One transaction took $6.44 million from a Safe wallet, and no owner signed it. $1.89 million went through a Monero swap service in 12 orders.
A shared wallet lost two of its tokens in a transaction that none of its owners signed. We traced each dollar across Ethereum and Hyperliquid, then asked whose treasury it was.
- $6.44M
- 2 of 5
- 1,833 ETH
- $1.89M
- 43 min
- 140M SNT
01 · What happenedA Safe wallet lost $6.4 million in one transaction
On 16 November, a crypto wallet lost $6.44 million in a single transaction. Three hours later, a security firm said some of the money was turning into Monero.
The firm was PeckShield. Its alert on X put the loss at $6.45 million. It said the hacker had spent about $813,000 on XMR, the ticker for Monero, on Hyperliquid. Monero is a privacy coin, built so that outsiders cannot follow its payments.
The wallet was a Safe, a shared wallet that many crypto teams use. Safe, the company behind it, said on X that the event touched one wallet and that "no owner signed it". Zodiac makes the add-on that the money left through. Its co-founder told Cointelegraph that the add-on has no flaw. A member's key was most likely stolen, the co-founder said. Unchained reported both statements. No one has said who owns the wallet.
Bitquery reads every transfer on Ethereum and every trade on Hyperliquid. So we followed the money out of the Safe, one transfer at a time.
Within 20 minutes, the thief had turned most of the stolen stablecoins into ETH. A stablecoin is a token meant to hold $1. Then the money split. 52% of it still sat as ETH in three wallets when we last read the chain, at 06:32 UTC on 17 November. Another $1.89 million went through a Monero swap service, a site that trades one coin for another with no account. That money went in 12 orders, and the total is more than twice what the alert counted.
Our own first count was short too. In our piece on the Lighter incident, we found five of those orders, and we correct that here. We also looked at who owns the Safe. Its first deposit, and the Safe that later took in what was left, both lead back to wallets that one project funds.
02 · The walletWhat a Safe wallet is, and who can move its money
Safe, once called Gnosis Safe, is a multisig wallet. It has several owners, and it moves money only when enough of them sign. This Safe had four owners and needed two signatures.
Owners can also add a module. A module is a small program that can move the Safe's money without an owner signature. Teams add one so that daily work does not need a round of signing each time.
This Safe used the Roles module from Zodiac, a set of tools for Safes. The module gives a named wallet a role, a short list of actions that wallet may take. We call that wallet the role wallet.
The role wallet was no stranger to the Safe. It had sent 792 transactions since June 2024, the month the Safe and its module were set up. Zodiac's co-founder called it a long-standing member.
We have seen a module empty a Safe before, in a drain of 2,900 rsETH.
03 · The transactionHow the Safe wallet was drained in one transaction
Late that morning, the role wallet sent one transaction through the module. That transaction did two things.
First, it cashed in the Safe's shares in a Morpho vault. Morpho is a lending protocol, and a vault there pools deposits and lends them out. The shares returned 4.39 million USDC.
Second, it called ParaSwap twice. ParaSwap is a DEX aggregator, an app that routes a swap across exchanges that run on the chain. Each swap on ParaSwap names an executor, the program that carries out the trade. Here, the executor was a new address, and the swap asked for next to nothing in return.
ParaSwap took the Safe's tokens and handed them to that address. Nothing came back to the Safe. The address received all of that USDC and 1.72 million syrupUSDC, a yield token from Maple that trades near $1.19. Together, that is $6.44 million.
| The drain, 16 November 2026 | Figure |
|---|---|
| Time | 11:35 UTC |
| Signed by | The role wallet |
| Owner signatures | None |
| USDC taken | 4,387,188 |
| syrupUSDC taken | 1,717,919 |
| Paid back to the Safe | Nothing |
| Value | $6.44 million |
ParaSwap could take the tokens because the Safe had approved it to. An approval is a standing permission that lets an app move one token out of a wallet. The Safe had given ParaSwap an approval with no limit for both tokens.
So no code broke. The module checked the role, the role allowed the call, and ParaSwap did what the call asked. Zodiac said the same on X. In its words, a custom policy allowed the transaction "but likely never intended" it.
The chain cannot tell a stolen key from an insider. Both sign the same way.
