On-chain investigationPolygon18 November 2026

$954,703 in stablecoins left Reental's lending app, twice the reported loss. MEV bots took $454,825 before the admin keyholder could.

An alert said a property-backed lending app on Polygon lost $454K. We followed every transfer from the morning's first code change to the last bridge out.

At a glance
Reental's lending app on Polygon lost $954,703 in stablecoins on 18 November, twice the $454K in the first alert. Someone used Reental's own admin key to swap the code behind the app's two dollar markets for code that paid anyone. Two MEV bots got there first and took $454,825. The keyholder took another $499,877 from user wallets and Safes and sent it to other chains within the hour. It also took $49.34 million in property tokens, and Reental pulled all of them back within about two hours. Lenders had $10.01 million in the pool, and $454,825 of it was cash. The pool was still open when we last checked.
$955K
Stablecoins out, twice the first figure
$455K
Taken by two MEV bots
$500K
Taken by the admin keyholder, then bridged
$49.3M
Property tokens taken, all returned
Key findingsEach line has its own share link
  1. $955K

    In stablecoins left Reental's RNT Lend on 18 November. That is twice the $454K in the first alert.

  2. $455K

    Went to two MEV bots. They beat the keyholder to the open code by seconds, and the keyholder's own calls failed.

  3. $500K

    Taken by whoever held the admin key, from 1,149 user wallets and four Safes. All of it left Polygon through two bridges within the hour.

  4. $49.3M

    In property tokens taken at the pool's own prices. Reental pulled every one back within about two hours.

  5. $10.0M

    In lender deposits stood behind $454,825 of cash, and the bots took all of that cash.

  6. Open

    The pool had not been paused at 16:17 UTC. Money paid into its dollar markets can still be taken.

01 · What happenedReental's lending app lost $955K in dollar tokens

On 18 November, someone emptied a crypto lending app in about an hour. The app paid about 12% per year to people who lent it dollars. Borrowers put up tokens that stand for shares in property. A security firm's alert put the loss at $454K.

The app is RNT Lend. It belongs to Reental, a Spanish company that sells tokenized real estate on Polygon, a blockchain. Lenders deposit stablecoins, tokens meant to hold $1. Borrowers take those dollars and lock up their property tokens as collateral, the security a lender can seize.

The alert came from Blockaid at 12:39 UTC. It said an admin had changed the code of the app's two dollar markets so that anyone could empty them. News sites repeated that figure.

Bitquery reads every transfer on Polygon, so we traced the morning's moves one by one. The stablecoin loss is twice the reported figure. Two MEV bots, programs that race to grab money left in public view, took the part the alert counted. Whoever held Reental's admin key, which can change the app's code, took about 10% more than the bots and sent it all to other chains within the hour.

The keyholder also took property tokens worth $49.34 million. Reental took them all back within about two hours. The app was still open to the same trick when we last checked.

MEV bots took $454,825 and the keyholder took $499,877the stablecoins that left RNT Lend on 18 November
WHERE THE $954,703 WENTMEV bots: $454,825Keyholder: $499,877294,040 USDT0160,785 USDCRelay $489,777Blockaid's alert: $454K. That is the bots' part.Bridgers $10,100Bots, USDT0Bots, USDCTo RelayTo BridgersUSDT0 and USDC both trade near $1. Amounts from the transfer records on Polygon.
Every part is a transfer on Polygon, from the Polygon dataset. The first alert's figure covers only the bots' part.

02 · The appWhat RNT Lend is, and what its admin key can do

Reental splits property projects into tokens and sells them to the public. Each token stands for a share of one project. RNT Lend priced them at $100 to $110 each before the drain.

RNT Lend runs on code copied from Aave, a large lending app. Its lending pool had 105 property markets and two dollar markets. One was for USDT0, the Tether dollar used on Polygon, and one for USDC. Each market keeps its coins in a contract called an aToken. A contract is a program that lives at its own address on the chain and holds money by itself.

