The DeFi pool that says it's owed more DAI than exists
Some lending markets outlive the people who used them. Their borrowers are gone and their cash is gone, but the debt stays on the books and often keeps growing. We read what nine of them say they are owed.
- $12.0B
- 7.3B DAI
- $1.4B
- $2.2B
- 550%
01 · How a market diesCash gone, debt stays
One abandoned pool on Ethereum says it is owed 7.3 billion DAI. That is more DAI than exists. It is one of nine lending markets on smaller lenders that keep counting debt nobody will ever pay back.
A lending market holds deposits and lends them out. Its rate rises as its cash runs low, to push borrowers to repay and depositors to add more. If the borrower never comes back and the depositors have already taken what cash there was, nothing can bring it back. The rate sits at its top, and the unpaid interest is added to the debt each time the books are updated.
Our piece on Morpho's zombie markets found this on one of the biggest lenders. The same thing happens on the small ones, and for longer.
02 · The sizeFour times the real thing
We read what each market says it is owed, month by month, straight from its contract. Nine markets on smaller lenders are dead or broken in this way. At the end of 2021 they recorded $1.9 billion, almost all of it CREAM's frozen ETH market. Now the total is $12.0 billion.
The real debt of every smaller lender we track, with these markets left out, was about $2.9 billion on the same day. On paper, the dead markets are four times bigger.
| Market | Debt | Rate |
|---|---|---|
| Rari Fuse, Olympus DAI | $7.32B | 242% |
| Silo v2, USDC 155 | $2.24B | – |
| CREAM, ETH market | $1.44B | 0% |
| unFederalReserve, USDC | $549M | 550% |
| Rari Fuse, Tribe FEI | $328M | 161% |
| Strike, wstETH | $146M | 652% |
| Omni | $12.0M | – |
| Onyx, ETH market | $2.2M | 152% |
| Augmented Finance | $1.1M | – |
| All nine | $12.04B |
03 · The biggestRari's Olympus Pool Party
Rari's Fuse pools were hacked in April 2022. One of them, the Olympus Pool Party, still has a DAI market. It has no cash left and charges 242% per year, so the unpaid debt feeds on itself. Each time the books are updated, the interest is added to the loan, and the next round of interest is charged on that.
| Date | DAI owed |
|---|---|
| End of 2021 | 8.9 million |
| End of 2022 | 10.7 million |
| End of 2023 | 18.9 million |
| End of 2024 | 136 million |
| End of 2025 | 1.31 billion |
| Sep 22, 2026 | 7.32 billion |
| All DAI, same day | 4.61 billion |
The pool now says it is owed more than one and a half times all the DAI there is. Nobody will ever repay it. Another Fuse pool, Tribe Convex, records 345 million FEI, a stablecoin whose makers wound up in 2022.
04 · FrozenCREAM's ETH, frozen since 2021
CREAM was exploited in October 2021. The attack left its ETH market recording 524,731 ETH of debt. That number has not moved since, because the market's rate is zero. It never grows, and it never shrinks. At September's price it is about $1.4 billion.
05 · Still happeningA market that broke this year
Some dead markets are new. A USDC market on Silo v2 recorded $50 million of debt at the end of April, and its books were not updated again for months. When they were, in September, the recorded debt jumped to $2.2 billion in one step.
Its depositors' balances rose to match, to about $2.1 billion on paper, and they cannot withdraw any of it, because the market holds no cash.
06 · The restSmaller ghosts
unFederalReserve's USDC market charges 550% per year. Its books have not been updated for ten months, so the true paper figure is higher than the table shows. Strike's wstETH market charges more than 600% per year. Onyx, Omni and Augmented Finance add small sums between them.
07 · Why it mattersNumbers you should not add up
DefiLlama, the tracker we checked, shows almost nothing borrowed on these lenders, so it leaves them out. Anyone who adds up what Ethereum's lenders report on-chain, or reads one pool's own numbers, will find billions of debt that nobody will pay and deposits nobody can withdraw. In our data feature on Ethereum lending, these are left out of every total.
08 · How we measuredWhat we counted, and what we left out
We read each market's own total-debt figure at every month end since 2021, and again on September 22. One counts here when it has no cash to lend and its debt stays on the books or grows with no repayment. We valued each at that day's price. FEI is at $0.95, the price Aave's old market still uses for it.
A newer market on Fira also looked odd at first. Our event data shows more than a thousand borrows there this year, so it is live and left out. The recorded figures move only when someone triggers an update, so some are behind. We did not try to identify who borrowed.
09 · The recordThe markets behind the numbers
| Market | Address |
|---|---|
| Olympus Pool Party DAI | 0x8e4e…0d19 |
| Silo v2 USDC 155 | 0x1de3…9bc2 |
| CREAM crETH | 0xd065…60ee |
| unFederal USDC | 0x6b57…c87a |
| Tribe Convex Pool FEI | 0x001e…ca4f |
| Strike wstETH | 0x1ebf…e2c7 |
| Onyx ETH | 0x714b…0d79 |
| Omni pool | 0xebe7…12a9 |
| Augmented Finance pool | 0x9276…cdf1 |
Check any lending market in plain English
Every figure above came from data anyone can query. The Bitquery MCP server puts it behind an AI assistant, so you can ask when a market last saw a repayment, how much cash it holds, or whether its debt is growing on its own, without writing the query yourself.
This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice.
The findings describe what each market's contract records. Recorded debt is not money anyone expects to be repaid; it is shown to explain why it should be left out of totals. Figures move only when a market's books are updated.
References to Rari Capital, Fuse, Olympus, Tribe, Fei, CREAM, Silo, unFederalReserve, Strike, Onyx, Omni, Augmented Finance, Fira and any other party describe contract state. They are not statements about the conduct of any person or company. Borrowers are not identified.
Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from the use of this article.