04 · The swapsStablecoins became ETH in 20 minutes
The first swap came two minutes after the drain. The hurry has a plain reason. Circle, the issuer of USDC, can freeze the token in any wallet, as Tether does with USDT. No one can freeze ETH.
The first wallet sent 3.0 million USDC to a second wallet, and both went to work. They made 23 swaps through the swap router of Bitget Wallet, the program that wallet app uses to trade for its users. They made one more trade elsewhere. Our labels, the names Bitquery keeps for known addresses, mark the router. Twenty minutes after the drain, the two wallets had bought 3,274 ETH.
They held back 490,000 USDC for the swap service.
05 · The orders12 orders, $1.89 million and two earlier counts
Twelve minutes after the drain, the thief's wallets began to pay out to 12 new addresses. Six received USDC, and six received ETH. A third wallet made the last two payments. It got the USDC for them by selling ETH.
Each address sent its money into LI.FI, an app that moves money across chains. Minutes later, an account with the same address bought XMR1 on Hyperliquid, an exchange that runs on its own chain. XMR1 is a token on Hyperliquid named after Monero.
Together, the accounts bought 3,657 XMR1 for $1.89 million. The last buy came more than two hours before PeckShield's alert.
The alert counted about $813,000. Our first count was higher and still short. In the Lighter piece, we found five of these orders, worth $1.01 million, and Unchained quoted that figure. We had searched for payments of 100 ETH or more. That search missed seven orders: six paid in USDC and one of 50 ETH.
06 · The serviceWhat a Monero swap service does with the money
The 12 addresses belong to the swap service. Each order there gets its own deposit address.
One wallet gives the pattern away. It sends a little ETH for gas, the fee a transaction costs, to each new deposit address. It paid out to all 12 of these addresses within minutes of their deposits. It pays out to between 110 and 220 new addresses per day.
Two analysts on X, Specter and tanuki42, say the service is Wagyu. We could not confirm the name. Wagyu's own documents describe the same steps: an order, a deposit address, and a bridge that moves Monero to Hyperliquid and back.
The XMR1 was still in those accounts when we last looked. That does not mean the thief is still waiting for Monero. We checked 85 older deposit addresses that the same gas wallet set up the week before. Of those, 44 had bought XMR1, 2,552 in all. Days later, they still held 2,550.
So the service leaves the XMR1 where the order bought it. Our reading is that it pays the customer in real Monero from its own reserve. The chain cannot show that payment. If the service paid, the trail for this $1.89 million ends there. We have traced money in and out of Hyperliquid before.
The service can also say no. That morning, a wallet that took money from Lighter, another exchange, used the same service. The service filled 12 orders for that wallet. An hour after the Safe drain, two more deposits from the wallet, 320 ETH in all, went back to the sender. None of the Safe thief's deposits came back. We found no transfers between the two sets of wallets, so we treat them as two cases.
07 · What is leftThree wallets still held $3.3 million in ETH on 17 November
About half of the money has not gone far. When we last read the chain, three wallets held 1,833 ETH, about $3.3 million. That is 52% of what left the Safe.
The money took a few turns along the way. The wallets sold 680 ETH back into USDC. They used part of that USDC for the last two orders and bought ETH again with most of the rest. The first two wallets are now empty.
The selling has started again. On 17 November, one of the three passed 302 ETH to a new address in three transfers. That address sells through Bitget Wallet, 20 to 30 ETH at a time. It had sold 202 ETH and still held 100 ETH when we last looked.
For anyone who tracks stolen funds, those four addresses are the ones to watch. An exchange can still act if the ETH reaches one of its deposit addresses.
One wallet holds 140,000 USDC and has never sent a transaction. Circle could still freeze that money.
In all, 475 ETH has left through Bitget Wallet. Each sale paid USDT or USDC, $863,000 in all, to a wallet that feeds Bitget's cross-chain bridge. A bridge moves money from one chain to another. Both names come from our labels, and we could not see which chain the money came out on.
You can follow any address in this story with the Bitquery MCP.
08 · The responseThe owners moved in 43 minutes. Two tokens were in reach
The owners moved fast. They replaced one of the Safe's four owners 43 minutes after the drain. Eight minutes later, they began to move the Safe's other tokens to a second Safe, one by one. They were done 63 minutes after the theft.
