$954,703 in stablecoins left Reental's lending app, twice the reported loss. MEV bots took $454,825 before the admin keyholder could.
An alert said a property-backed lending app on Polygon lost $454K. We followed every transfer from the morning's first code change to the last bridge out.
- $955K
- $455K
- $500K
- $49.3M
- $10.0M
- Open
01 · What happenedReental's lending app lost $955K in dollar tokens
On 18 November, someone emptied a crypto lending app in about an hour. The app paid about 12% per year to people who lent it dollars. Borrowers put up tokens that stand for shares in property. A security firm's alert put the loss at $454K.
The app is RNT Lend. It belongs to Reental, a Spanish company that sells tokenized real estate on Polygon, a blockchain. Lenders deposit stablecoins, tokens meant to hold $1. Borrowers take those dollars and lock up their property tokens as collateral, the security a lender can seize.
The alert came from Blockaid at 12:39 UTC. It said an admin had changed the code of the app's two dollar markets so that anyone could empty them. News sites repeated that figure.
Bitquery reads every transfer on Polygon, so we traced the morning's moves one by one. The stablecoin loss is twice the reported figure. Two MEV bots, programs that race to grab money left in public view, took the part the alert counted. Whoever held Reental's admin key, which can change the app's code, took about 10% more than the bots and sent it all to other chains within the hour.
The keyholder also took property tokens worth $49.34 million. Reental took them all back within about two hours. The app was still open to the same trick when we last checked.
02 · The appWhat RNT Lend is, and what its admin key can do
Reental splits property projects into tokens and sells them to the public. Each token stands for a share of one project. RNT Lend priced them at $100 to $110 each before the drain.
RNT Lend runs on code copied from Aave, a large lending app. Its lending pool had 105 property markets and two dollar markets. One was for USDT0, the Tether dollar used on Polygon, and one for USDC. Each market keeps its coins in a contract called an aToken. A contract is a program that lives at its own address on the chain and holds money by itself.
Someone has to be able to fix that code. In RNT Lend, an admin key can. A key is the secret that signs for an address. This one can swap the program behind each market for a new one. The key had signed Reental's contracts since May 2023, including a Reental Safe, a shared wallet that needs several owners to sign.
03 · Twenty secondsMEV bots beat the keyholder to $455K
The morning began at 11:39 UTC, when the admin key put two new contracts on the chain. Half a minute later, it handed the pool's admin rights to one of them.
About a minute after that, it swapped the program behind both dollar markets. The new program has one job. It sends the market's coins to any address the caller names. It does not check who the caller is.
Twenty seconds later, both markets were empty. One MEV bot took the cash from the USDT0 market. It is a program that watches transactions before they are confirmed, and pays to go first. A second bot took the cash from the USDC market. That came to $454,825, all the cash the two markets held.
The keyholder tried the same thing within seconds. A block is a batch of transactions that the chain confirms together. Senders can pay a tip to go first. The bots sat first in their blocks, and the keyholder's two calls sat further back in the same blocks and failed because, by then, the money had gone. The USDT0 bot paid about 240,000 times the keyholder's tip.
Blockaid's alert listed the USDT0 bot as the exploiter. That bot went on the chain on 28 October and has since taken small sums from many addresses. The USDC bot has run since August 2024. Neither bot has sent money to the keyholder's wallets, or got any from them, in the past year.
The keyholder changed tactics after that. It put a new program on the chain 17 minutes after the bots won. This one does the same job but obeys only the admin key. The keyholder used it for the user wallets and the property tokens.
04 · The other halfThe keyholder took $499,877 and moved it off Polygon
Ten minutes after the bots, the keyholder started on three other kinds of Reental accounts. Each sent its Tether dollars to one new wallet.
The largest part came from 1,149 wallets that Reental's own wallet factory had made for its users. The keyholder swapped the program behind all of them for the locked one, then drained them in five batches. We checked 15 of those wallets at random. Each was opened by a different address, between 2023 and this August, which fits one wallet per user.
Two Safes had given a Reental contract standing permission to move their Tether dollars. The keyholder swapped that contract's program and used the permission. A third Reental contract let the keyholder pull from two more Safes.
By 12:37 UTC, less than an hour after the bots, a second wallet had sent those Tether dollars on. They went to two bridges, services that move money from one chain to another. Relay got almost all of it, in six transfers, most of them round sums. Bridgers got the rest. Less than a cent was left behind. We could not see where it went next. Each bridge keeps the link between a deposit and its payout in its own books. The money from the Kava Lend drain on 14 November also left through bridges within hours.
05 · Out and backProperty tokens worth $49.34 million left, and all came back
The keyholder then turned to the property tokens. Starting at 12:22, over about twenty minutes, it swapped the program behind 89 property markets. It then pulled out all the tokens that borrowers had locked there, worth $20.98 million at the pool's own prices.
It also reached into Reental's own Safe. Reental has a token manager, a contract that can move its property tokens between wallets without the holder's signature. The admin key could use it. The keyholder moved five kinds of tokens out of the Safe, worth $28.36 million at the same prices. One more token, which the pool does not price, came from another address.
Reental used the same tool to strike back. Half an hour after Blockaid's alert, a new Safe appeared, owned by eight of the old Safe's owners. Reental moved the old Safe's Tether dollars into it. Then three owners of the old Safe signed a transaction that pulled the six tokens back from the keyholder's wallet. An hour later, one more transaction pulled back all 89. At our snapshot, the keyholder held no property tokens at all.
Many tokens for real assets carry a switch like this, as we found in our study of stock-token issuers. Here it worked in both directions within about two hours.