Someone has to be able to fix that code. In RNT Lend, an admin key can. A key is the secret that signs for an address. This one can swap the program behind each market for a new one. The key had signed Reental's contracts since May 2023, including a Reental Safe, a shared wallet that needs several owners to sign.

03 · Twenty secondsMEV bots beat the keyholder to $455K

The stablecoins were gone within an hour; the property tokens came back within about two hours18 November 2026, in UTC
18 NOVEMBER 2026, IN UTCAdmin keyMEV botsAlertReental's other owners11:39The admin key puts two new contracts on the chain11:40It hands the pool's admin rights to one of them11:41It swaps the code behind both dollar markets11:41Two MEV bots empty both markets: $454,82511:51It starts on 1,149 user wallets and four Safes11:58It deploys a version only its own key can use12:05The first USDT0 leaves through a bridge12:08The key sends a Safe transaction that lists RET-412:22It starts pulling 89 kinds of property token12:32It pulls five tokens out of Reental's Safe12:37The last of the $499,877 leaves through a bridge12:39Blockaid posts its alert13:12A new Reental Safe appears13:19Reental moves 14,177.61 USDT0 into it13:23Reental pulls six tokens back14:23Reental pulls all 89 pool tokens backTimes from the transaction receipts on Polygon; the alert time from its post on X.
Amber steps were signed by Reental's key. Teal steps came from the other owners of Reental's Safe.

The morning began at 11:39 UTC, when the admin key put two new contracts on the chain. Half a minute later, it handed the pool's admin rights to one of them.

About a minute after that, it swapped the program behind both dollar markets. The new program has one job. It sends the market's coins to any address the caller names. It does not check who the caller is.

Twenty seconds later, both markets were empty. One MEV bot took the cash from the USDT0 market. It is a program that watches transactions before they are confirmed, and pays to go first. A second bot took the cash from the USDC market. That came to $454,825, all the cash the two markets held.

The keyholder tried the same thing within seconds. A block is a batch of transactions that the chain confirms together. Senders can pay a tip to go first. The bots sat first in their blocks, and the keyholder's two calls sat further back in the same blocks and failed because, by then, the money had gone. The USDT0 bot paid about 240,000 times the keyholder's tip.

The bots sat first in both blocks; the keyholder's calls failedevery transaction that tried to take the cash
WHO GOT IN FIRSTEach row is one transaction. Bars show the tip paid, on a log scale.100 gwei10,0001 million100 millionUSDT0 market, block of 11:41:58Place 0: USDT0 bottook the cashPlace 3: USDC botfailedPlace 15: Another addressfailedPlace 21: KeyholderfailedUSDC market, block of 11:42:02Place 0: USDC bottook the cashPlace 8: Another addressfailedPlace 14: Keyholderfailed
A tip is the extra fee a sender pays to go first. The USDT0 bot paid about 240,000 times the keyholder's tip.

Blockaid's alert listed the USDT0 bot as the exploiter. That bot went on the chain on 28 October and has since taken small sums from many addresses. The USDC bot has run since August 2024. Neither bot has sent money to the keyholder's wallets, or got any from them, in the past year.

The keyholder changed tactics after that. It put a new program on the chain 17 minutes after the bots won. This one does the same job but obeys only the admin key. The keyholder used it for the user wallets and the property tokens.

04 · The other halfThe keyholder took $499,877 and moved it off Polygon

Ten minutes after the bots, the keyholder started on three other kinds of Reental accounts. Each sent its Tether dollars to one new wallet.

$340,083 came from wallets made for 1,149 userswhere the keyholder's USDT0 came from
WHERE THE KEYHOLDER'S $499,877 CAME FROMWallets made for 1,149 users$340,083, in five batchesTwo Safes, through a standing permission$115,388Two more Safes, through a third contract$44,401Other$5All of it went to one new wallet, then out through two bridges within the hour.
The keyholder swapped the code behind each source, then pulled the USDT0 into one new wallet between 11:51 and 11:59 UTC.