The thief took two tokens and left the rest. The token approval explains why. Of the Safe's five large holdings, only USDC and syrupUSDC had a ParaSwap approval. The other three had none, so the same trick could not reach them.
We do not know everything the role allowed. We did not decode its full list of rights, so we cannot say what else was at risk.
For anyone who runs a Safe with a role, the lesson is the pairing. A role that may call an aggregator, plus an approval with no limit, adds up to a right to withdraw. An old approval has cost owners before, as in this NFT approval exploit.
| Still open at 06:32 UTC, 17 November | State |
|---|---|
| USDC approval | No limit, to ParaSwap |
| syrupUSDC approval | No limit, to ParaSwap |
| Roles module | Still enabled on the Safe |
| The replaced owner | Still an owner of the Safe that controls the module |
| Tokens at risk now | None. The Safe holds neither token |
The Safe holds neither USDC nor syrupUSDC now, so the open approvals put nothing at risk today. They would matter again if either token came back.
09 · The ownerWho owns the drained Safe wallet?
No one has claimed the wallet. The transfers lead to one treasury.
Start with the second Safe, the one that took in the rest. In November 2025, it sent the drained Safe 7.0 million USDC. In April 2026, it got 5.1 million USDC back. Our reading is that the same people run both, though the two Safes list different owners.
The second Safe gets its money from a third Safe, which has sent it 14.2 million USDC and 11,916 ETH. That third Safe received 140 million SNT, and ETH as well, from a multisig that our labels mark as Status. Status is the project behind a messaging app and the SNT token. Our labels also mark that multisig as the wallet from its token sale.
The drained Safe's own first deposit ties in too. It was 1,000 DAI in July 2024, and it came from a wallet on the third Safe's payroll. That wallet has received 94 million SNT from the third Safe in 27 payments.
So the drained Safe sits inside a group of wallets that the Status-labelled multisig funds. There is another reading. A manager who runs money for Status could own these Safes. The chain cannot tell the two apart. Status has not confirmed our label or the link to the Safe.
10 · The limitsWhat the chain cannot tell us
We do not know who held the role wallet's key, or how the thief got to it.
We cannot see Monero. If the service paid out, we do not know where the coins went.
We did not decode the LI.FI route for each deposit. We tie each deposit to its Hyperliquid account by the shared address, timing and amount.
We did not follow the money past Bitget's bridge wallet. We also did not check what backs XMR1.
11 · The methodHow we traced the Safe wallet drain
We began with the one transaction and read each transfer inside it. Then we read every transfer in and out of the wallets that received the money, and of each wallet they paid. For each wallet, the ETH in minus the ETH out matches its balance on the chain.
On Hyperliquid, we read each account's trades and its balance, using Bitquery's Hyperliquid data and the exchange's own records. We checked the Safe's owners, module and approvals against a public Ethereum node.
We left out the fake tokens that bots sent to the wallets all day, a trick called address poisoning. Dollar values use Bitquery's price for each coin. Names of services come from Bitquery's own labels.
The full Ethereum history is also sold as files, as the Ethereum dataset on the Bitquery Data Store. For cases like this one, we also run crypto investigation services.
Ethereum balances, the Safe's settings and the Hyperliquid accounts were read at 06:32 UTC on 17 November 2026. Transfers were read up to that time. Anything after that is not covered.
The owner of the Safe has not made a statement. Safe and Zodiac have said only that their code worked as built. Their later reports may describe the event differently.
The thief's wallets are tied to each other and to the Safe by the transfers between them. We attribute them to nobody.
The 12 deposit addresses are tied to the thief's wallets by the payments they received. The link from each deposit to each Hyperliquid account rests on the shared address, the timing and the amount. We did not decode the LI.FI route.
We call the swap service a service because one gas wallet funds more than a hundred new deposit addresses per day. We could not confirm its name. Wagyu is the name two analysts gave it.
That the service pays out in Monero from its own reserve is our reading. It rests on 44 older accounts that still hold the XMR1 they bought. We cannot see Monero payments, and we did not check what backs XMR1.
The Bitget names are Bitquery's own labels on a swap router and a bridge wallet. We do not say Bitget knew where the money came from.
