet, and both went to work. They made 23 swaps through the swap router of Bitget Wallet, the program that wallet app uses to trade for its users. They made one more trade elsewhere. Our labels, the names Bitquery keeps for known addresses, mark the router. Twenty minutes after the drain, the two wallets had bought 3,274 ETH.

They held back 490,000 USDC for the swap service.

The drain, the swaps and the 12 orders took 51 minutes16 November 2026, in UTC
THE FIRST 70 MINUTES (UTC)11:3011:4512:0012:1512:3012:45The SafeThief's walletsDepositsHyperliquid11:35 $6.44M leaves12:18 Owner replaced12:26 to 12:38 The rest moved out11:37 to 11:55 Stablecoins into ETH11:47 to 12:1912 deposits11:50 to 12:26XMR1 boughtTHE AFTERNOON (UTC)13:0014:0015:0016:0017:0018:0019:0014:46 PeckShield's alert16:41 to 18:46More ETH sold through Bitget WalletThe last XMR1 buy came more than two hours before the alert.
Each amber tick is one deposit to the swap service. The owners began to move the rest of the Safe out as the last order filled.

05 · The orders12 orders, $1.89 million and two earlier counts

Twelve minutes after the drain, the thief's wallets began to pay out to 12 new addresses. Six received USDC, and six received ETH. A third wallet made the last two payments. It got the USDC for them by selling ETH.

Each address sent its money into LI.FI, an app that moves money across chains. Minutes later, an account with the same address bought XMR1 on Hyperliquid, an exchange that runs on its own chain. XMR1 is a token on Hyperliquid named after Monero.

12 orders bought 3,657 XMR1 for $1.89 millionwhat each order spent on Hyperliquid
THE 12 ORDERS, BY TIME OF DEPOSIT (UTC)11:47 200,000 USDC390 XMR1 for $199,95911:47 100,000 USDC196 XMR1 for $99,98111:54 90,000 USDC174 XMR1 for $89,98011:54 100,000 USDC194 XMR1 for $99,98111:59 50 ETH174 XMR1 for $89,89312:00 100 ETH347 XMR1 for $180,10812:03 100 ETH348 XMR1 for $180,01212:03 100 ETH348 XMR1 for $179,91512:06 100 ETH348 XMR1 for $179,45712:08 160 ETH557 XMR1 for $287,10012:14 100,000 USDC192 XMR1 for $99,98112:19 200,000 USDC389 XMR1 for $199,961From the first walletFrom the second walletFrom a third walletBars show what each order spent on XMR1. An order's first buy came 2 to 21 minutes after its deposit.
The orders ran from $90,000 to $287,000. Each account bought within minutes of its deposit and has not traded since.

Together, the accounts bought 3,657 XMR1 for $1.89 million. The last buy came more than two hours before PeckShield's alert.

The alert counted about $813,000. Our first count was higher and still short. In the Lighter piece, we found five of these orders, worth $1.01 million, and Unchained quoted that figure. We had searched for payments of 100 ETH or more. That search missed seven orders: six paid in USDC and one of 50 ETH.

The full count is more than twice the alert'sdollars of XMR1 bought with money from the Safe
XMR1 BOUGHT WITH MONEY FROM THE SAFE, THREE COUNTSPeckShield's alert$813KOur first count, five orders$1.01MAll 12 orders$1.89MAll 12 buys were done by 12:26 UTC on 16 November, before the alert.
PeckShield's alert gave a dollar figure and showed one account. Our first count found five orders. There were 12.

06 · The serviceWhat a Monero swap service does with the money

The 12 addresses belong to the swap service. Each order there gets its own deposit address.

One wallet gives the pattern away. It sends a little ETH for gas, the fee a transaction costs, to each new deposit address. It paid out to all 12 of these addresses within minutes of their deposits. It pays out to between 110 and 220 new addresses per day.