The largest part came from 1,149 wallets that Reental's own wallet factory had made for its users. The keyholder swapped the program behind all of them for the locked one, then drained them in five batches. We checked 15 of those wallets at random. Each was opened by a different address, between 2023 and this August, which fits one wallet per user.

Two Safes had given a Reental contract standing permission to move their Tether dollars. The keyholder swapped that contract's program and used the permission. A third Reental contract let the keyholder pull from two more Safes.

By 12:37 UTC, less than an hour after the bots, a second wallet had sent those Tether dollars on. They went to two bridges, services that move money from one chain to another. Relay got almost all of it, in six transfers, most of them round sums. Bridgers got the rest. Less than a cent was left behind. We could not see where it went next. Each bridge keeps the link between a deposit and its payout in its own books. The money from the Kava Lend drain on 14 November also left through bridges within hours.

Two routes out for the stablecoins, and one route back for the property tokensthe money trail on Polygon
THE MONEY TRAILTwo dollar markets294,040 USDT0160,785 USDCTwo MEV botstook $454,825at 11:41 UTCcode swapped by the keyReental user wallets, Safes1,149 wallets, four Safes$499,877 in USDT0Two new walletsone collects, one sends onbetween 11:51 and 12:37Relay$489,777 in six transfersBridgers$10,100Pool markets, Reental's Safe$20.98 million and $28.36 millionin property tokensThe keyholder's wallets$49.34 million at the pool's pricesfrom 12:22Reental's new Safeevery token backby 14:23 UTCArrows are transfers on Polygon. The bridges pay out on other chains; we could not see where.Balances read at 16:17 UTC on 18 November 2026.
Short labels stand for the full addresses in the record below.

05 · Out and backProperty tokens worth $49.34 million left, and all came back

The keyholder then turned to the property tokens. Starting at 12:22, over about twenty minutes, it swapped the program behind 89 property markets. It then pulled out all the tokens that borrowers had locked there, worth $20.98 million at the pool's own prices.

It also reached into Reental's own Safe. Reental has a token manager, a contract that can move its property tokens between wallets without the holder's signature. The admin key could use it. The keyholder moved five kinds of tokens out of the Safe, worth $28.36 million at the same prices. One more token, which the pool does not price, came from another address.

$49.34 million in property tokens left, and all came backproperty tokens the keyholder took, at the pool's own prices
$49.34 MILLION IN PROPERTY TOKENS, OUT AND BACK89 kinds, pulled from the pool: $20.98 milliontaken 12:22 to 12:44back at 14:23Five kinds, pulled from Reental's Safe: $28.36 milliontaken at 12:32back at 13:23At our snapshot, 16:17 UTC, the keyholder held none of them.Values use the pool's own price for each token, which Reental sets.
Reental moved them back with its token manager. Each token's price is the pool's own, which Reental sets.

Reental used the same tool to strike back. Half an hour after Blockaid's alert, a new Safe appeared, owned by eight of the old Safe's owners. Reental moved the old Safe's Tether dollars into it. Then three owners of the old Safe signed a transaction that pulled the six tokens back from the keyholder's wallet. An hour later, one more transaction pulled back all 89. At our snapshot, the keyholder held no property tokens at all.

Many tokens for real assets carry a switch like this, as we found in our study of stock-token issuers. Here it worked in both directions within about two hours.

06 · The lendersRNT Lend's lenders had $10.01 million in, and $454,825 in cash

Before the drain, lenders had $10.01 million in the two dollar markets. Borrowers had $9.57 million of it on loan. The markets kept less than 5% as cash, and the bots took that.

