Most MIM loans on Ethereum have no one to repay them
A stablecoin crashed and its maker leaned on the people who owe it. We went through the books on Ethereum, market by market, to see who those people are. For most of the debt, there is no one.
- 34.7M
- 24.4M
- 7.4M
- 230K
- 13
01 · The crashMIM loses its dollar
MIM, short for Magic Internet Money, is Abracadabra's stablecoin. You mint it by borrowing against crypto in one of Abracadabra's lending markets, which it calls cauldrons. Each MIM is meant to be worth a dollar, because each one is backed by a loan and the collateral behind it.
MIM held its dollar through May. It slipped on June 12, came back for a few days, and broke for good on June 24. By the end of June it traded at 16 cents, and in late September at about 7 cents. Crypto Times reported that heavy selling met thin trading, with no sign of a hack. Our data fits that. No MIM was minted or burned on Ethereum in June, so the fall came from selling.
| Date | Price |
|---|---|
| May 2026 | $0.995 to $1.000 |
| Jun 12 | $0.97 |
| Jun 14 | $0.74 |
| Jun 24 | $0.62 |
| Jun 25 | $0.45 |
| Jun 30 | $0.16 |
| Jul 31 | $0.071 |
| Aug 31 | $0.054 |
| Sep 22 | $0.073 |
02 · The fixHigher rates, more debt
Abracadabra said it would raise rates on all its markets, old ones too, so that people would pay back their loans and less of it would be out there. On Ethereum it changed the rate on 13 markets on June 25. The rises were small.
| Market | June 24 | After |
|---|---|---|
| yvDAI | 3.06% | 5.33% |
| WBTC | 0.50% | 1% |
| yvCurve-stETH | 0.87% | 1.52% |
| Attacker, market one | 0% | 1% |
| Attacker, market two | 0% | 1% |
The debt did not shrink. Its Ethereum books recorded 33.9 million at the end of May and 34.7 million in late September. Most of the debt has no one who will pay it, and interest kept adding to it.
03 · Who owes itFour kinds of debt
We read every Ethereum market that records more than a thousand in debt, straight from the contract, and worked out who owes each one.
| Whose | Owed | Share | Loans |
|---|---|---|---|
| Left behind | 24.41M | 70% | 1,096 |
| Attacker | 7.40M | 21% | 4 |
| Real, short | 2.18M | 6% | 491 |
| Real, backed | 664,291 | 2% | 840 |
| All | 34.65M | 100% | 2,431 |
04 · Left behindThe 2024 move
In March 2024, the lender moved its old markets off Sushi's BentoBox, the shared vault they used, and onto its own DegenBox. It set up a new market for each old one. On March 30 it took the backing out of the old ones, put it into the new ones and copied each loan across, amount for amount.
The people who had borrowed carried on in the new ones, and most have since paid back. The old markets were never cleared. They still say the same loans are owed, with nothing behind them.
| Market | Copy, start | Copy now | Old now |
|---|---|---|---|
| yvWETH | 10.57M | 6,388 | 10.57M |
| Tricrypto | 11.58M | 971,854 | 12.50M |
One old entry even grew by 0.9 million over the summer, when a single call to it booked interest on paper. The lender made the same kind of move with two markets in December 2022, and those old entries have since been cleared.
05 · The attackerLoans from the January 2024 hack
On January 30, 2024, an attacker used a rounding flaw to borrow MIM from two markets with almost no backing, as reported at the time. The loans that attack opened are still on the books. They record 7.4 million against backing worth about 42,000. In June, the lender raised the rate on both from zero to 1% per year, so this debt now grows too.
06 · What is realAbout 2.8 million
Take out the left-behind entries and the attacker, and 2.8 million MIM is owed by real borrowers. Most of that is short of backing, mainly loans from the 2024 copies whose tokens have lost value. Fewer than fifty borrowers owe more than a thousand MIM each.
They did respond to the crash, a few hundred wallets of them, and they are the only ones who did.
| Since June 24 | Amount | Count |
|---|---|---|
| Repaid | 230,205 | 305 wallets |
| Liquidated | 13,045 | 323 liquidations |
| Old or attacker | 0 |
07 · Why it mattersA book twelve times too big
Anyone who adds up what these books record gets 34.7 million. The real book is about a twelfth of that. Rate rises cannot shrink the rest, because no one is left to respond to them.
Our own study of Ethereum lending since 2021 counted the left-behind entries as loans. They are far too small to change any figure in it, and we now leave them out. Old Abracadabra markets also turn up in our piece on price feeds that stopped tracking the market.
08 · How we measuredWhat we counted, and what we left out
We replayed every loan, payment and deposit on them from their on-chain events, and checked each market's debt against its contract as of September 22, 2026. They matched in every case. We valued the backing at each market's own last price, and traced the 2024 move through the vault's records and the token moves in those calls.
MIM prices come from trades on Ethereum. We measured Ethereum only. The lender also lends on other chains, and we did not count those.
09 · The recordThe contracts behind the numbers
| What | Address |
|---|---|
| Old yvWETH market | 0x920d…3f9f |
| Its copy | 0xed51…0e09 |
| Old tricrypto market | 0x4eae…b3a0 |
| Its copy | 0x46f5…f82c |
| Attacker, market one | 0x7259…6a90 |
| Attacker, market two | 0x6928…b684 |
| Safe that moved the backing | 0x5adb…af16 |
| The move, March 30, 2024 | 0x08de…4824 |
| Exploit address | 0x87f5…78c9 |
Check any lending market in plain English
Every figure above came from data anyone can query. The Bitquery MCP server puts it behind an AI assistant, so you can ask who owes a market's debt, when a position was opened, or where a vault's collateral went, without writing the query yourself.
This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice.
The findings describe what Abracadabra's lending contracts on Ethereum record and the transactions that changed them. Markets on other chains are not measured. Collateral is valued at each market's own last price.
References to Abracadabra, MIM, Sushi, Yearn, Curve and any other party describe contract state and on-chain activity. They are not statements about the conduct of any person or company. The January 2024 exploit is described by the linked reporting; addresses are identified by their on-chain activity only.
Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from the use of this article.