Two analysts on X, Specter and tanuki42, say the service is Wagyu. We could not confirm the name. Wagyu's own documents describe the same steps: an order, a deposit address, and a bridge that moves Monero to Hyperliquid and back.

The XMR1 was still in those accounts when we last looked. That does not mean the thief is still waiting for Monero. We checked 85 older deposit addresses that the same gas wallet set up the week before. Of those, 44 had bought XMR1, 2,552 in all. Days later, they still held 2,550.

So the service leaves the XMR1 where the order bought it. Our reading is that it pays the customer in real Monero from its own reserve. The chain cannot show that payment. If the service paid, the trail for this $1.89 million ends there. We have traced money in and out of Hyperliquid before.

The service can also say no. That morning, a wallet that took money from Lighter, another exchange, used the same service. The service filled 12 orders for that wallet. An hour after the Safe drain, two more deposits from the wallet, 320 ETH in all, went back to the sender. None of the Safe thief's deposits came back. We found no transfers between the two sets of wallets, so we treat them as two cases.

07 · What is leftThree wallets still held $3.3 million in ETH on 17 November

About half of the money has not gone far. When we last read the chain, three wallets held 1,833 ETH, about $3.3 million. That is 52% of what left the Safe.

Where the $6.44M sat at 06:32 UTC on 17 Novemberthe money taken from the Safe, in five parts
WHERE THE $6.44M SAT AT 06:32 UTC, 17 NOV52%29%14%ETH in three wallets$3.35M52%1,833 ETH at $1,827ETH in a fourth address$183K3%100 ETH, being sold through Bitget WalletThe swap service$1.89M29%12 orders, 3,657 XMR1 boughtBitget Wallet route$863K14%475 ETH sold, paid to a bridge walletIdle USDC$140K2%in a wallet that has never sent a transactionThe five parts add up to within 1% of the amount taken. The rest is fees and price moves.
ETH is priced at $1,827. The fourth address got its ETH from one of the three and sells through Bitget Wallet.

The money took a few turns along the way. The wallets sold 680 ETH back into USDC. They used part of that USDC for the last two orders and bought ETH again with most of the rest. The first two wallets are now empty.

The selling has started again. On 17 November, one of the three passed 302 ETH to a new address in three transfers. That address sells through Bitget Wallet, 20 to 30 ETH at a time. It had sold 202 ETH and still held 100 ETH when we last looked.

For anyone who tracks stolen funds, those four addresses are the ones to watch. An exchange can still act if the ETH reaches one of its deposit addresses.

One wallet holds 140,000 USDC and has never sent a transaction. Circle could still freeze that money.

In all, 475 ETH has left through Bitget Wallet. Each sale paid USDT or USDC, $863,000 in all, to a wallet that feeds Bitget's cross-chain bridge. A bridge moves money from one chain to another. Both names come from our labels, and we could not see which chain the money came out on.

You can follow any address in this story with the Bitquery MCP.

08 · The responseThe owners moved in 43 minutes. Two tokens were in reach

The owners moved fast. They replaced one of the Safe's four owners 43 minutes after the drain. Eight minutes later, they began to move the Safe's other tokens to a second Safe, one by one. They were done 63 minutes after the theft.

The thief took two tokens and left the rest. The token approval explains why. Of the Safe's five large holdings, only USDC and syrupUSDC had a ParaSwap approval. The other three had none, so the same trick could not reach them.

The drain took the two tokens ParaSwap could pullthe Safe's five largest holdings on 16 November
WHAT THE SAFE HELD, AND WHAT PARASWAP COULD PULLUSDC, out of a Morpho vault4.39M takensyrupUSDC1.72M takensenRLUSDv22.86M moved by the ownersaHorRwaRLUSD1.30M moved by the ownerssenPYUSDmain1.20M moved by the ownersUnlimited approval to ParaSwapNo approvalAmounts in tokens. Each is a dollar stablecoin or a share in a dollar vault.Approvals read at 06:32 UTC on 17 November. Both unlimited approvals were still in place.
The owners moved the three tokens in green to a second Safe within 63 minutes of the drain.