06 · The lendersRNT Lend's lenders had $10.01 million in, and $454,825 in cash
Before the drain, lenders had $10.01 million in the two dollar markets. Borrowers had $9.57 million of it on loan. The markets kept less than 5% as cash, and the bots took that.
A lending app that pays about 12% has to lend out most of what it takes in, so a thin cash buffer is normal. The loans have not gone away. The borrowers still owe the money, and their collateral now sits with Reental instead of the pool. When lenders can withdraw, and how much, is a question only Reental can answer.
The two dollar markets no longer work. Deposits and withdrawals fail, and any coins paid into those markets can be taken. When we last checked, at 16:17 UTC on 18 November, the pool had not been paused. Do not send any money to RNT Lend until Reental says the pool is fixed.
07 · The keyWhose admin key was it?
The key is Reental's own. It signed the setup of the company's Safe, its wallet factory and its token manager in 2023. On 25 September, it became a MetaMask smart account, a setting that lets a normal address run extra code. It sat unused from 5 November until the first step of the drain.
At 12:08, in the middle of the drain, the key also sent a transaction from the Safe that owns the pool. Three of that Safe's nine owners had signed it, the key among them. That step added a new property token, RET-4, as a market. Nothing was borrowed against it.
The chain cannot tell a stolen key from an insider, because both sign the same way. It does show Reental's other owners moving against the key. They set up a new Safe and pulled the tokens back. Reental had not commented publicly when we published.
Two days earlier, a Safe wallet lost millions to a trusted key as well. Keys with that much power have failed before, as in the Lootbot drain.
08 · The methodHow we traced the RNT Lend drain
We read each transfer into and out of the keyholder's wallets, and each step the key took that day. For each step, we read the receipt from a public node. We read the pool's deposits, debts, cash and prices one block before the first code change.
Prices for the property tokens are the pool's own, set by Reental. We tested what the broken markets do with dry runs, which ask a node what a call would do without sending it. We left out the fake tokens that bots sent to these wallets all day, a trick called address poisoning. Names of services come from Bitquery's own labels.
The full Polygon history is also sold as files, as the Polygon dataset on the Bitquery Data Store. For cases like this one, we also run crypto investigation services.
Balances and the pool's state were read at 16:17 UTC on 18 November 2026, at block 97,542,140. Anything after that is not covered.
The chain shows that one key signed each step. It cannot show who held the key, or whether it was stolen.
The 1,149 wallets came from Reental's wallet factory. That they belong to Reental's users rests on a sample of 15, each opened by a different address.
Property token values use the pool's own price for each token, which Reental sets. We did not check what the tokens would fetch in a sale.
In dry runs from real users' addresses, a small repayment went through and a small deposit failed. That a repayment lands where anyone can take it is read from the pool's code.
We did not follow the money past Relay and Bridgers. The link between a deposit and its payout sits in each bridge's own records.
Bot and service names come from on-chain behaviour and Bitquery's own labels.
Reental's other owners may have taken steps that did not touch the addresses we read.
09 · The recordThe addresses behind the RNT Lend drain
Follow the money in plain English
Every transfer in this story comes from Bitquery's data. The Bitquery MCP server puts that data behind an AI assistant, so you can ask where a wallet's money went without writing a query. The full history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store, as the Polygon dataset.
This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any token or asset, or to use or avoid any exchange, wallet, bridge, protocol or service.
The findings describe transactions and balances observed on Polygon on 18 November 2026, and earlier transactions between 2023 and 2026. Attributions come from on-chain behaviour and Bitquery's own labels; they may be incomplete or incorrect and may be revised as more data becomes available. Reental has not published a report, and its findings may differ from those described here.
References to Reental, RNT Lend, Aave, Polygon, Tether, Circle, MetaMask, Safe, Relay, Bridgers, Blockaid or any other named project, company or service describe what the public record shows and what those parties have said in public. They are not statements about any party's intent, security practices, solvency or conduct, and nothing here asserts that any named party acted unlawfully or negligently or knew of the events described. The wallets that took and moved the money are described by their behaviour and attributed to nobody.
Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and company names are the property of their respective owners.
Reported by Gaurav Agarwal for Bitquery Research, with AI tools; every figure was checked against the raw data.
FAQ
Was Reental hacked?
Someone used Reental's own admin key to empty its lending app on 18 November 2026. The chain cannot show whether the key was stolen or used by an insider. Reental's other Safe owners acted against the key within hours, and Reental has not yet said what happened.
How much was taken from RNT Lend?
$954,703 in stablecoins left the app, twice the first reported figure. Two MEV bots took 48%, and the keyholder took the rest. Reental got back all the property tokens that were also taken.
What is an MEV bot?
An MEV bot is a program that watches transactions before the chain confirms them. It pays a higher fee to put its own first. Here, two bots saw that the new code would pay anyone, and they emptied both dollar markets before the keyholder could.
Where did the money go?
The bots kept their share in their own wallets. The keyholder sent the rest through two bridges, Relay and Bridgers, to other chains. We could not see where it arrived.
Did Reental get the property tokens back?
Yes. Reental's token manager can move its property tokens between wallets. Reental used it twice that day and pulled back all the property tokens the keyholder took.
Is RNT Lend safe to use now?
We last checked at 16:17 UTC on 18 November. The two dollar markets still ran the broken code, and the pool was not paused. Do not send money to it until Reental says it is fixed.
What is an aToken?
An aToken is the contract that holds one market's coins in a lending app built on Aave's code. Whoever controls the program behind it controls the coins inside.
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