Two Ocean Protocol signers approved the contract that took $1.51 million from frozen pools
Two trading pools on Ethereum had been locked for six years. We read the record of how they were finally emptied, and of who gave the permission.
- $1.51M
- 2 of 5
- 23
- 209
- 0.03 ETH
- 2023
01 · What happenedTwo old Ocean Protocol pools lost $1.51 million in one transaction
In 2020, people put money into two trading pools. Then the pools froze, and nobody could take it out. Six years later, all of that money left at once.
It happened on 20 November. The money was 875 WETH, worth about $1.51 million that afternoon. WETH is ether in the form of a token. Both pools paired it with an old version of OCEAN, the token of Ocean Protocol. The project builds tools for sharing and selling data, and it has replaced its token twice.
Firepan, a security firm, flagged the drain on X and called it a likely exploit. It said the attacker had minted two fake OCEAN tokens. Bitquery reads every transaction on Ethereum, so we read this one and the six years behind it.
Firepan's total is right. The tokens are not fake. They are the project's own retired tokens. And the permission to create new ones came from the project's own multisig wallet, a wallet that needs more than one key to act.
Two of that wallet's signers, the keys that approve what it does, gave the drain its permission that morning. We can show what each key signed and when. We cannot show who held the keys. When we checked, the project had published nothing about the drain.
02 · Three tokensOcean Protocol has had three versions of its token
A token on Ethereum is a small program, called a smart contract, that keeps a list of balances. A contract can give special powers to the wallet that controls it. One is the power to create new tokens, called minting, and another is the power to stop all transfers, which is called a pause.
The project launched OCEAN in 2019. In August 2020 it moved OCEAN to a new contract, to get ready for staking rewards, and asked holders to swap. A month after that, hackers stole tokens from the KuCoin exchange, and the team moved to a third contract to cut the stolen coins off. The third one is the token that trades today.
Each time, the team paused the contract it was leaving. A paused token cannot move. The balances are all still there, but no one can send them anywhere, and that includes the pools that held them.
| OCEAN contract | What happened to it |
|---|---|
| 2019 token | Paused 21 August 2020. Drained 20 November 2026. |
| August 2020 token | Paused 27 September 2020. Drained 20 November 2026. |
| Today's OCEAN | Never paused. The multisig gave up its powers in May 2023. |
The same multisig wallet controls all three contracts. In May 2023 it gave up its powers over today's token. It can no longer mint it, pause it or change it. It never did the same for the two old contracts. It stayed their owner and their minter.
03 · The frozen poolsWhy the pool holders could not get their money out
A Uniswap pool is a pot of two tokens that anyone can trade against. People who put tokens in get pool shares back. A share can later be cashed in for its slice of both tokens. No one owns these pools, and no one can freeze them.
The pause froze them anyway. To cash in a share, the pool has to send both tokens back, and since the pool could not send the old token, every withdrawal failed.
The last withdrawal that worked on the older pool went through 18 seconds before its token was paused. That morning, the team had warned holders to take their tokens out of Uniswap, or see them stranded. After the pause, people kept trying. We found 23 withdrawals that failed, the last one in February 2026. The WETH sat in the pools, owned by the shareholders and out of their reach.
04 · The multisigHow the project's multisig wallet works
A multisig wallet has several keys, and a set number of them must agree before it acts. This one has five keys, and any two of them can act together. Each key belongs to an address called a signer.
It works in two steps. One signer proposes a transaction, a second approves it, and the transaction runs the moment that second approval lands on chain. Over the years this wallet has minted tokens, swapped its signers and paused the old tokens.
Two signers matter here. We call them the first signer and the second signer. The second signer has approved this wallet's work since 2019. The first signer joined in August 2020, and before 20 November it had sent nothing since May 2023.
A multisig is only as safe as its keys and its add-ons. Earlier this month a different wallet lost money through an add-on that needed no signature at all.
05 · 20 NovemberThe morning of the drain, hour by hour
The first money came from Binance. Early that morning, Binance wallets sent small amounts of ETH to three wallets. Two had never been used: one became the drain wallet, and the other became an owner of a new Safe, a common type of multisig wallet. The third, an older wallet with 41 earlier transactions, created that Safe. The Binance names come from our labels.
A little after nine, the drain wallet put its contract on chain. Three minutes later, it sent the first signer a little ETH. That was enough to pay the fees for a few transactions.
About half an hour after that, the first signer proposed two transactions on the multisig. Each one, called addMinter, would make the drain contract a minter of one of the old tokens. A quarter of an hour later, the first signer sent some ETH back.
Then nothing happened for almost four hours. The second signer approved both proposals just before 14:00 UTC, and the drain landed 3 minutes later.
06 · The drainHow the mint emptied both pools
A pause stops transfers. It does not stop minting, so new tokens can still appear inside a paused contract. The drain used that gap.
The drain contract minted new tokens of each old version straight into its pool. The tokens never had to move to get there. Each mint took its token exactly to the most the contract allows.
Then the contract called swap() on each pool. A swap trades tokens already sitting in the pool, so the pools paid out their WETH as if someone had just sold them the new tokens. All of it went to the Safe, and only crumbs stayed behind. In the same transaction, the contract gave up its right to mint. Both tokens are now at their limit, so no one can mint more of either.