We do not know everything the role allowed. We did not decode its full list of rights, so we cannot say what else was at risk.

For anyone who runs a Safe with a role, the lesson is the pairing. A role that may call an aggregator, plus an approval with no limit, adds up to a right to withdraw. An old approval has cost owners before, as in this NFT approval exploit.

Still open at 06:32 UTC, 17 NovemberState
USDC approvalNo limit, to ParaSwap
syrupUSDC approvalNo limit, to ParaSwap
Roles moduleStill enabled on the Safe
The replaced ownerStill an owner of the Safe that controls the module
Tokens at risk nowNone. The Safe holds neither token

The Safe holds neither USDC nor syrupUSDC now, so the open approvals put nothing at risk today. They would matter again if either token came back.

09 · The ownerWho owns the drained Safe wallet?

No one has claimed the wallet. The transfers lead to one treasury.

Start with the second Safe, the one that took in the rest. In November 2025, it sent the drained Safe 7.0 million USDC. In April 2026, it got 5.1 million USDC back. Our reading is that the same people run both, though the two Safes list different owners.

The second Safe gets its money from a third Safe, which has sent it 14.2 million USDC and 11,916 ETH. That third Safe received 140 million SNT, and ETH as well, from a multisig that our labels mark as Status. Status is the project behind a messaging app and the SNT token. Our labels also mark that multisig as the wallet from its token sale.

The drained Safe's own first deposit ties in too. It was 1,000 DAI in July 2024, and it came from a wallet on the third Safe's payroll. That wallet has received 94 million SNT from the third Safe in 27 payments.

The first deposit and the rescue lead to the same fundertransfers on Ethereum, 2022 to 2026
THE TRANSFERS BEHIND THE OWNER LEADStatus multisig0xa646...0a2b, named by our labelsSafe 0x7be2...bf4ffunded by the Status multisigSafe 0x5b0b...c565funded by the Status multisigWallet 0x7bdf...4cbbpaid by the Safe above since 2022Second Safe 0x7dc3...7498took in the rest on 16 NovemberThe drained Safe0x5953...80de140 million SNT, 41,650 ETH811 million SNT94 million SNT, 27 payments100 million SNT14.2 million USDC, 11,916 ETH1,000 DAI, the first deposit4 July 20247.0 million USDC in, 5.1 million backthen the rest, 16 NovemberEvery arrow is a transfer on Ethereum. The transfers show money links. They do not prove who controls a wallet.
Short addresses stand for the full ones in the record below. The Status name is Bitquery's own label.

So the drained Safe sits inside a group of wallets that the Status-labelled multisig funds. There is another reading. A manager who runs money for Status could own these Safes. The chain cannot tell the two apart. Status has not confirmed our label or the link to the Safe.

10 · The limitsWhat the chain cannot tell us

We do not know who held the role wallet's key, or how the thief got to it.

We cannot see Monero. If the service paid out, we do not know where the coins went.

We did not decode the LI.FI route for each deposit. We tie each deposit to its Hyperliquid account by the shared address, timing and amount.

We did not follow the money past Bitget's bridge wallet. We also did not check what backs XMR1.

11 · The methodHow we traced the Safe wallet drain

We began with the one transaction and read each transfer inside it. Then we read every transfer in and out of the wallets that received the money, and of each wallet they paid. For each wallet, the ETH in minus the ETH out matches its balance on the chain.

On Hyperliquid, we read each account's trades and its balance, using Bitquery's Hyperliquid data and the exchange's own records. We checked the Safe's owners, module and approvals against a public Ethereum node.

We left out the fake tokens that bots sent to the wallets all day, a trick called address poisoning. Dollar values use Bitquery's price for each coin. Names of services come from Bitquery's own labels.

The full Ethereum history is also sold as files, as the Ethereum dataset on the Bitquery Data Store. For cases like this one, we also run crypto investigation services.