The thief was still moving and selling ETH when we took the snapshot. Balances and shares will be lower after it.
The two deposits that went back to the Lighter wallet may have been refused by the service or pulled back by the sender. We saw only the return.
The Status name is Bitquery's own label on one multisig. The link from that multisig to the drained Safe runs through three other wallets and rests on transfers. Status has not confirmed it, and a manager acting for Status would leave the same trail.
The $6.44 million values syrupUSDC at $1.19, Bitquery's price for 16 November. ETH is valued at $1,827, the price at 06:32 UTC on 17 November.
We did not decode the role's full permissions. That only two tokens were in reach is our reading of the Safe's approvals.
Links between wallets are money links. They do not prove who controls a wallet.
12 · The recordThe addresses behind the Safe wallet drain
Follow the money in plain English
Every transfer in this story comes from Bitquery's data. The Bitquery MCP server puts that data behind an AI assistant, so you can ask where a wallet's money went without writing a query. The full history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store, as the Ethereum dataset.
This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any token or asset, or to use or avoid any exchange, wallet, bridge, protocol or service.
The findings describe transactions and balances observed on Ethereum and Hyperliquid on 16 and 17 November 2026, and earlier transfers between 2022 and 2026. Attributions come from on-chain behaviour and Bitquery's own labels; they may be incomplete or incorrect and may be revised as more data becomes available. The owner of the Safe has not published a report, and its findings may differ from those described here.
References to Safe, Zodiac, Gnosis Guild, ParaSwap, Morpho, Maple, Circle, Tether, Bitget, Bitget Wallet, LI.FI, Hyperliquid, Wagyu, Lighter, Status, PeckShield or any other named project, company or service describe what the public record shows and what those parties have said in public. They are not statements about any party's intent, security practices, solvency or conduct, and nothing here asserts that any named party acted unlawfully or negligently or knew of the events described. The wallets that took and moved the money are described by their behaviour and attributed to nobody.
Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and company names are the property of their respective owners.
Reported by Gaurav Agarwal for Bitquery Research, with AI tools; every figure was checked against the raw data.
FAQ
Was Safe hacked?
No. One Safe wallet lost $6.44 million on 16 November 2026, and nothing in the transaction points to a flaw in Safe's own contracts. The transaction went through a Roles module that the wallet's owners had added. A wallet with a role on that module signed it. No owner did.
How was the Gnosis Safe wallet drained?
A wallet with a role on the Safe sent one transaction. It turned the Safe's Morpho vault shares into USDC, then called ParaSwap twice. Each call named the thief's wallet as the executor of the swap and asked for next to nothing back. The Safe had approved ParaSwap for both tokens with no limit, so ParaSwap moved them.
How much was taken from the Safe wallet?
The thief took 4.39 million USDC and 1.72 million syrupUSDC. At Bitquery's price for syrupUSDC that day, the two come to $6.44 million. PeckShield's alert put the loss at $6.45 million.
Where did the money go?
When we last read the chain, 52% of it sat as ETH in three wallets, about $3.3 million. A fourth address was selling more ETH. Another $1.89 million went through a Monero swap service. A smaller part left through Bitget Wallet to a bridge wallet. One wallet holds USDC that it has not moved.
Did the thief get Monero?
Probably, yes. That answer covers the $1.89 million that went through the swap service. The service bought XMR1 on Hyperliquid for each order and still holds it. Older orders at the same service look the same days later, so the XMR1 stays with the service. A payout in real Monero would not show on any chain we can read.
What is XMR1?
XMR1 is a token on Hyperliquid named after Monero, a privacy coin. A swap service buys it when a customer orders Monero. We did not check what backs the token.
Who owns the drained Safe?
No one has said. The Safe's first deposit came from a wallet that a Status-funded Safe pays, and a second Safe from the same group took in the rest of its holdings. The name Status comes from Bitquery's labels on one multisig. Status has not confirmed the label or that it owns the Safe.
Can the stolen funds be frozen?
Only a small part. Circle can freeze the USDC that sits in one wallet. No one can freeze ETH, which is where 52% of the money sat on 17 November. An exchange can still act if that ETH arrives at one of its deposit addresses.
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