A pool share is a claim on the WETH in its pool, so the shareholders are the ones who lost. We counted them from every transfer of the shares, using our token holder data. In all, 209 wallets held shares when the pools were drained, and 22 of them held only tiny amounts, under $20 each.
Most of those wallets had put money in before the pause, and they took 71% of the loss. The others got their shares later from someone else, since no one could add to a frozen pool. The largest single loss was 165 WETH. The median wallet lost 0.80 WETH.
The rest of the WETH sat behind shares that nobody could claim. Some shares had gone back into the pools themselves, and some to addresses that destroy whatever they get.
07 · Two readingsWhat the chain cannot tell us about the keys
Two readings fit what we saw. In one, an outsider got hold of two signers' keys. In the other, the project's own signers did this on purpose. Nothing on chain separates the two.
Some facts sit closer to the first reading. The drain wallet paid the first signer's fees, and that signer sent ETH back. The money went to a Safe with no history before that day. The drain wallet, the Safe's creator and one Safe owner all got ETH from Binance within 11 minutes of each other. Keys do leak: a Telegram bot that kept its users' keys saw them used to empty wallets.
Other facts sit closer to the second reading. Two different signers acted, almost four hours apart. Both keys had signed for this multisig for years. The drain contract gave up its powers the moment it was done.
Firepan said this may be a whitehat operation, meaning a rescue by people who plan to give the money back. If so, the WETH could go back to the shareholders. When we last checked, it had not left the Safe.
08 · The methodHow we traced the drained pools
We read the drain transaction, the multisig's proposals and approvals, and each signer's history with Bitquery's address data. We also checked each fact on a public Ethereum node. That covers the pause dates, the token limits, the Safe's owners and every pool balance, at the block just before the drain and again a day later.
We rebuilt each pool's shareholders from every share transfer since the pools began. Their balances add up to the exact number of shares each pool had issued. Prices come from Bitquery's price data.
The money can be followed further with the Bitquery MCP. The full Ethereum history is also sold as files, as the Ethereum dataset on the Bitquery Data Store. For cases like this one, we also offer crypto investigation services.
Balances and contract settings were read at 11:44 UTC on 21 November 2026, at block 26,463,260. Anything after that is not covered.
The wallets are tied to each other by the transfers between them. We attribute them to nobody, and we cannot see who holds any key.
The project had published nothing about the drain that we could find when we checked. Its own account may differ.
Each share holder's loss is its share of the WETH taken, at the block before the drain. Shares held by the pools themselves, or by addresses that destroy what they receive, are counted apart.
A failed withdrawal counts when a pool's own withdrawal step was called and reverted. We did not count attempts that failed earlier, in a wallet or app.
The dollar value uses Bitquery's ETH price at the time of the drain.
09 · The recordThe addresses behind the drain
Follow the money in plain English
Every transfer in this story comes from Bitquery's data. The Bitquery MCP server puts that data behind an AI assistant, so you can ask where a wallet's money went without writing a query. The full history is also sold as files on the Bitquery Data Store, as the Ethereum dataset.
This article is provided for informational and educational purposes only and reflects analysis of publicly available on-chain data as of the dates indicated. It does not constitute legal, financial, compliance, or investment advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any token or asset, or to use or avoid any exchange, wallet, protocol or service.
The findings describe transactions and balances observed on Ethereum. Attributions come from on-chain behaviour and Bitquery's own labels; they may be incomplete or incorrect and may be revised as more data becomes available. Ocean Protocol has not published an account of these events that we could find, and its account may differ from what is described here.
References to Ocean Protocol, Uniswap, Firepan, Binance, KuCoin, Safe or any other named project, company or service describe what the public record shows and what those parties have said in public. They are not statements about any party's intent, security practices or conduct. Nothing here asserts that any named party, or any holder of a key, acted unlawfully or knew of the events described. The wallets that moved the money are described by their behaviour and attributed to nobody.
Nothing herein should be relied upon as a definitive determination of fact. Readers should conduct their own independent verification before taking any action. The authors and publisher accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this material. All trademarks and company names are the property of their respective owners.
Reported by Gaurav Agarwal for Bitquery Research, with AI tools; every figure was checked against the raw data.
FAQ
Was Ocean Protocol hacked?
We cannot say. Two signers of the project's own multisig wallet approved the contract that took the money. The chain shows which keys signed, but not who held them, and the project had not commented when we looked.
What happened to the old OCEAN pools on Uniswap?
A new contract became a minter of two retired versions of the token. It minted new tokens straight into two Uniswap V2 pools and swapped them for the WETH inside. The pools lost about $1.51 million in one transaction.
Were the OCEAN tokens in the drain fake?
No. Both are real versions of the project's token. It retired them in 2020 and moved to the one that trades today.
What is a multisig wallet?
A multisig wallet is a wallet with several keys, where a set number of them must agree before it acts. The one in this story has five keys, and any two can approve a transaction. Teams use them to share control of money or contracts.
Is today's OCEAN token affected?
No. The multisig gave up its powers over today's token in 2023, so it can no longer mint or pause it. The drain used only the two retired tokens.
Why could the pool holders not withdraw?
The project paused both old tokens in 2020. A paused token cannot move, and a withdrawal from a Uniswap pool has to send it. Every withdrawal after the pause failed.
Where is the money now?
In a Safe wallet created on the morning of the drain. Two of its three owners must agree to move it. It still held all the WETH when we last checked.
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