Limits on these findings

Ethereum balances, the Safe's settings and the Hyperliquid accounts were read at 06:32 UTC on 17 November 2026. Transfers were read up to that time. Anything after that is not covered.

The owner of the Safe has not made a statement. Safe and Zodiac have said only that their code worked as built. Their later reports may describe the event differently.

The thief's wallets are tied to each other and to the Safe by the transfers between them. We attribute them to nobody.

The 12 deposit addresses are tied to the thief's wallets by the payments they received. The link from each deposit to each Hyperliquid account rests on the shared address, the timing and the amount. We did not decode the LI.FI route.

We call the swap service a service because one gas wallet funds more than a hundred new deposit addresses per day. We could not confirm its name. Wagyu is the name two analysts gave it.

That the service pays out in Monero from its own reserve is our reading. It rests on 44 older accounts that still hold the XMR1 they bought. We cannot see Monero payments, and we did not check what backs XMR1.

The Bitget names are Bitquery's own labels on a swap router and a bridge wallet. We do not say Bitget knew where the money came from.

The thief was still moving and selling ETH when we took the snapshot. Balances and shares will be lower after it.

The two deposits that went back to the Lighter wallet may have been refused by the service or pulled back by the sender. We saw only the return.

The Status name is Bitquery's own label on one multisig. The link from that multisig to the drained Safe runs through three other wallets and rests on transfers. Status has not confirmed it, and a manager acting for Status would leave the same trail.

The $6.44 million values syrupUSDC at $1.19, Bitquery's price for 16 November. ETH is valued at $1,827, the price at 06:32 UTC on 17 November.

We did not decode the role's full permissions. That only two tokens were in reach is our reading of the Safe's approvals.

Links between wallets are money links. They do not prove who controls a wallet.

12 · The recordThe addresses behind the Safe wallet drain

0x595362a906a0b4e90aee1430b1f80fdde2be80de
0x6c7cce68b6373dd0e645e6667d46788f49da5a4afc286bc363a2bf34f0a8c9c5
0x065f395147fc72747c7f48f67f039d4235884148
0x729c87d1b6939c9b2b0858ac25e235e83e5e6410
0x2b02c38022fee2f3c805055f49cd8d24a90cb9e1
0xe804fc0c7756977e0c512b7a1c392693f4f36198
0x8ce742682110c64f0610456b7444ac3f7effbbdf
0xf726d60875e64fd312fe0317c1df231fc4c93f07
0x52753a5d7816302ba6bccedb3cf65227bdf4d613
0x6d6e28eaa3c133a8c56f6a82f0cb927a6e6e146e
0x72aebbf94b0c8f9791b21d4f39362288aa12f844
0x78ace9b2ee9a31737fad748015266a59f32dc79a
0xae06669dfd3e932476f00ea49fce82e5e63f83bf
0x68b383b150647dd4a307943fb92b466947a8865a
0x814271e49a3bf97905a7e816052707fa5841bc4d
0xbd601d316d743ff85d2c4f0ec369128fb1c9825d
0x9a851c6ce953b37a2b1792c5859aaefa4c3df84f
0x1c84152ab6c145cdd1144d0023d227b078e99bf1
0x6c0d3fd53fd1013a32bc1af72ec3b432a66629b2
0x44390eba944bd97bf0db86de012a65feac84166a
0x836ccd122d1b50c49ad3aef13ee053f247ad6649
0x0ee230bce32d0e7a6a39dfdac5acf01e0a69d5ef
0x67e0baaf638513c411e25bd39b1d2e3591db0668
0x9018f1d0182580949c38f1d2c78f8513df3bcc3c
0x0c898ee5f0872f32b37ccc93f45ece04ec825deb
0x7dc3b586d4f3df925a707cd4ffa7c8f4c74c7498
0x7be29fddb841584468fd5dc15bb7ab0b45a2bf4f
0x7bdf634f898ad124a9adb7a1aff95a95aa864cbb
0x5b0be18ca1069a915bf86d72bdf1f2af0d08c565
0xa646e29877d52b9e2de457eca09c724ff16d0a2b
Run it yourself

Follow the money in plain English

Every transfer in this story comes from Bitquery's data. The Bitquery MCP server puts that data behind an AI assistant, so you can ask where a wallet's money went without writing a query. The full history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store, as the Ethereum dataset.