Lenders had $10.01 million in; less than 5% of it was cashRNT Lend's two dollar markets, one block before the drain
LENDERS HAD $10.01 MILLION IN. $454,825 WAS CASHUSDT0Deposited $7.93 million, on loan $7.65 million, cash $294,040USDCDeposited $2.08 million, on loan $1.92 million, cash $160,785Cash, all taken by the botsLent to borrowersRead from the pool one block before the first code change.
Busy lending pools lend out most of what they take in. The cash is what lenders can withdraw at once.

A lending app that pays about 12% has to lend out most of what it takes in, so a thin cash buffer is normal. The loans have not gone away. The borrowers still owe the money, and their collateral now sits with Reental instead of the pool. When lenders can withdraw, and how much, is a question only Reental can answer.

The two dollar markets no longer work. Deposits and withdrawals fail, and any coins paid into those markets can be taken. When we last checked, at 16:17 UTC on 18 November, the pool had not been paused. Do not send any money to RNT Lend until Reental says the pool is fixed.

07 · The keyWhose admin key was it?

The key is Reental's own. It signed the setup of the company's Safe, its wallet factory and its token manager in 2023. On 25 September, it became a MetaMask smart account, a setting that lets a normal address run extra code. It sat unused from 5 November until the first step of the drain.

At 12:08, in the middle of the drain, the key also sent a transaction from the Safe that owns the pool. Three of that Safe's nine owners had signed it, the key among them. That step added a new property token, RET-4, as a market. Nothing was borrowed against it.

The chain cannot tell a stolen key from an insider, because both sign the same way. It does show Reental's other owners moving against the key. They set up a new Safe and pulled the tokens back. Reental had not commented publicly when we published.

Two days earlier, a Safe wallet lost millions to a trusted key as well. Keys with that much power have failed before, as in the Lootbot drain.

08 · The methodHow we traced the RNT Lend drain

We read each transfer into and out of the keyholder's wallets, and each step the key took that day. For each step, we read the receipt from a public node. We read the pool's deposits, debts, cash and prices one block before the first code change.

Prices for the property tokens are the pool's own, set by Reental. We tested what the broken markets do with dry runs, which ask a node what a call would do without sending it. We left out the fake tokens that bots sent to these wallets all day, a trick called address poisoning. Names of services come from Bitquery's own labels.

The full Polygon history is also sold as files, as the Polygon dataset on the Bitquery Data Store. For cases like this one, we also run crypto investigation services.

Limits on these findings

Balances and the pool's state were read at 16:17 UTC on 18 November 2026, at block 97,542,140. Anything after that is not covered.

The chain shows that one key signed each step. It cannot show who held the key, or whether it was stolen.

The 1,149 wallets came from Reental's wallet factory. That they belong to Reental's users rests on a sample of 15, each opened by a different address.

Property token values use the pool's own price for each token, which Reental sets. We did not check what the tokens would fetch in a sale.

In dry runs from real users' addresses, a small repayment went through and a small deposit failed. That a repayment lands where anyone can take it is read from the pool's code.

We did not follow the money past Relay and Bridgers. The link between a deposit and its payout sits in each bridge's own records.

Bot and service names come from on-chain behaviour and Bitquery's own labels.

Reental's other owners may have taken steps that did not touch the addresses we read.

09 · The recordThe addresses behind the RNT Lend drain

0x67dc8037db6309dd5571d82c65f5f593f7da1505
0xfaf2338e041258a43c062d60296a9f8f0f8c2121
0xd3cb693d157816dd4a9de27b62c6e723db49d880
0x30729b6910757042024304e56beb015821462691
0xa97dcfe2728c0d20a5833f46d0c6fe58a0cb317fb31fb1b33ce39ea97d727e93
0xb977d09c1cb4f74c6b33ed0c0a4f5b9536b0c48f86adda65ca072694b2e0642f
0x60674299d2ca76176ab9041129c3c3a6ed682a478a2b1c6511628c9e222afa79
0xb0fe6e9c4ea2d567e1fb6e45ecf2c9ddb3401101
0x301789888805e1967b9db7cb48dd896fba7144b9
0xde0a99fb39e78efd3529e31d78434f7645601163
0xda45c0b318784ce04a494b112b00588889006c19
0x9ff1a6a5f3ecf28672206ee7113a73ccc85e83b8
0x4cd00e387622c35bddb9b4c962c136462338bc31
0xc1d13492285eb664951e201bf7c80c7c6318a1b5
0x11a6f1e9ac749aea790340fa3c2f6a0d4c7fa6bb
0x9b0f397db67907057a3b8ca73a4488438996c949
0x48141c561c7cbc5700ab50bd1df96f27cca72906
0x414f65a595b1cb51b685c936169a3bbdf5dc07c5
0x38bbfc389c6e3e52ca7c66583245ae3f55f6add5
0xab652faf57f77b4e61ec341dce0f2fed2321f275e61fe15804fd41b69b245555
0xedf90856608bfa85f874e48b6395edceca3a2c801f6ef42f6181eaa16f35fedb
Run it yourself

Follow the money in plain English

Every transfer in this story comes from Bitquery's data. The Bitquery MCP server puts that data behind an AI assistant, so you can ask where a wallet's money went without writing a query. The full history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store, as the Polygon dataset.

Follow USDT0 and USDC from a wallet, one transfer at a timeList every transaction an address sent in one hourRead who deployed a contract, and whenCheck an address against Bitquery's labels
Explore Bitquery MCP →Polygon data from Bitquery and a public Polygon node. Data read on 18 November 2026.
Legal disclaimer

This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any token or asset, or to use or avoid any exchange, wallet, bridge, protocol or service.

The findings describe transactions and balances observed on Polygon on 18 November 2026, and earlier transactions between 2023 and 2026. Attributions come from on-chain behaviour and Bitquery's own labels; they may be incomplete or incorrect and may be revised as more data becomes available. Reental has not published a report, and its findings may differ from those described here.

References to Reental, RNT Lend, Aave, Polygon, Tether, Circle, MetaMask, Safe, Relay, Bridgers, Blockaid or any other named project, company or service describe what the public record shows and what those parties have said in public. They are not statements about any party's intent, security practices, solvency or conduct, and nothing here asserts that any named party acted unlawfully or negligently or knew of the events described. The wallets that took and moved the money are described by their behaviour and attributed to nobody.

Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and company names are the property of their respective owners.

Reported by Gaurav Agarwal for Bitquery Research, with AI tools; every figure was checked against the raw data.

FAQ

Was Reental hacked?

Someone used Reental's own admin key to empty its lending app on 18 November 2026. The chain cannot show whether the key was stolen or used by an insider. Reental's other Safe owners acted against the key within hours, and Reental has not yet said what happened.

How much was taken from RNT Lend?

$954,703 in stablecoins left the app, twice the first reported figure. Two MEV bots took 48%, and the keyholder took the rest. Reental got back all the property tokens that were also taken.

What is an MEV bot?

An MEV bot is a program that watches transactions before the chain confirms them. It pays a higher fee to put its own first. Here, two bots saw that the new code would pay anyone, and they emptied both dollar markets before the keyholder could.

Where did the money go?

The bots kept their share in their own wallets. The keyholder sent the rest through two bridges, Relay and Bridgers, to other chains. We could not see where it arrived.

Did Reental get the property tokens back?

Yes. Reental's token manager can move its property tokens between wallets. Reental used it twice that day and pulled back all the property tokens the keyholder took.

Is RNT Lend safe to use now?

We last checked at 16:17 UTC on 18 November. The two dollar markets still ran the broken code, and the pool was not paused. Do not send money to it until Reental says it is fixed.

What is an aToken?

An aToken is the contract that holds one market's coins in a lending app built on Aave's code. Whoever controls the program behind it controls the coins inside.

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