Follow ETH and USDC from a wallet, one transfer at a timeList every swap a wallet made in one hourRead what a Hyperliquid account bought and what it holdsCheck an address against Bitquery's labels
Explore Bitquery MCP →Ethereum and Hyperliquid data from Bitquery. Data read on 17 November 2026.
Legal disclaimer

This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any token or asset, or to use or avoid any exchange, wallet, bridge, protocol or service.

The findings describe transactions and balances observed on Ethereum and Hyperliquid on 16 and 17 November 2026, and earlier transfers between 2022 and 2026. Attributions come from on-chain behaviour and Bitquery's own labels; they may be incomplete or incorrect and may be revised as more data becomes available. The owner of the Safe has not published a report, and its findings may differ from those described here.

References to Safe, Zodiac, Gnosis Guild, ParaSwap, Morpho, Maple, Circle, Tether, Bitget, Bitget Wallet, LI.FI, Hyperliquid, Wagyu, Lighter, Status, PeckShield or any other named project, company or service describe what the public record shows and what those parties have said in public. They are not statements about any party's intent, security practices, solvency or conduct, and nothing here asserts that any named party acted unlawfully or negligently or knew of the events described. The wallets that took and moved the money are described by their behaviour and attributed to nobody.

Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and company names are the property of their respective owners.

Reported by Gaurav Agarwal for Bitquery Research, with AI tools; every figure was checked against the raw data.

FAQ

Was Safe hacked?

No. One Safe wallet lost $6.44 million on 16 November 2026, and nothing in the transaction points to a flaw in Safe's own contracts. The transaction went through a Roles module that the wallet's owners had added. A wallet with a role on that module signed it. No owner did.

How was the Gnosis Safe wallet drained?

A wallet with a role on the Safe sent one transaction. It turned the Safe's Morpho vault shares into USDC, then called ParaSwap twice. Each call named the thief's wallet as the executor of the swap and asked for next to nothing back. The Safe had approved ParaSwap for both tokens with no limit, so ParaSwap moved them.

How much was taken from the Safe wallet?

The thief took 4.39 million USDC and 1.72 million syrupUSDC. At Bitquery's price for syrupUSDC that day, the two come to $6.44 million. PeckShield's alert put the loss at $6.45 million.

Where did the money go?

When we last read the chain, 52% of it sat as ETH in three wallets, about $3.3 million. A fourth address was selling more ETH. Another $1.89 million went through a Monero swap service. A smaller part left through Bitget Wallet to a bridge wallet. One wallet holds USDC that it has not moved.

Did the thief get Monero?

Probably, yes. That answer covers the $1.89 million that went through the swap service. The service bought XMR1 on Hyperliquid for each order and still holds it. Older orders at the same service look the same days later, so the XMR1 stays with the service. A payout in real Monero would not show on any chain we can read.

What is XMR1?

XMR1 is a token on Hyperliquid named after Monero, a privacy coin. A swap service buys it when a customer orders Monero. We did not check what backs the token.

Who owns the drained Safe?

No one has said. The Safe's first deposit came from a wallet that a Status-funded Safe pays, and a second Safe from the same group took in the rest of its holdings. The name Status comes from Bitquery's labels on one multisig. Status has not confirmed the label or that it owns the Safe.

Can the stolen funds be frozen?

Only a small part. Circle can freeze the USDC that sits in one wallet. No one can freeze ETH, which is where 52% of the money sat on 17 November. An exchange can still act if that ETH arrives at one of its deposit addresses.

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